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ABSTRACT

HABERMAS AND THE FEMINIST ENGAGEMENT WITH COMMUNICATIVE
ETHICS: SOLIDARITY AND UTOPIAN INTERESTS AS A CORRECTIVE TO
NORMATIVE POLITICAL PROBLEMATICS

By
Taine Duncan
August 2010

Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Swindal.
My dissertation subjects Habermas to a critique inspired by ethical and political
feminist philosophy. Whereas Habermas believes particularized political interests are
foundational for communicative ethics, neo-Marxist feminists argue that he makes naïve
assumptions about the separation of public from private interests. Habermas, on one
hand, sees communication as politically oriented dialectics that culminates in rational
consensus and normative guidelines. Seyla Benhabib, on the other hand, claim that
Habermas‟ notion of consensus is obtained through false dialectical syntheses. In her
view, Habermas cannot preserve the utopian goals cherished by diverse and marginalized
members of society. Benhabib thus attempts to reconcile contemporary Critical Theory
with the utopian nature of a neo-Kantian inspired ethics. My first three chapters argue
that this feminist notion of utopianism is a helpful corrective to Critical Theory.
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My next chapter moves to Habermas‟ most recent explorations of the nature of
rational human beings themselves. Despite his interests in the individuating effects of the
lifeworld, he gives an increasingly formalistic account of human nature—one that is all
but solidified in the prenatal stage of life and thus determines potential political action in
the public sphere. From a feminist standpoint, I argue that his strictures limit what
normative ethics should actually engender, a notion of autonomy that contributes to
emancipation and political participation.
My final two chapters argue more positively that a relational ethics contributes to
an expansive understanding of human nature and intersubjective possibility. I explain
how conceptions of diversity and relationality can supply a rich formulation of solidarity
as the model for political action. I use Amy Allen, Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler to
reimagine an Arendtian inspired notion of solidarity, suggesting that the utopian spirit of
normative ethics can be only fairly achieved through a fluid process of working together
for shared interests. By synthesizing the feminist hopes for utopian ideals with the
concept of solidarity emergent from a relational ethics, I attempt to salvage Habermasian
concerns for a feminist project of cosmopolitanism and the foundation of an
emancipatory ethical society.
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Introduction
A Future for Feminist Critical Theory

There was no strain between them and that cannot be explained. Better not. For either
to try to. Not everything between two people can be laid before The Table for resolution.
That’s it.1—Nadine Gordimer.

Nadine Gordimer‟s The Pickup (2001) tells a thoroughly contemporary
transnational and intercultural love story. Gordimer weaves an elegant tale of the
meeting and relationship of Julie and Abdu (Ibrahim), spanning continents, traditions,
and a process of maturation and growth. This story illuminates the complexity of
intersubjective relationships, exposing the fundamental sharing of vulnerability at the
heart of any human relationship. Simultaneously, their relationship highlights the
irreconcilable differences that make every individual unique. Thematically, the novel
also works through issues of gender, class, race, religion, and nationality. These complex
and interwoven themes help to illuminate the core philosophical problems I deal with in
this dissertation. In my research and writing, I hold that philosophy works best as an
ever-developing and ever-changing dialogue with itself. In both Critical Theory and
feminism, this methodology of self-critical examination and evolution is not merely a
method, but integral to their respective philosophical systems. In what follows, I attempt
a critical examination of the dialogue between Habermas and feminist philosophers, but

1

Gordimer, Nadine. The Pickup. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001. p. 229.
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also among various feminist perspectives, ranging from Amy Allen and Bonnie Honig, to
Judith Butler and Carole Pateman. However, keeping in mind the requisite development
of critical reflection, I also offer an original analysis of substantive normativity, to which
Habermas‟ argument in The Future of Human Nature seems to lead. This analysis
culminates in a re-evaluation of autonomy in contemporary ethics. I contend that
autonomy is relevant to the feminist concerns of participation, universalization, and
innovation, which are all threatened by overly normatively conceived interests.
The general question that I am interested in answering is how to reconcile autonomy and
power in human freedom. More specifically, I address the intersection between the
theories of Habermas‟ communicative ethics and various feminist analyses of problems
emerging from such a normative ethics, in order to account for a positive notion of
autonomy founded in relational ethics. In my first chapter, I engage the neo-Marxist
feminist critique of Habermasian normativity as reifying the distinction between public
and private interests. In my next two chapters, I claim that Habermas‟ definition of
normativity depends on an overly optimistic account of rational consensus. Here, I am
most interested in uncovering the possibility for a utopian dimension in Habermasian
ethics. In chapters 4 and 5, I synthesize these feminist critiques to lay out my original
ethical position: a notion of human nature as embedded inextricably in relational ethics,
dependent on solidarity and the utopian imaginary. In chapter 6, I address the
relationship of the current movement in feminist philosophy to adopt and adapt Arendtian
theory, and I demonstrate the link Arendt affords between Habermas and feminist theory
on the basis of her conception of solidarity. Finally, I conclude by showing how revised
notions of human nature, autonomy, and ethics can restore Habermas‟ own project, as
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well as address the most important feminist concerns regarding normativity and rationally
based autonomy.
Let me outline my argument in a bit more detail. I begin chapter 1 by exploring
the relation between Habermas‟ depiction of particularized political interests as
foundational for communicative ethics and the neo-Marxist feminist critique of his naïve
assumptions about the separation of public from private interests. I am interested here in
critiques ranging from the relatively established radical critique of contractualism
espoused by Carole Pateman and Catherine MacKinnon, to the more nuanced views of
someone like Bonnie Honig, who is sympathetic to Habermas‟ interest in preserving a
clearly defined notion of rationally motivated society. I use these critiques as grounding
for my analysis of Habermas‟ overly Hegelian conception of a communicative and
politically oriented positive dialectics that culminates in rational consensus and normative
guidelines. Critical theoretical feminists like Seyla Benhabib believe that Habermas—to
his detriment—abandons the utopian goals of a Kantian inspired ethical system, in favor
of false dialectical syntheses. Benhabib especially attempts to reconcile contemporary
Critical Theory with the utopian nature of a neo-Kantian inspired ethics—salvaging
Critical Theory for a feminist, cosmopolitan, and global society. Once I have made the
argument that this feminist notion of utopianism could be a helpful corrective, I move to
Habermas‟ most recent explorations of the nature of rational human beings themselves, in
his books The Future of Human Nature and Between Naturalism and Religion. Here
Habermas argues that human nature is circumscribed by the individual‟s ability to
employ reason. Habermas continues to argue for an increasingly formalistic account of
human nature—one that is all but solidified in the prenatal stage of biological life, and
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determinate of potential political action in the public sphere. It is at this stage that I
introduce my original feminist analysis of Habermas‟ increasingly substantive
normativity. I argue that his strictures limit what normative ethics should actually
engender; namely, a notion of autonomy that contributes to emancipation and political
participation. I contend that Habermas‟ recent preoccupation with biological constraints
and reason undermines his own interests in the intersubjective nature of lived experience
and the ongoing process of subject formation. Instead, I argue that a relational ethics,
grounded first in the intersubjective, rather than the biological, formal, or abstractrational, contributes to an expansive understanding of human nature. I then explain that
this concept of human diversity and relationality, can ground a rich conception of
solidarity as the model for political action. Using feminist Critical Theorists like Amy
Allen and Drucilla Cornell, I explore the possibility that the utopian spirit of normative
consensus is fairly achieved only through a fluid process of working together for shared
interests. By synthesizing the feminist hopes for utopian ideals with the concepts of
solidarity that emerge from relational ethics, I then explore the possibility for salvaging
Habermasian concerns for cosmopolitanism and an emancipatory ethical society by
providing an inclusionary and proactive feminist grounding.

Introduction: Why Habermas and the Feminist Engagement with Communicative Ethics?
In the current academic atmosphere of theories concerning global politics,
terrorism and economic hegemony, an understanding of political discourse seems not
only important, but integral, to any attempt at understanding contemporary philosophy.
Issues of language, politics, freedom and human interaction which have been central to
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German philosophical thought throughout the history of philosophy are yet the subjects
with which contemporary philosophers are most concerned. Meanwhile, contemporary
philosophy is often faulted for being compartmentalized, with each theory or school
acting as though completely isolated from every other theory. When theories intersect,
generally they fail to fully engage one another, generating little or no productive
dialogue. Out of this contemporary climate and philosophical heritage, scholars such as
Habermas, Benhabib, Butler and Cornell reach beyond isolation and
compartmentalization to productively engage in critically challenging dialogue. Similarly
interested in intersubjective experience, political representation and the construction of
“society,” political feminism and Critical Theory have recognized their shared
background in Marxist and Socialist interests and created theories which lend themselves
to continuous debate.
On the side of Critical Theory, there is perhaps no more influential figure than
Habermas. Habermas‟ interest in theories of democracy, American pragmatism, and his
roots in The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory afford him a unique perspective on
ethics, politics, and the future of philosophic debate. His magnum opus The Theory of
Communicative Action, explains a system of discourse involving two equal interlocutors
whose discussion, situated in a normative sphere, produces the possibility for social and
political action. Several feminists contribute the other side of the dialogue, including, but
far from being limited to, Carole Pateman, Catherine MacKinnon, Seyla Benhabib,
Bonnie Honig, Nancy Fraser, Amy Allen, Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell. These
feminist political scholars are interested in the problematics of equal socio-political
dialogue, especially in a world where the distinction between public and private spheres

xiii

still takes precedence. The research presented here allows me to address several
philosophically important questions: How and why are these feminist critiques
interrelated? What might the shared interest in Habermas/Critical Theory indicate about
current trends in political feminism? Does the feminist confrontation with Habermas
offer a unique insight into a synthesis of various feminist ideals, issues and concerns?
By constructing a theoretical dialogue wherein these various feminist positions
can simultaneously engage one another, as well as Habermasian Critical Theory, I argue
that I can best relate to the core problems concerning discourse, autonomy and
intersubjectivity today. A cursory evaluation of the constructed Pateman-Benhabib
engagement indicates that the relationship of Habermasian communicative action to
political feminism is complex and potentially productive. Through my project, I seek to
uncover the complexities of this relationship. On a first order level, I offer a
philosophical exposition of Habermas‟ theory of communicative ethics and action as it
relates to political feminism. On a deeper level, through my analysis of the pervading
critiques of Habermas and normativity, I provide crucial linkages connecting the
disparate feminist theories to one another. As I explored the relationship between the
various feminist positions, I discovered the possibility for an innovative and integrative
approach to a Critical Theoretical feminist ethics.

Chapter 1: Feminism as Meta-Critical: The Redemption of the Other Major Antinomy in
Critical Theory
Whereas, traditional Critical Theory attempts to restore the primacy of the
antinomy between subject and object with society as mediation, political feminism,
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particularly that represented by Carole Pateman, attempts to restore the missing
antinomy—a critical approach to society itself via a recognition of the tension between
public and private. Feminists often recognize an internal problem of Marxist theory as
reinforcing the separation of public and private. However, this problematization usually
falls short of requiring a critical reinstatement of the antinomy between public and private
as potentially productive for the feminist critical position. Reinvigorating the project of a
critical approach to the private sphere, Pateman and MacKinnon have addressed the
specific concerns of the separation of a feminine/private dimension of society. As
Pateman writes in The Sexual Contract: “The civil individual and the public realm appear
universal only in relation to and in opposition to the private sphere, the natural foundation
of civil life.”2 Applying this notion of the importance of the private realm to a critique of
Habermas‟ system of communicative action, several tensions between Habermas‟ theory
and feminist concerns emerge. Pateman, MacKinnon and others contrast Habermas‟
notion of egalitarianism, universalization, and an emphasis on public discourse as
exclusionary of marginalized, individual and private concerns. However, this feminist
perspective may be limited as well; by developing a Critical Theory of the private as
foundational for the public, Pateman, in particular, risks a false reconcilement of the
antinomy in favor of the private sphere. Preserving the productive nature of this
antinomy, while ensuring that private interests do not collapse under the weight of the
generalized public sphere, requires a synthetic approach to Habermas‟ democratic realism
and feminist considerations of difference. In chapter 1, I make the argument that such a

2

Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. pp. 113-114.
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synthetic approach is an integral part of productive feminist critique in contemporary
Critical Theory.

Chapter 2: Raising the Stakes: Normativity and the Problem of Feminist Belonging
Exploring autonomy and intersubjectivity through feminist lenses requires an
analysis of power, representation, and an exploration of political legitimation. For
Habermas, these concepts are constrained theoretically by his narrow definition of
normativity as both the foundation for social relations, and the means through which
ethical society is ensured. In this chapter, I argue that Habermas‟ definition of
normativity is uniquely influential for feminist theories of autonomy, as both a challenge
to, and an inspiration for, feminist notions of difference, individuation, and participation.
The tension between feminist theories and a Habermasian notion of normativity further
exposes an internal tension within feminist Critical Theory: How can an emancipatory
theory simultaneously respect difference, while ensuring justification for social
participation? This dilemma develops explicitly in the influential feminist work Feminist
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange (1995), with contributions from Seyla Benhabib,
Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser. Ostensibly a debate between feminist
theorists on the usefulness of postmodern philosophy to feminist ethics and political
philosophy, this exchange is indicative of this central dilemma in establishing a feminist
Critical Theory. In order to develop this position, I articulate the progression of
Habermas‟ conception of normativity. Then, I relate this concept of normativity to both
the postmodern positions espoused by Butler and Cornell, as well as the more
conservative theoretical positions articulated by Benhabib and Fraser. I uncover how
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even the most stringent postmodern position Butler puts forward is still dependent on a
notion of discursivity with normative understanding at its core. Simultaneously, the most
sympathetic and Habermasian argument maintained by Benhabib exposes the difficulty
normative theory faces with particularity and difference. I end this chapter by analyzing
case studies, embodying the Critical Theoretical emphasis on relating theory and practice.
With both women‟s health care, and transnational feminist concerns for Afghani
emancipation, normative theories provide valuable means for evaluation and justification,
while at the same time tending towards anonymous universalization and disguising
particularized needs and problems. The theoretical alternative begins to emerge as a
relationally grounded ethics, neither abstracted in an absolute postmodern sense, nor
leveled by overly rationalist normative Critical Theory.

Chapter 3: Seeking Utopia: A Feminist Critical Analysis of Habermas’ Consensus
Orientation
In another vein of feminist discourse and debate, Seyla Benhabib and Bonnie
Honig approach the limitations of Critical Theory from a utopian perspective. Benhabib
studied under Habermas at the University of Frankfurt, and much of her work is
influenced by the time she spent there. Benhabib‟s work is uniquely important to my own
understanding of the debate between communicative action theory and American
feminists, because contrary to many feminist philosophers, Benhabib espouses a modified
version of Habermas‟ theory. For Benhabib, a system of Habermasian communicative
action resolves conflicts, answers moral and political questions, and balances self-interest
(private) with mutual understanding (public), albeit in a limited way given his emphasis
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on normativity. Benhabib believes Habermas recognizes and addresses the dichotomy
between public and private, but that his application and extension of political discourse is
limited by its consensus orientation. In this chapter, I emphasize these unique critical,
neo-Kantian perspectives by analyzing the tension between this consensus orientation and
utopian ethics in Habermas‟ discourse theory. According to Benhabib, and others,
Habermas—to his detriment—abandons the utopian goals of a Kantian inspired
philosophical ethics. Benhabib and Honig attempt to reconcile contemporary Critical
Theory with the utopian nature of a neo-Kantian inspired cosmopolitan ethics—salvaging
Critical Theory for feminist and global social considerations.
In her essay “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics”(1991), Benhabib
offers a critique using Habermasian ideas against Habermas himself. Her critique rests
on the grounds that Habermas over-determines the normatizing power of communicative
action in fulfilling truth ideals to the detriment of the utopian and emancipatory
transfiguring powers of critique. Explicit in her claims is a neo-Kantian and feminist
formulation of utopian universalization and emancipation as the primary outcomes of
critical philosophy. However, implicit in her claims lies a potentially illuminating
reconstruction of Habermasian communicative ethics as a philosophy of spirit rather than
critique. In this chapter, I uncover Habermas‟ Hegelian tendencies in Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990). Then, by examining Benhabib‟s
critique of fulfillment-oriented philosophy, I argue that Habermas‟ description of
normativity is not only linked more to his Hegelian heritage of philosophies of spirit than
to his critical allegiance with Kantianism, but that it also abandons the central critical
theoretical goal of emancipation. It is precisely emancipation and transfiguration that
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allow for a feminist Critical Theory to emerge, and by recreating the philosophical
historical lineage of Habermas‟ thought, I reconfigure a contemporary Critical Theory
that synthesizes Habermasian concepts with the ethical, political, and practical theoretical
aspects of feminist critique. I end this chapter with an analysis of practical and
theoretical issues illuminated by a case example of immigration legislation, culminating
in a developed feminist utopian position using Honig‟s, Benhabib‟s, and Pateman‟s
theories of cosmopolitanism.

Chapter 4: The Future of Human Nature: A Critical Analysis of Habermas and the
Ethics of Expanding Human Nature
In this chapter, I contend that Habermas‟ concerns with normativity and
autonomy become too restrictive when it comes to controversial issues such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis. In this case, his strictures limit normatively guaranteed
autonomy by constricting parental decision-making and confining the free choice of the
individual within biological and genetic constraints. Using critical theorists Amy Allen,
Cristina Lafont, and Nikolas Kompridis, in conjunction with care ethicists such as
Virginia Held, I propose that in order to evaluate the ethics of medical enhancement, the
definition of "human nature" must be expanded to recognize the cultural, psychological,
and self-constitutive forces that contribute to the creation of personhood.
In The Future of Human Nature (2003), Habermas‟ argument hinges on the
notion of biological nature—he proposes that genetic interference is ultimately
irreversible and final in the constitution of a person. However, Habermas' strict
definition of human nature and its future possibilities restricts the potential for

xix

reevaluating the very notion of human nature, and subjectivation. A feminist revision of
the notion of existential personhood simultaneously respects the decision-making ability
of the individual, while recognizing the expanded notions of human nature and parental
responsibility. In this chapter, I begin with a careful analysis of Habermas' core
argument in The Future of Human Nature, providing an examination of challenges to his
project, notably from Lafont on the role of parental responsibility and Kompridis on
normativity. Once the core argument is established, I provide an analysis of an
alternative ethical foundation through a modification of relational care ethics. In this
way, I challenge the fundamental assumption that genetic enhancement limits autonomy
by proposing that a responsible medical ethics including genetic enhancement may
instead expand existential freedom. This deeper understanding of the relation between
bodies, social recognition and our self-identity is of important concern to a feminist
project of Critical Theory. Genetic intervention may have a determinative influence on
physiology, but Habermas‟ account also indicates his belief that it is determinative of
subjective identity. This position undermines his own acceptance of communicative
action as self-empowering, and ultimately intersubjective.

Chapter 5: Mourning and Vulnerability: What Butler and Cornell Offer to Habermas’
Theories of Human Nature
Central to Habermas‟ conception of autonomous subjects is not only the genetic
formation of the biological self, but also the psychological development of the
ethical/moral adult. These themes were most important for Habermas‟ reflections on
Lawrence Kohlberg and psychology, but returning to these ideas is additionally useful for
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feminist correctives to the overly normative and biological-formal accounts Habermas
has more recently espoused. In this chapter, I continue the exploration of human nature I
began in chapter 4, focusing predominately on Habermas‟ arguments in Between
Naturalism and Religion (2008). Here Habermas contends that subjectivation is
motivated by the recognition that comes from rational consensus. This overly rationalist
version of Habermas‟ theory of autonomy seems to occlude the dynamic and complex
psychological characteristics of Habermas‟ earlier conceptions of subjectivity. Here, I
use Cornell and Butler to reintroduce a psychological component of subjectivity. Unlike
the overly rationalist conception of subjectivation, the subject Cornell and Butler propose
is primarily dynamic and future oriented. It is continually in a process of subjectivation,
one which relies on both intersubjective recognition, and on personal imagination. With
this fuller conception of intersubjectivity and imagination, I contend that participation in
the public sphere becomes not only possible, but additionally meaningfully oriented
towards a utopian future of greater emancipation.
As an alternative to recognition through rational-consensus, Butler proposes a
Levinasian conception of recognition through vulnerability and mourning. The Other is
an embodied subject, and like oneself, that body and that psychology is vulnerable to
harm. This fundamental vulnerability connects all subjects, across national, cultural and
gender divides, ensuring that subjects are recognized even when we cannot make rational
sense of them. By combining this conception of vulnerability to Cornell‟s conception of
imagination and forgiveness, which allow us to conceptualize new and illimitable
emancipatory ideals, subjectivation and intersubjectivity are redefined. Highlighting the
potentials for emancipation, and future possibility, I argue that these theories allow for
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the development of a new concept of autonomous participation. Through recognition and
imagination, the desire for change becomes real. With this desire, I argue, comes a
motivation for solidarity. I then articulate how a concept of solidarity functions as an
alternative to public participation through rationally motivated normative consensus,
working to combine the impulse to relational ethics I found emergent in feminist critiques
of rationality, with a utopian conception of subjectivation and autonomy.

Chapter 6: Arendtian Solidarity: What Hannah Arendt Offers to a Feminist Critique of
the Public Sphere
For the development of a utopic and relational ethics of solidarity, I trace the
formulation of solidarity to another historical line of development from German political
philosophy. Highlighting the ways in which Hannah Arendt has been reimagined for an
explicitly feminist project of contemporary Critical Theory, in this chapter I work to
define Arendtian solidarity in contradistinction to Habermasian normativity. In order to
do so, I first identify the affinities Habermas‟ and Arendt‟s theories have with one
another; not only are they both indebted to a thoroughly German conception of the public
sphere, wherein the weight of the history of the Holocaust features prominently
(explicitly and implicitly), but they are also both theorists that emphasize the material and
practical in relationship to theory. This affinity ties them to one another, as well as to the
feminist theoretical positions which, I argue, will reinvigorate Critical Theory for 21st
Century thought.
This construction is not only viable as an abstraction of theoretical affinities;
contemporary feminist philosophers have reclaimed Arendtian theory explicitly. Amy
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Allen, as well as Honig and Benhabib, find Arendt a kindred theorist. Additionally,
Arendt‟s careful articulation of a theory of solidarity combines sensitivity to a utopic
future with a pragmatic groundedness in material reality. Arendt I contend that this
synthesis can be interpreted to function as the important linkage between the feminist
theories of difference and postmodernism with the feminist theories of universalism and
pragmatism.
In order for a neo-Arendtian conception of solidarity to accomplish this weighty
task, however, the characteristics and applications of solidarity must be carefully laid out.
In chapter 6, I provide the philosophical history of Arendtian solidarity, and working
from this groundwork, I articulate a particular formulation of a relationship of solidarity.
By highlighting the pluralistic possibilities of solidarity, I argue that a contentious
relationship of intergendered, international, or intercultural solidarity may serve to both
ensure autonomous difference and universal emancipatory possibility.
Keeping in mind the notion of concerted activity as a specific application of
political power, solidarity fits well into the sort of transfiguration Benhabib calls for in a
system of utopian Communicative ethics. If transfiguration is the “new and imaginative
constellation of the values and meanings of the present,”3 is solidarity not also a
transfigurative power? Solidarity, as a political activity, is directly opposed to the notion
of unchallenged fulfillment of norms. Additionally, to remain true to Arendtian theory,
constellations of political agents working in the interests of solidarity must remain fluid
constellations. Solidarity retains its full power by opening itself to as-yet-unseen
3

Benhabib, Seyla. “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics.” Critical Theory: The Essential

Readings. Ed. by David Ingram and Julia Simon-Ingram. St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991. p.
389.
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interests and as-yet-unheard voices in the political arena. Following Honig, if Arendtian
politics maintains a Derridean duality, than a refreshed concept of Arendtian solidarity
would also provide the “double-gesture”—solidarity works towards the protection of
generalizable interests; however, as a form of ongoing political action, rather than ideal
fulfillment, solidarity is also open to the influence of individual political actors.

A Future for Feminist Critical Theory: “Not everything between two people can be laid
before The Table for resolution.”
In The Pickup, Gordimer gives a fictionalized account of a complex and fluid
intergendered love relationship. The Pickup illustrates the necessity for change, even
when the intersubjective relationship is only between two people. Although the changes
are precipitated by the development of psychological needs rather than overtly political
needs, Gordimer draws a parallel between the psychical and the political that I contend is
central to understanding autonomy and intersubjectivity. At the beginning of the novel,
Julie and Abdu are motivated to begin a sexual relationship in order to fulfill reciprocal
needs for belonging and family. Julie feels distant from her own South African family
and feels explicitly expelled by her wealthy, White, and patriarchal father. In order to
construct a familial bond outside the confines of her privileged categories of race and
class, Julie seeks companionship from Abdu. As an illegal immigrant day laborer, Abdu
seems to need the same sort of sense of belonging. In a foreign place, under an assumed
name, and with no permanent address, Abdu is cut off from social and family relations of
belonging. So Abdu and Julie work together to fill these needs for one another. This
relationship works only because Abdu and Julie recognize a mutual vulnerability and a

xxiv

reciprocal need in one another. Equally importantly, they do not allow this recognition to
fool them into absolute understanding of one another, or to allow the relationship to
consume them. Instead, Julie and Abdu misunderstand one another at times, have hidden
motivations for some of their actions, and strive to keep an autonomous individual
existence. Julie keeps a group of friends that she knows Abdu does not particularly
understand or approve of, while Abdu maintains certain Muslim cultural practices, for
example, by not drinking alcohol. However, once the desire for familial belonging has
been met, at least in a qualified sense, both Julie and Abdu develop other needs and seek
to have them fulfilled by the other.
By the end of the novel, Julie and Abdu are married and living in Abdu‟s—now
Ibrahim‟s—home country. There, Ibrahim is reunited with his immediate family, and
rekindles traditional familial bonds, particularly with his mother. Meanwhile, Julie forms
her own bonds with his family and her newly adopted community. The need for
belonging slowly develops and changes into a desire for individual fulfillment. Ibrahim
desires a challenging and more fulfilling job, and wishes to emigrate again. Julie desires
to invest in an oasis in the desert, so she can cultivate her own crops, wishing to stay in
Ibrahim‟s homeland. After various misunderstandings, disagreements, and fights,
Ibrahim and Julie tacitly agree to let Ibrahim immigrate to the U.S., while Julie remains.
The novel ends ambiguously, leaving the reader unsure if Ibrahim and Julie will reunite
in either the U.S. or the desert, or even if either of them would wish to reunite. To my
mind, this is the perfect ending for illustrating the necessity for truly intersubjective
relationships to remain fluid. Now that Julie and Ibrahim are attaining individual
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fulfillment, the potentials for their relationship remain open to accommodating future
needs and the corresponding changes that will be required of their relationship.
Meaningful life is both grounded in a historically contingent present and oriented
towards a transfiguring future. In feminist Critical Theory, this combination is of utmost
concern, resulting in debate, dialogue, and contention. However, in the lived human
relationships we find reflected in good literature, this apparent antagonism is a central
component to understanding the meaning of lived experience. Gordimer‟s Julie
ruminates:
No, no…that‟s not what I‟m trying to…Water‟s—water is change; and the desert doesn‟t. So
when you see the two together, the water field of rice growing, and it‟s in the desert—there‟s a
span of life right there—like ours—and there‟s an existence beyond any span. You know? 4

Although Ibrahim misinterprets Julie as attempting to argue for God‟s existence, I believe
that Gordimer‟s point, through Julie, is that human existence must encompass past,
present, and future. Life must be grounded, like the desert, and open to transfiguration,
like an oasis of water. And the real magic occurs where both elements occur together.
This essential revelation mirrors the feminist philosophical attempt to reconcile thatwhich-is with the yet-to-come. This supports Cornell‟s point that human imagination is
central to Critical Theory, that openness to future possibility is necessary for
emancipation. But this also supports Benhabib‟s more Habermasian claim that
emancipation rests on human rights, which must emerge in a specific historical-political
time and place.
Not only must the feminist theorist be mindful of the relationship of present and
future to contingency and change, but for Critical Theory reemerge consistent with
feminist theories of solidarity and utopic concerns, then particularization and
4
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universalization must be similarly accounted for. Butler makes this possible through her
theory of recognition in mutual vulnerability. Gordimer also expresses the feeling of this
destabilizing intersubjectivity. She describes the psychological reflection on physical
intimacy:
The capacity returned to him, for this foreigner makes him whole. That night he made love to her
with the reciprocal tenderness—call it whatever old name you like—that he had guarded against—
with a few lapses—couldn‟t afford its commitment, in this situation, must be able to take whatever
the next foothold might offer. That night they made love, the kind of love-making that is another
country, a country of its own, not yours or mine. 5

For me, this passage expresses that, not only is recognition a result of seeing the
vulnerability of the Other, but that it is equally the result of sharing in that vulnerability—
making a shared space from that vulnerability. Here the metaphor of a country of its own
highlights how important this recognition is, not only for feminist considerations of
intergendered6 relations, but also how important recognition is in the face of an
increasingly cosmopolitan and transnational society.
Despite this optimism for the potential for feminist philosophy to account for
theoretical tensions in Critical Theory, feminist philosophy must be wary of settling for
an absolute or final Theory-as-such. Feminist Critical Theory must be oriented toward
critique, evaluation, and reinterpretation to retain its essential critical and emancipatory
potential. In general, philosophy works best as an ever-developing and ever-changing
dialogue with itself. In both Critical Theory and feminism, this methodology of selfcritical examination and evolution is not merely structural, but integral to their respective
philosophical systems. To this end, I hope to provide a critical examination of the
5
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dialogue, not only between Habermas and feminist philosophers, but also among various
feminist perspectives. Employing the critical methodology, I will offer a historically
relevant explanation of the contemporary Critical Theory and feminist engagement;
however, keeping in mind the requisite development of critical methodology, I will also
offer my own original analysis of substantive normativity and the possible reevaluation of
autonomy in a contemporary ethics—a notion of autonomy which is relevant to the
feminist concerns of participation, universalization, and innovation, otherwise threatened
by overly normatively construed interests. In this way, this dissertation offers something
new to the discourses of Critical Theory and feminist theory, and to applications of both
in the field of ethics.
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Chapter 1
Feminism as Meta-Critical:
The Redemption of the Other Major Antinomy in Critical Theory

Working from a Marxist feminist perspective, Carole Pateman has written
extensively on critical appraisals of contract theory and the situation of private life in the
contemporary political state. The intersection between the theories of Habermas‟
communicative action and Pateman‟s analysis of contract theory is particularly
interesting from both sides of the Critical Theory and political feminism dialogue.
Following one vein of a constructed theoretical intersection, in this chapter I seek to
provide the framework for Habermas‟ treatment of society as a constitutive component of
his theory of communicative action, compare that to Pateman‟s problematization of the
public/private distinction and, finally, to evaluate this comparison within feminist
scholarship both supportive of and critical to Habermas‟ usefulness for feminist analysis
of the antinomy between public and private.

Habermas’ Indebtedness to Adorno
To understand fully the framework within which Habermas develops his notion of
society in communicative action, it is necessary to provide a brief exegesis of Adorno‟s
theory of negative dialectics. In his theory of negative dialectics, Theodor Adorno

1

reinforces the productive possibilities of philosophical critique based on the recognition
of irresolvable antinomies. Rather than proposing a theory of dialectics based on
“reconcilement”—as Adorno accuses the Idealists of doing—Adorno rejects a totalizing
trajectory of philosophy in favor of a critical analysis of the tension between subject and
object.7 Proper employment of the negative dialectic involves the understanding that
neither reconciliation nor absolute separation is fully appropriate to Critical Theory:
The separation of subject and object is both real and illusory. True, because in the cognitive realm
it serves to express the real separation, the dichotomy of the human condition, a coercive
development. False, because the resulting separation must not be hypostasized, not magically
transformed into an invariant. 8

In his humbled approach to philosophy, Adorno claims he “redeems” theory by
introducing a critical approach. Although Adorno recognizes that the antinomy cannot be
resolved, he contends it can be restructured and reformulated. This restructuring and
recognition of the tension necessary for irresolvable antinomies is “one of the strongest
motives of nonidealist [negative] dialectics.”9
If one were to take Adorno‟s system of negative dialectics most seriously, then
critical philosophy must be performed on his own work in order to redeem the theory of
negative dialectics itself. Taking up this task, Habermas critically engages the system of
negative dialectics. Analyzing the efficacy of this system, Habermas is most concerned
with the prospects of a critical understanding of society. Initially, Habermas agrees with
the negative dialectical emphasis on the mediating capacity of society; however,
Habermas identifies problems with Adorno‟s treatment of mediation as incomplete:
7
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This dialectic makes us aware of the untruth of both positions, and this raises the question of their
mediation. The thesis developed in Dialectic of Enlightenment does not direct our thought to the
path that is nearest at hand, a path which leads through the inner logics of the different complexes
of rationality and through processes of societal rationalization divided up according to universal
aspects of validity, and which suggests a unity of rationality beneath the husk of an everyday
practice that has been simultaneously rationalized and reified. 10

Habermas indicates that although Adorno and Horkheimer do not themselves follow the
trajectory “nearest at hand,” a path utilizing “societal rationalization” would be more
direct and productive for negative dialectics. In his critique of Adorno, Habermas claims
that Adorno‟s notion of society and its operations is incomplete—it does not maintain
enough interest in the role of communication as a productive element of society.11
According to Habermas, Adorno manages simultaneously to downplay the productive
role of communication, while falsely elevating the role of reified consciousness in place
of true intersubjectivity in society:
After this, if you will, „idealist‟ retranslation of the concept of reification into the context of the
philosophy as consciousness, Horkheimer and Adorno give such an abstract interpretation of the
structures of reified consciousness that it covers not only the theoretical form of identifying
thought but even the confrontation of goal-oriented acting subjects with external nature…With
this they take back in part the abstraction they made at first, namely the detachment of thought
from the context of reproduction. Instrumental reason is set out in concepts of subject-object
relations. The interpersonal relation between subject and subject, which is decisive for the model
of exchange, has no constitutive significance for instrumental reason.12

In Habermas‟ estimation, the concept of societal subjects is necessarily split in Adorno‟s
theory; just as subject is differentiated from object, so too is society differentiated from
nature.13 Habermas claims that his own notions of communicative action would provide
the proper mediation between societal subject and the natural world—allowing for both
natural materialism and intersubjective discourse. In other words, for Habermas
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communicative action is the proper goal of intersubjective communication in society:
“This model has ushered in a communications-theoretic turn that goes beyond the
linguistic turn of the philosophy of the subject. What interests me in the present context
is not the philosophical significance of this turn, but the caesura that the end of the
philosophy of the subject means for the theory of society.”14 By replacing a theory of
absolute subjectivity with a theory based on intersubjectivity, Habermas proposes a
system he claims to be free of marginalization, relativism and misunderstanding. Further,
this understanding of intersubjectivity creates the grounds for what Habermas deems the
lifeworld. For Habermas, the lifeworld represents the environment and outcome of
intersubjective experience. Recognizing the importance of both the environmental
foreground against which cultural practices and interactions are established, as well as the
cultural environment that develops from such interactions, Habermas suggests the
concept of a lifeworld to represent this complex interaction between subjects, their
environment, and one another.

Universalization in the Public Sphere
Intersubjectivity for Habermas includes both the notion of actual intersubjectivity,
as well as the discursive possibilities of intrapsychic communication. In making a call
for a critical understanding of both the intersubjective and intrapsychic, Habermas seems
to indicate his own interest in both private and social interests.15 In fact, Habermas
explicates a desire to analyze critically the reciprocal relationships between private and
public interests in Between Facts and Norms when he writes: “We will see that the social
14
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changes leading to an awareness of the paradigm shift make it necessary to conceive the
relation between private and political autonomy no longer as an opposition but as a nexus
of reciprocal connections.”16 According to Habermas, private law is traditionally
conceived of incorporating a “certain set of rights and institutions”; these rights originally
included personal rights, freedom to enter into contracts, and property rights.17 He goes
on to say, however, that private law has changed to correspond with socio-ethical
interests—indicative of reciprocity between the private and public. He recognizes the
conceptual importance of making a formal distinction between the public and private,
but, using the changes in the reciprocity of private law and public interest as examples,
Habermas argues that the relationship between the public and private is more complicated
than an actual separation.18 In other words, although the public and private are
increasingly collapsed as a result of the development of reciprocity in contemporary
society, Habermas understands that the public and private can neither be entirely
synthesized, nor completely distinguished.
In his attempt to provide evidence for reconciliation in a system of intersubjective
communication, Habermas returns again to the notions of universal accessibility and
compulsion-free society:
The structures of reason to which Adorno merely alludes first become accessible to analysis when
the ideas of reconciliation and freedom are deciphered as codes for a form of intersubjectivity,
however utopian it may be, that makes possible a mutual and constraint-free understanding among
individuals in their dealings with one another, as well as the identity of individuals who come to a
compulsion-free understanding with themselves—sociation without repression.19
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The idealistic concept of “sociation without repression” seems incompatible with the
contemporary understanding of power relationships; however, Habermas does not
altogether abandon the notion of actualizing compulsion-free understanding. Instead,
Habermas places the onus of responsibility on free citizens to determine the functional
relationship between the private and the public.20 In actual, material existence agreement
and universalization must be determined in specific, particular instances. As Habermas
explains: “It must therefore be decided from case to case whether and in which respects
factual (or material) equality is required for the legal equality of citizens who are both
privately and publicly autonomous.”21 Based on his theory that universalization can be
determined for each particular instance of communicative action, Habermas believes that
any problems with the reciprocity of public and private stem from forced normalizations,
and could be avoided through careful expression of agreed-upon boundaries. Habermas
clarifies this concept of normativity:
This nexus of reciprocal references provides an intuitive standard by which one can judge whether
a regulation promotes or reduces autonomy. According to this standard, enfranchised citizens
must, in exercising their public autonomy, draw the boundaries of private autonomy in such a way
that it sufficiently qualifies private persons for their role of citizen. This is because
communication in a public sphere that recruits private persons from civil society depends on the
spontaneous inputs from a lifeworld whose core private domains are intact. At the same time, the
normative intuition that private and public autonomy presuppose each other informs public dispute
over the criteria for securing the equal autonomy of private persons, that is, criteria that specify
what material preconditions of legal equality are required at a given time. 22

For Habermas, therefore, what constitutes the public and private realms is determined by
communicatively-participating citizens. Through discourse, citizens determine the
historically constituted criteria for the equal autonomy of private individuals. In this
theory, then, not only are the public and private realms determined by communication,
20
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but also the autonomous capacity of participants is communicatively dictated. With his
recurrent emphasis on the role of universal participation ensuring universal agreement
and equality, Habermas indicates that the validity of norms is determined by the universal
appeal of practical discourse: “According to discourse ethics, a norm may claim validity
only if all who might be affected by it reach (or would reach), as participants in a
practical discourse, agreement that this norm is valid.”23
In addition to the notion of universalization, Habermas claims that reflexivity is
also necessary to achieve the goal of consensus, indicating a positive relationship with
dialectic reasoning: “By entering into a process of moral argumentation, the participants
continue their communicative action in a reflexive attitude, with the aim of restoring a
consensus that has been disrupted.”24 Habermas admits that his notion of reflexivity,
however, can only occur within a publicly constituted discourse: “Only these public
presuppositions are comparable to the transcendental preconditions on which the Kantian
analysis was focused. Only of them can one say that they are inescapable
presuppositions of irreplaceable discourses and in that sense universal.”25 Despite his
recognition of public and private elements of society, and his emphasis on the necessity
for a critical appraisal of society, Habermas continually reiterates the importance of
universalization via public discourse—a leveling that arguably eliminates the importance
of the private. Not only is the public element of society granted a greater importance in a
Habermasian system of communicative action, but the effective system is also necessarily
23
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controlled by institutional forces in public society. Even when not actively participating
in communication, an individual is subject to the ethical foundations and ramifications of
public communicatively-oriented society. Habermas makes the further claim that
individual choice is merely an abstraction from a socially constituted lifeworld: “As long
as he is alive at all, a Robinson Crusoe existence through which the skeptic could
demonstrate mutely and impressively that he has dropped out of communicative action is
inconceivable, even as a thought experience.”26
Anticipating feminist criticisms of discursively constituted autonomy, Habermas
carefully lays the groundwork for a discussion of political feminism within the
framework of communicative action. Habermas concisely describes the feminist view in
terms of the legal debate in defining private and public spheres. Habermas claims that
this feminist perspective is part of a movement he calls the “women‟s struggle for
equality.”27 For Habermas, feminist concerns are all related to notions of public equality.
According to his reading of feminist theory, women must speak in the public realm to
ensure proper treatment of the private notions of gender identity and difference. The
onus of responsibility is again placed on active participants; feminist equality is ensured
by women‟s public participation.
Despite Habermas‟ careful consideration of intersubjectivity, the lifeworld, and
social interests in his theory of communicative action, many feminists view Habermas‟
treatment of society as a leveling force, rather than the appropriate grounds for a critical
appraisal of the dichotomy between public and private. In her book The Sexual Contract,
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Carole Pateman provides a compelling argument for the necessity of reinstating a
productively motivated understanding of this missing critical antinomy in social theory.

Pateman and the Foundation of the Private
Like Habermas, Carole Pateman recognizes the distinction in legal and social
society between public and private. However, unlike Habermas, Pateman believes this
dichotomy to be much more philosophically relevant to emancipation than
universalization; in fact, Pateman believes that political society inherently neglects
aspects of private society because of the incorrect assumption that private society is
irrelevant to the public sphere.28 Pateman recognizes that the missing critical appraisal of
the private is necessary for understanding the actual state of affairs in political discourse.
Marie Fleming notes the importance of Pateman‟s analysis, claiming that, “In an
impressive analysis she demonstrates that, notwithstanding the objections made by some
feminists—Okin, for example—the coexistence of public equality and private inequality
is not a contradiction of the modern „fraternal‟ patriarchy, but part of a „coherent social
structure‟.”29 For Pateman, and many other feminists, a critical analysis of the private
sphere is not merely theoretically relevant, but relevant for consideration of actual social
inequality. As in Adorno‟s recognition of the dual relationship between subject and
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object, Pateman recognizes the reciprocal relationship two sides of the social antinomy
have with one another:
The two spheres of civil society are at once separate and inseparable. The public realm cannot be
fully understood in the absence of the private sphere, and similarly, the meaning of the original
contract is misinterpreted without both, mutually dependent, halves of the story. 30

This reciprocal relationship, according to Pateman, extends beyond merely providing two
sides of a basic concept of society. The reciprocal interaction of public and private is
exactly that point on which political society has been founded. On the surface, Pateman‟s
description of mutually dependent halves of the social sphere seems analogous to
Habermas‟ characterization. However, Pateman goes on to argue that traditional
characterizations—including those quite similar to Habermas—tend to oversimplify the
private sphere in order to account for private interests within the public sphere. Instead,
Pateman suggests that the private sphere is complex and although dependent upon, not
collapsible into, public society.
Understanding this reciprocal relationship as the foundation for society, Pateman
recognizes that the exclusion of women from the public realm rests on the simultaneous
relationship and distinction that exists between public and private, a complex relationship
which is not only critically ignored, but often misrepresented to the detriment of the
private realm:
The private sphere is „forgotten‟ so that the „private‟ shifts to the civil world and the class division
between private and public. The division is then made within the „civil‟ realm itself, between the
private, capitalist economy or private enterprise and the public or political state, and the familiar
debates ensue.31

For Pateman, the legal debate over private interests in a public society camouflages the
actual distinction between public and private. „Private interests‟ in the legal realm are
30
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merely capitalist interests within the narrow spectrum of private businesses, opposed to
the „public interests‟ of larger corporations or politics. The actually existent private
realm of society, however, is much more closely connected to the notions of “nature,”
“woman,” and the “individual”:
Women are incorporated into a sphere that both is and is not in civil society. The private sphere is
part of civil society, but is separated from the „civil‟ sphere. The antinomy private/public is
another expression of natural/civil and women/men. The private, womanly sphere (natural) and
the public, masculine sphere (civil) are opposed but gain meaning from each other, and the
meaning of the civil freedom of public life is thrown into relief when counterposed to the natural
subjection that characterizes the private realm…What it means to be an „individual‟, a maker of
contracts and civilly free, is revealed by the subjection of women in the private sphere. 32

By recognizing the reciprocal relationship of the private and public spheres, and by
offering a critical analysis of this relationship, Pateman reintroduces the importance of a
relationship between nature and civil society. Habermas, too, recognized this
relationship; he criticized Adorno for ignoring the importance of the societal subject
against the natural world. However, Habermas‟ notion of lifeworld as the proper
reconciliation of the societal subject and the natural world serves as another leveling of
the differences between intersubjective experience in public society and the personal
experience of the private world.33
Pateman‟s notion of subjection reintroduces the possibility of mediation between
the two sides of the private/public antinomy. Where Adorno identified the subject being
32
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socially constructed and the object being socially named, Pateman identifies the structure
of society in which the initial subjugation of women in the private sphere of the home
parallels the subjugation of women in political discourse of the public sphere: “Women
are subject to men in both the private and public spheres; indeed, men‟s patriarchal right
is the major structural support binding the two spheres into a social whole.”34 The notion
of patriarchal subjugation in both realms finds support in the misunderstanding for the
role of sexual difference in society:
The structure of our society and our everyday lives incorporates the patriarchal conception of
sexual difference. I shall show how the exclusion of women from the central category of the
„individual‟ has been given social and legal expression and how the exclusion has structured the
contracts with which I am concerned. Despite many recent legal reforms and wider changes in the
social position of women, we still do not have the same civil standing as men, yet this central
political fact about our societies has rarely entered into contemporary discussions of contract
theory and the practice of contract.35

Contrary to Habermas‟ view that the public realm can allow for political equality
regardless of gender difference, Pateman‟s reintroduction of subjugation as mediating
both the private and the public suggests that difference and subjugation necessarily
impact all aspects of society.
Despite the seemingly altruistic and equality-based interests of Habermas‟ theory,
his claims for political equality obviate the underlying existence of inequality in the
private realm—an inequality which seeps out into the inherently related political/public
aspects of society. Pateman goes on to claim that theories of the kind to which Habermas
seems to subscribe, at best relegate issues of patriarchy to private consideration, and, at
worst, completely ignore the reciprocal impact of patriarchal subjugation in both realms:
To argue that patriarchy is best confronted by endeavoring to render sexual difference politically
irrelevant is to accept the view that the civil (public) realm and the „individual‟ are
uncontaminated by patriarchal subordination. Patriarchy is then seen as a private familial problem
34
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that can be overcome if public laws and policies treat women as if they were exactly the same as
men…The most dramatic example of the public aspect of patriarchal right is that men demand that
women‟s bodies are for sale as commodities in the capitalist market; prostitution is a major
capitalist industry.36

By refusing to acknowledge the role of patriarchal domination in the public sphere, and
by attempting to level any notion of sexual difference, Habermas is guilty of allowing his
theory of communicative action the power to misappropriate the power of creativity. For
Pateman, as a neo-Marxist, all humans are fundamentally creatively productive.
Additionally, in her particular feminist reading, women are reproductive, and so, by her
account, even more fundamentally creative. Although Habermas wants to claim that the
productive and creative aspects of communicative action correspond to the needs and
desires of society at large, without the understanding of sexual difference and
subjugation, Habermas‟ theory necessarily forgets that the maternal power for creativity
and production underlies the male-generated power of public political discourse.
Pateman faults theories that forget this relationship; these theories not only forget the
power of maternal reproduction, but they forget any powers unique to specific individuals
as they are defined in the private realm.37 The forgetting of uniqueness, and the
overemphasis on political equality, serves as its own form of a false reconciliation; a
problem not only defined by Carole Pateman, but which Adorno identified in his own
theory of negative dialectics.
Recognizing the potential problems of a theory presupposing equality and
reconciliation, Catherine MacKinnon provides critical arguments which, in conjunction
with Carole Pateman‟s theory, could prove detrimental to Habermas‟ theory of
communicative action. Specifically addressing Kantian-based systems of
36
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universalization, toward which Habermas‟ theory for communicative action selfadmittedly strives, MacKinnon exposes the faulty misconception that a move to
universalization would be equalizing and productive:
Many readers (in the Kantian tradition) say that if a discourse is not generalized, universal, and
agreed-upon, it is exclusionary. The problem, however, is that the generalized, universal, or
agreed-upon never did solve the disagreements, resolve the differences, cohere the specifics, and
generalize the particularities. Rather, it assimilated them to a false universal that imposed
agreement, submerged specificity, and silenced particularity. 38

The problem with ignoring the private sphere, or of subsuming it into analysis of public
society, emerges in the leveling of difference and the disregard for non-political (or depoliticized) concerns. Additionally, even if recognition of the private sphere is addressed
(as in Habermas‟ theory), the problem of false or imposed universalization can still
misrepresent the role of the private/individual/natural sphere. As MacKinnon explains:
In approaches that equate and collapse, women‟s problems are given no specificity or cross-class
commonality at all. They are totally subsumed under, telescoped within, assimilated to, a class
analysis. To the extent women exist at all within the theory [Marxist or post-Marxist], their
problems are eclipsed by those of the working class and their remedy is collapsed into socialism. 39

Communicative action rests on the ideal of equitable consciousnesses engaging as active
subjects in a constructive dialogue indicating desire for agreement; by this definition, to
which Habermas repeatedly lays claim, communicative action is necessarily exclusionary
where it intends to be universal.40 The collapse of individual rational interests into a
theory of (public) social agreement disavows the important differences between private
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interests and public society. Additionally, this collapse further distances women from the
public realm of society. Because of their historical relegation to subjugation, women
have never been able to constitute themselves as active, rational subjects in discourse.41
Rather, according to MacKinnon, women are necessarily conceived of as objects: “For
women, there is no distinction between objectification and alienation because women
have not authored objectifications, they have been them. Women have been the nature,
the matter, the acted upon to be subdued by the acting subject seeking to embody himself
in the social world.”42
In her work on critical approaches to political feminism, Nancy Fraser recognizes
that not only does the existent antinomy between the public and private remain
untheorized in political thought, but also that a reinstated antinomy could offer a positive
alternative to current conceptions of gender (in)equity in society. A reinstatement of the
tension between public and private could provide for what Fraser considers, a “universal
caregiver” alternative to society. In this model, men and women would each adopt
traditionally private (caregiving) and public (breadwinning) roles, splitting the demands
of each position in order to ensure gender equity (but not the leveling concept of
„equality‟) for all of society.43 In Fraser‟s view, the antinomy between public and private
interests must exist and not-exist simultaneously, and so she provides a deconstruction of
41
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private and public interests. In her estimation, the initial step consists of deconstructing
the private role of caregiving and the public role of breadwinning and would encourage
further deconstruction of additional aspects of the private/public antinomy.44 Fraser
models this deconstructive work through analysis of traditional gender roles‟
correspondence to particular economic roles. This position leaves open the necessity for
a critical appraisal of individual caregiving and breadwinning roles. The need for
preserving a productive antinomy via deconstruction should not be confused, however,
with a move to divide the public and private even further apart.
Bonnie Honig reinforces the concept of the productive aspect of a two-sided
dilemma (or antinomy), indicating that the productivity of identity/difference would
correspond to the productivity of the tension between public and private.45 In her
analysis, Honig proposes that the inherently conflictual enables and constitutes the
subject—as well as the world:
Indeed, we might think of the subject as positioned on multiple, conflictual axes of
identity/difference such that her agency itself is constituted, even enabled—and not simply
paralyzed—by dialing dilemmatic choices and negotiations. The perspectives of this subject
suggest that we ought not to think only in terms of dilemmas as discrete events onto which unitary
agents with diverse commitments stumble occasionally…but perhaps also in terms of a
dilemmatic space or spaces that both constitute us and form the terrain of our existence. 46

Honig‟s notion of dilemmatic space serves as a more productive concept of the
Habermasian “lifeworld.” Whereas the lifeworld necessarily constitutes a shared
horizon, Honig‟s dilemmatic space is based on the actual tensions of the material world,
reemphasizing the importance of productive difference.
44
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Similar to Honig, Susan Gal recognizes that the reinstatement of the antinomy
would also be much more realistic, in addition to restoring productive power to Critical
Theory. Mirroring Pateman‟s claims that the reciprocal relationship between separate
public and private spheres is foundational for the actual existence of society, Gal claims
that:
Despite the assumption of „separate spheres‟, most social practices, relations, and transactions are
not limited to the principles associated with one or another sphere. Empirical research shows that
monetary transactions of various kinds are common in social relations that are otherwise
understood as intimate interactions within families: love and money are often intertwined.
Similarly, the „personal in political‟ in part because private institutions such as families often
operate, like the polity, through conflict, power hierarchies, and violence. 47

Basing her analysis on empirical research and transactions, Gal reinvigorates the notion
of materiality in understanding the relationship between public and private spheres.
Where Habermas criticized Adorno for disregarding the material in favor of an idealized
natural, so, too, can the political feminists level claims against Habermas‟ neglect of the
private sphere as ignoring important material actuality.

A Partial Reappraisal
Not all feminists are so critical of Habermas‟ project, however. Many, in fact,
recognize the importance of his conception of lifeworld as complimentary to feminist
theorizing. In one such alternative reading, Marie Fleming proposes that Habermas‟ own
theory of communicative action can provide something closer to a productive mutuallydependent interaction: “Accordingly, the theory seems to illuminate how system and
lifeworld—the public and private—are inextricably linked and mutually supportive; thus
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it undermines any position based on absolute division.”48 If system loosely corresponds
to the public dimension of communicative outcomes and lifeworld is intended as a
conceptual placeholder for private interests, then the reciprocal nature of system and
lifeworld actually supports an appropriate productive tension between public and private
spheres.
Another critique of the feminist perspectives espoused by Pateman, MacKinnon,
Fraser, Honig and Gal focuses on the possibility that these feminist theories
overemphasize the antinomy between public and private. According to Noëlle McAfee‟s
analysis of the “Two Feminisms,” the political feminism espoused by these scholars
resembles an agonistic feminism which focuses too much on confrontation and overthematizes the “private sphere.”49 She explains that there are real limitations in focusing
on struggle and agon in politics:
The making of the public sphere always involves difference, struggle, discord, and tension; but
this agonistic dimension of politics is not the meaning of politics per se. In my many years of
observing political processes, I see that central to politics, central to my motivation of anyone who
cares to enter into the fray, is the hope that some kind of agreement might be reached. Without
such hope, there would be no will to enter. 50

According to MacAfee‟s interpretation, some feminists‟ emphasis on the role of gender
difference and private inequality necessarily prioritizes the private realm of society over
the public. This type of reversal would undermine the possibilities for these theories to
provide a positive critique of Habermas‟ treatment of public and private; essentially,
these women would be enacting the same type of leveling of which they accuse
Habermas, with an overemphasis on the private rather than the public. Additionally, the
prioritization of the private realm potentially reintroduces the problem of subjective
48
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instrumental reason, which Habermas worked diligently to overcome within his own
theory.

Conclusion
Whereas Critical Theory attempts to restore the primacy of the antinomy between
subject and object with society as a filter, political feminism, particularly that represented
by Carole Pateman, attempts to restore a missing antinomy—a critical approach to
society itself via a recognition of the tension between public and private. Feminists often
recognize an internal problem of Marxist theory as reinforcing the separation of public
and private.51 However, this problematization usually falls short of requiring a critical
reinstatement of the antinomy between public and private as potentially productive for
the feminist critical position. Reinvigorating the project of a critical approach to the
private sphere, feminists such as Pateman have addressed the specific concerns of the
feminine/private dimension of society. Applying this notion of the importance of the
private realm to a critique of Habermas‟ system of communicative action, several
inconsistencies between Habermas‟ theory and feminist concerns emerge. Pateman,
MacKinnon and others contrast Habermas‟ notion of egalitarianism, universalization, and
an emphasis on public discourse as being exclusionary to marginalized, individual and
private concerns. However, this feminist perspective may be limited as well; by
developing a Critical Theory of the private as foundational for the public, Pateman, in
particular, risks a false reconcilement of the antinomy in favor of the private sphere.
Fleming and McAfee, for example, believe Habermas recognizes and addresses the
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dichotomy between public and private. But is this recognition and critical appraisal
merely implicit? Or does Habermas productively address the dichotomy?
Through the preceding discussion, I have implicitly suggested the value of a
feminist position between neo-Marxist and Habermasian theories. In the following two
chapters, I articulate the role of feminist positions that exist in this middle-ground. I
propose a hybrid theory in which Habermas‟ concepts of intersubjectivity and the
lifeworld are read alongside feminist critiques of public interest and increasingly formal
normativity. By offering a positive critical analysis of Habermasian theory in these
feminist terms, it is my hope that Habermas‟ project can be enlivened and reinvigorated
for an increasingly complex, differentiated, and cosmopolitan world.
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Chapter 2
Raising the Stakes: Normativity and the Problem of Feminist Belonging

Although Habermas is even today the leading figure in contemporary Critical
Theory, Axel Honneth as his Frankfurt School successor developed a „third generation‟
in Critical Theory. Whereas Habermas emphasizes normative foundations, Honneth
returns to issues of subjectivity and power. For example, in Honneth‟s The Critique of
Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory (1993), he argues that Critical
Theory should not follow Habermas‟ aversion to Foucaultian critiques of power, but
instead should share in its emphasis on socio-political relations. This understanding of
power informs many feminist critical theorists, as well. Amy Allen, for example, in her
book The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (1999) argues
explicitly that a Foucaultian conception of power would make Critical Theory more
palatable and applicable for feminist theory.52 It would seem that Honneth‟s emphasis on
power relations and subjectivity would mark closer and continued engagements with
feminist critical theorists; however, Habermas‟ lasting impact in the discipline has
overshadowed much of the potential dialogue between feminist theory and Honneth.
There are exceptions, of course; notably, Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib have engaged
explicitly with Honneth‟s theory.53 However, even these engagements are infused with
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the tension emergent from Habermas‟ continuing influence.54 It is my contention that the
secondary status granted to Honneth‟s theories is indicative of the feminists‟
understandable preoccupation with Habermas‟ devaluation of issues of power and
valorization of the normative foundations for emancipatory ethics.55
As a challenge to feminist aspirations for a kinship with Habermasian Critical
Theory, many contemporary feminist philosophers recognize an inescapable tension with
ethical theories founded in normativity as such. Drucilla Cornell, voicing concerns
shared by many feminists, explains her take on a qualified postmodernist feminist
position in her essays, “What is Ethical Feminism?” and “Rethinking the Time for
Feminism.”56 For Cornell, Critical Theory gets the questions right: How should we
understand the relationship between theory and practice? How do we create/maintain
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emancipatory and inclusionary social practices? And even the more Habermasian
questions of how to theorize the relationships between political participation, linguistic
expression, and lived experience. However, Cornell is suspect of the answers given
through contemporary Critical Theory grounded in notions of rationality, morality, and,
of greatest interest here, normativity. In this chapter I address the potentially productive
tension between Habermas and feminists explicitly engaged with Critical Theory, as well
as among various feminist positions on the issue of normativity. I argue through this
analysis that as Habermas developed his theory of communicative ethics, and his notion
of normativity emerged, feminists found further fertile ground for a critical engagement.
As in his theory of system and lifeworld, which feminists found both productive and
challenging to an understanding of private interests in the public sphere, Habermas‟
theory of normativity is both vexing and inspiring for many theorists. I begin by
outlining Habermas‟ general conceptualization of normativity. I then address how
normativity is critically important for feminist ethics. Once this affinity is established, I
trace two contemporary feminist concerns to problematize the Habermasian normative
framework: from the perspective of socioeconomic interests, and from the perspective of
transnational feminist interests.

What is Habermasian Normativity?
The concept of normativity and the notion of normatively guided society in
Habermas stems logically from the development of his theory of communicative action
and his corresponding theory of discourse ethics. In what follows, I sketch an outline of
communicative action and discourse ethics as they relate to normativity. In order to
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articulate normativity‟s initial emergence, as well as give a brief exegesis of its
development, in this section I will deal primarily with The Theory of Communicative
Action (1981), Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), and Justification and
Application (1993). I start with an analysis of the relationship between reason, the
lifeworld, and communication so as to provide sufficient background for the development
of normativity. Then, I outline the correspondence between communicative action and
discourse ethics precisely upon the basis of normativity. Finally, I suggest that
Habermas‟ own treatment has necessarily grown with the expansion of his theoretical and
practical interests.
There are two foundations for rationality. The first is the notion of rationality as
based in an intersubjective lifeworld. This notion of rationality is distinct from traditional
philosophical notions—it is not centered on abstract logic or on metaphysics. Instead, for
Habermas, rationality is socially constituted through validity claims in the lifeworld. The
second foundation is the idea of rationality based in communicative acts. Validity claims
in an intersubjective lifeworld can only be evaluated through the medium of
communicative action. Reason in an intersubjective world involves reaching
understanding and agreement with at least one other participant in communication.
Rationality is not exclusively dependent upon others, however. Early in The Theory of
Communicative Action, Habermas identifies rationality as being heightened by selfreflection and self-awareness—one of his many allusions to Hegel.57 For Habermas the
telos of communicative action is not merely understanding, but rational agreement, which
depends on the individual‟s commitment to a position, as well as the eventual consensus
57
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orientation. The end goal of communication should be agreement between two members
of a linguistically united lifeworld, so communicative action can offer a real possibility
for social integration: “I have called the type of interaction in which all participants
harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue their
illocutionary aims without reservation „communicative action‟.”58 In this way, the height
of reason is a situation in which rationally motivated actors come together to form
consensus. Importantly, for Habermas, agreement cannot be forced or imposed:
Agreement rests on common convictions. The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other
accepts the offer contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a „yes‟ or „no‟ position on a
validity claim that is in principle criticizable. Both ego, who raises a validity claim with his
utterance, and alter, who recognizes or rejects it, base their decisions on potential grounds or
reasons.59

Agreement then is a more or less normalized rational process of accepting the possibility
of understanding and recognizing the communication itself, in addition to being a
normalized rational process for consensus formation. These validity claims can take
three forms in Habermas‟ theory, as constative truth, normative rightness, or as subjective
truthfulness. Constative truth is what we generally conceive of as a truth, or a true fact,
and forms the foundation for speech acts. For example, “The sky is blue,” has constative
truth.60 Normative rightness is based on the regulative constructs of a given society.
Regulative ideals and laws express normative rightness in validity claims. And finally,
subjective truthfulness is based on the speaker expressing herself truthfully, rather than
being deceptive or misleading. The interrelationship between reason, validity, and
normativity ensures that communicative acts are oriented toward understanding as much
58
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as consensus, by establishing rational linguistic boundaries as well as social interpretive
boundaries. This establishes a philosophy of communication for creating and
maintaining intersubjective relationships that provide the basis for a socio-ethical system.
In his essay “Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative
Structures,” Habermas articulates the importance of understanding justificatory structures
in creating a socioethical philosophy:
In its developmental dynamics, the change of normative structures remains dependent on
evolutionary challenges posed by unresolved, economically conditioned, system problems and on
learning processes that are a response to them. In other words, culture remains a superstructural
phenomenon, even if it does seem to play a more prominent role in the transition to new
developmental levels than many Marxists have heretofore supposed. This prominence explains
the contribution that communication theory can, in my view, make to a renewed historical
materialism.61

Apropos of themes I articulated in Chapter 1, Habermas asserts that his theory of
communicative action links Marxist historical materialism with lifeworld analysis.
Normative structures are constantly created and re-created according to systemic
development and changing conditions; particularly, for Habermas, changes in economic
conditions. The responsiveness to change ensures justification on a macro-scale for the
normative structures.
Following a developmental psychology model of subject identity-formation,
Habermas contends that normative structures emerge in society in homologous ways.
Using Piaget and Kohlberg‟s particular analyses of childhood development, Habermas
explains that as humans grow and develop the process of subjectivation leads us to
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universalizable moral understanding.62 This universalizable moral understanding does
more for Habermas than it would appear to do for the developmental psychologists,
however. Whereas developmental psychologists are most interested in how children
grow and move from one stage to the next, Habermas is interested in what social,
cognitive, and linguistic capacities mean for the relationship between the individual and
society:
To begin with, the concept of ego development, ontogenesis, can be analyzed in terms of the
capacity for cognition, speech, and action. These three aspects of cognitive, linguistic, and
interactive development can be brought under one unifying idea of ego development—the ego is
formed in a system of demarcations. The subjectivity of internal nature demarcates itself in
relation to the objectivity of a perceptible external nature, in relation to the normativity of society,
and in relation to the intersubjectivity of language. In accomplishing these demarcations, the ego
knows itself not only as a subjectivity but as something that has „always already‟ transcended the
bounds of subjectivity in cognition, speech, and interaction simultaneously.63

For Habermas, then, ontogenesis is indicative of the importance of understanding the
lifeworld in relation to the ethical, or what he will later call the “ethical-existential.”64
This relationship to psychological development becomes further articulated with a move
from justification to application in Habermas‟ Justification and Application, which I will
detail at the end of this section.
The relationship between norms and communicative acts, however, is further
complicated by the possibility for confusing purposive-rational acts with communicative
acts. Purposive-rational actions are guided by means-end rationality: “The rationality of
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means requires technically utilizable, empirical knowledge; the rationality of decisions
requires the explication and inner consistency of value systems and decision maxims, as
well as the correct derivation of acts of choice.”65 Communicative action is distinct from
this form of action, since its consistency is guaranteed through “intersubjectively binding
norms that guarantee the fulfillment of the motivational conditions.”66 This means that
even in Habermas‟ earliest incarnations of normatively guided communicative action,
there was expressed the possibility of intersubjectively grounded consensus, not only in
the outcome orientation of communicative action, but also in its very grounding for
possibility. This indicates additionally that norms are established by intersubjectively
engaged ethical actors, who then participate in the normative grounding for
communication oriented towards rational consensus. Normativity is for Habermas
developmentally grounded and materially, historically ensured. It is also rationalizable,
albeit neither by empirical knowledge, nor by internal logic. Instead, norms are
rationalized through generalization in social justificatory procedures.
This early account of Habermas‟ theory of the reciprocal exchange between norm
development and communicative action is further developed in Habermas‟ everexpanding theory. At this stage, it seems as though norms are still quite abstract from
application. Communicative action in this early instantiation is more or less a way of
differentiating from purposive-rational action, where communicative action is ensured
consistency through intersubjectivity, while purposive-rational acts have internal rational
consistency. As Habermas‟ theory develops, and he seriously considers the application
of such a system, communicative action grounds a discursive ethical system. In
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Justification and Application (1994), Habermas distances himself from the abstract
concerns of idealism by asserting that, unlike ethicists in the tradition of the Kantian
categorical imperative, he is an ethicist concerned with both justification and application.
Idealized ethics always runs into the problem of fairly applying ethical norms: “Once
moral justifications rest on a principle of universalization constraining participants in
discourse to examine whether disputed norms could command the well-considered assent
of all concerned, detached from practical situations and without regard to current
motivations or existing institutions, the problem of how norms, thus grounded, could ever
be applied becomes more acute.”67 In contradistinction, Habermas contends that the
historical contingency of each application of a norm confines the justification:
“Moreover, every justification of a norm is necessarily subject to the normal limitations
of a finite, historically situated outlook that is provincial in regard to the future.”68 The
relationship between communicative action and discourse ethics is in this particular
application. Communicative action is oriented towards norms that are open to challenges
given the historical context and current emancipatory merit of such norms.
In addition to highlighting the historical contingency of the justifiable application
of norms, Habermas also highlights that the psychological processes of individuation play
a major role in how ethical norms are taken into practice: “The standpoint of morality
differs from that of concrete ethical life in its idealizing extension and reversal of
interpretive perspectives that are tied to particular, established cultural lifeforms and are
the result of individual processes of development.”69 In this way, Habermas asserts his
67
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own recognition of individual contingency, and founds his ethical paradigm on
psychological development. Additionally, as a critic of Kant‟s transcendental idealism,
Habermas suggests that ethics cannot be grounded in egocentrism—“Do unto others as
you would have them do unto you”—but instead that ethics must be founded
intersubjectively in the lifeworld.70 However, unlike feminist ethical theorists, who also
understand the specificity of individuation, Habermas still sees individual psychological
development culminating in the grasp of universalist principles.71
Normativity, then, seems to progress gradually from an abstract theoretical
concept that Habermas uses to unify reason with intersubjective justificatory processes to
a concrete, historically contingent, and individually contestable, means of applying ethics
in society. However, just as Habermas seems to become more attuned to individuation
and individual concerns, he returns to the universalizable appeal to reason, consensus,
and stable systems. He intimates that the ethical, which is particularized in the act of
individuation in relation to society, is distinct from both the moral and the legal. For
Habermas, the ethical is a highly contextualized normative application of universalizable
moral principles. The moral is therefore simply the generalized and universalized
concept of those normative structures. The legal is the application of the moral structures
as socially agreed upon and enforceable norms. However, all three concepts are
organized finally into a deontological moral theory that ultimately differentiates ethical,
moral and legal questions only by degree. He explains that a tenable deontological
theory:
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…[N]eed only maintain that ethical discussions, in contrast to moral arguments, are always
already embedded in the traditional context of a hitherto accepted, identity-constituting form of
life. Moral judgments differ from ethical judgments only in their degree of contextuality.72

With this reconstruction of a universalized notion of judgment, Habermas implicitly
extends his conception of normativity to universal application as well. This generalized
and universalized normativity informs an increasingly formal notion of normativity in
Habermas‟ theory. This move to generalization and universalization is both a liability
and an ally for feminist concerns with normativity.

Feminist Critical Theory and the Dilemma of Normativity
In Chapter 1, I constructed a dialogue between neo-Marxist and critical theoretical
feminists, identifying Habermasian themes as means for understanding their shared
engagements with the philosophical and socio-ethical problem of private interests. In this
section of Chapter 2, I would like to take an already established philosophical debate
among various feminist perspectives and demonstrate that the fundamental issues at stake
are again best represented in relationship to Habermas. In an attempt to understand the
relationships between intersubjectivity, reason, and the justification for ethical
frameworks, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, and respondent Nancy Fraser came together
for a symposium on feminism and postmodernism in the fall of 1990. This debate was
expanded, with the additional contribution of Drucilla Cornell, to a book first published
in German in 1993, and then finally in English in 1995.73 Although the debate presented
in this book is ostensibly on what relationship postmodernism may have with socio72
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ethically concerned feminist philosophy, I would like to recast the exchange in terms of
normativity. I contend that what is really at stake when Benhabib, Butler, Cornell, and
Fraser are disputing the merits of postmodern methods is precisely the issue with which
Habermas attempts to grapple in the development of his theory of the justification and
application of norms. By constructing the debate in this way, it is not only more apparent
which philosophical and social issues are most relevant to the feminist project, but it also
becomes clear that the feminist engagement with Habermas‟ influence is complex and
potentially fruitful.

Why is Normativity Problematic for Feminist Concerns?
Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell voice the most direct anti-normative positions
in Feminist Contentions. According to Butler and Cornell, normativity and the
corresponding determinate notions of the individual foreclose differences and fluidity. In
this foreclosure, otherwise emancipatory processes of subjectivation and resignification
are limited, thereby stifling rather than preserving emancipatory goals.
Cornell begins distancing herself from this characterization of contemporary Critical
Theory by articulating a sharp distinction between ethics and morality. For Cornell,
ethics is grounded in non-violent respect of difference, without appropriation. Morality,
on the other hand, is systematic, not interested in difference, but ultimately interested in
political, social and juridical universalism. She writes:
For my purposes, morality designates any attempt to theoretically spell out how one determines a
system that absolutely governs the „right way to behave.‟ As Niklas Luhmann has succinctly
defined it, „morality is a special form of communication which carries within it indications of
approval or disapproval.‟ The ethical as I define it is not a system of behavioral rules, nor a
system of positive standards by which to justify disapproval of others. It is, rather, an attitude
towards what is other than oneself. This attitude shares much in common with those which
Charles Peirce called fallibilism and musement. Fallibilism implies a challenge to one‟s basic
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organization of the world, while musement indicates the stance of amazement before the mysteries
and marvels of life.74

In contradistinction to morality based theories, Cornell advocates a feminist theory of
ethics. As she intimates, ethics is defined by the following characteristics: It is, first, a
theory to guide attitudinal orientation. Ethics is necessary because of the otherness of
others; it is grounded precisely in what is not us. Ethics must also allow for theoretical
instability, both in regards to challenges to our own beliefs, theories, viewpoints, but also
in regards to the unknown.75
Cornell‟s insistence on the ultimate respect of and deference to alterity aligns her
with a postmodern theory of difference: the Other is that which we cannot fully
understand, although it is also that over-and-against which we formulate ourselves as
subjects. This ethical grounding not only shapes her notion of subjectivity, but it also
shapes Cornell‟s understanding of Critical Theory. For Cornell, Habermasian Critical
Theory attempts to create “positive standards by which to justify” if not disapproval, then
the correct method of intersubjective interaction. She later refers to this system of
normatively guided ethics as a theory of “causal appropriateness”:
A classic example of the introduction of a theory of causal appropriateness into an account of
practical reason is Habermas‟s attempt to incorporate Kohlberg‟s cognitive psychology into his
theoretical justification of a dialogic conception of justice. Rawls, on the other hand, correctly
argues that we should not and cannot borrow from theoretical concepts of objectivity and
incorporate them into the field of practical reason we call justice. 76
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“Causal appropriateness” is Cornell‟s term for the scientific acceptance of theories which
seem to explain correspondence adequately in terms of causal chains. In other words,
Cornell sees danger in Habermas‟ willingness to accept the explanatory power of
objective causation as theoretically sufficient.77
Rather than focus on the normative guidelines that would dictate moral-ethical
behavior, Cornell understands the goal of Critical Theory in terms of feminist ethics as
“consciousness raising.” Consciousness raising is not simply a political program for
indicating another way of thinking, however. It is instead a process of problematizing, of
breaking apart meaning and signification in order to “re-imagine and re-symbolize the
feminine within sexual difference so as to break the bonds of the meaning of Woman that
have been taken for granted and that have been justifiable as fate.”78 Cornell not only
differentiates herself from Habermas in this respect, but also from those feminists who
take up, unquestioned, Habermasian normative guidelines. She identifies a productive
tension with such feminists, finding kinship with their utopian spirit, but
disenfranchisement with their conservative understanding of morality confined to
normative limits. Cornell finds Seyla Benhabib to be a prime example of this type of
feminist. She writes, however, “Like Benhabib, I believe that feminism demands the
thinking of the „wholly Other‟ and thus must retain, and proceed through, an unerasable
moment of utopianism.”79 On the other hand she disagrees with Benhabib because of her
commitment to the rational normative morality of the present:
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I take issue with Benhabib because she is not a utopian, in the specific sense that she thinks that
feminism can operate within the philosophical tools provided by Habermas‟s attempt to theorize
the legitimacy of a normative rational sphere of nature…Feminism is radical because it demands
that we re-think the „origins‟ and the „limit‟ of philosophical discourse, even as we are challenged
to do so philosophically, which is why feminism finds itself in alliance with thinkers such as
Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, as well as with Adorno and Benjamin. 80

For Cornell it is particularly the notion of limit that replaces the notion of normativity as
the critical theoretical move. Whereas Habermas sees the critical power of justification
and application embodied in normativity, Cornell identifies the promise of a future, a
time that has not yet come and cannot yet be theorized, as the critical space for ethical
articulation.
Judith Butler also suggests that feminist theory should be critical and utopic in the
specific sense of future orientation. She suggests that subject formation is an
intersubjective process of recognizing alterity and reconstructing subjective identity. She
explains: “What is „outside‟ is not simply the Other—the „not me‟—but a notion of
futurity—the „not yet‟—and these constitute the defining limit of the subject itself.”81
More obliquely, Judith Butler shares Cornell‟s concerns about Habermas‟ theoretical
foundations. For Butler, theories that universalize normativity, like Habermas‟, reinstate
the political hegemony of colonialism into the very social theories that should serve as
challenges to social hegemonic institutions. She writes:
Within the political context of contemporary postcoloniality more generally, it is perhaps
especially urgent to underscore the very category of the „universal‟ as a site of insistent contest
and resignification. Given the contested character of the term, to assume from the start a
procedural or substantive notion of the universal is of necessity to impose a culturally hegemonic
notion on the social field. To herald that notion then as the philosophic instrument that will
negotiate between conflicts of power is precisely to safeguard and reproduce a position of
hegemonic power by installing it is the metapolitical site of ultimate normativity. 82
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Rather than highlight the universal normative component of a socio-ethical theory, Butler
contends that feminists should work to express the processes of subjectivation and
resignification—the continual procedures by which subjects create themselves and
meaning in a contextualized world.83
Just as Cornell identified with Benhabib‟s utopic moment, as she criticized
simultaneously her normative complacency, Butler is sympathetic to the process of the
productive power of discourse at the heart of Habermas‟ theory, even as she is most
opposed to his hegemonic inclinations. For Butler, it is precisely through discourse that
subjects re-iterate and re-constitute themselves:
‟Agency‟ is to be found precisely at such junctures where discourse is renewed. That an „I‟ is
founded through reciting the anonymous linguistic site of the „I‟ implies that citation is not
performed by a subject, but is rather the invocation by which a subject comes into linguistic being.
That this is a repeated process, an iterable procedure, is precisely the condition of agency within
discourse. If a subject were constituted one and for all, there would be no possibility of a
reiteration of those constituting conventions or norms. That the subject is that which must be
constituted again and again implies that it is open to formations that are not fully constrained in
advance.84

The productive power of discourse is, in fact, the very ground by which Butler articulates
her postmodern position. For Habermas, discourse is rooted in reason, marking discourse
as decidedly modernist. However, for Butler, discourse is the procedure through which
the ongoing process of subjectivation takes place. It is not reason that gives power to
discourse for Butler, but iterability and re-signification. According to Butler‟s
overarching theory, subjects are continually in a process of subjectivation through
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performativity. Performativity is a linguistic theory by which identity is constructed
through the continued reiteration of certain discursive utterances and practices. In
Butler‟s estimation, there are specific discursive acts that work to create subjects. For
example, gender is a performative construction. Through the repetition and recreation of
certain discursive acts and ways of representing the self, an individual creates his or her
own gender identity. However, as discourse, these performative utterances and acts are
contextualized in society, which provides an interpretive lens and framework for
understanding the meaning of performativity.

Why Normativity is Important for the Feminist Critical Theoretical Project?
Despite Cornell and Butler‟s reservations about normativity‟s role in feminist
ethics, a Habermasian concept of normativity provides compelling theoretical grounding
for feminist appeals to universal rights for democratic participation, recognition, and
cooperation. It is to these appeals that Benhabib and Fraser make recourse in their
respective qualified support of a normative ethical system qua Habermas.
In her position defending a critical theoretical approach to feminist philosophy, Benhabib
defines an almost modernist notion of the rational individual, who she then describes as
engaged in universalization-seeking emancipatory pursuits. She criticizes the
postmodernist position that would suggest that subjects are simply the products of
language:
Along with this dissolution of the subject into yet „another position in language‟ disappear of
course concepts of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity, and autonomy. The subject that
is but another position in language can no longer master and create that distance between itself and
the chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can reflect upon them and creatively
alter them.85
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Here Benhabib obviously has Butler in mind. Despite Butler‟s assertion that the
possibility for resignifying and reconstructing the self through discourse is emancipatory,
Benhabib contends that autonomy is lost, making freedom irrelevant.
The issue of subjectivity is important for Benhabib‟s characterization of the feminist
project. Feminist philosophy is, for Benhabib, oriented toward the real emancipation of
women in society. Without the ability to appeal to an autonomous self, the important
characteristics that make that self unique are also meaningless. This means that not only
is selfhood lost, but any appeal to a solidarity based in shared identification is also lost.
For Benhabib, over-determination of a fluid postmodern subject brings only the detriment
of women‟s movements and practical emancipatory procedures: “The postmodernist
position(s) thought through to their conclusions may eliminate not only the specificity of
feminist theory but place in question the very emancipatory ideals of the women‟s
movements altogether.”86 This practical appeal to a modernist subject is more closely
allied with Habermasian rational individuals, than Butlerian subjectivation processes.
Benhabib extends her affinity for Habermasian constructs to a theoretical level.
In addition to arguing that a postmodern feminist ethics denies subjectivity on the level of
practice, Benhabib argues that postmodern social criticism is empty of necessary formal
theoretical structures. Without the ability to appeal to normative legitimating criteria,
postmodern feminists find themselves in a dilemma. Either there is no justificatory
criterion, in which case ethical relativism prevents productive critique, or the justificatory
criterion is assumed, in which case postmodernists are more hegemonic in their uncritical
acceptance of normative justification:
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I am now arguing that the practice of immanent social criticism or situated social criticism has two
defects: first, the turn to immanent or internal criteria of legitimation appears to exempt one from
the task of philosophical justification only because the postmodernists assume, inter alia, that
there is one obvious set of such criteria to appeal to. But if cultures and traditions are more like
competing sets of narratives and incoherent tapestries of meaning, then the social critic must
herself construct out of these conflictual and incoherent accounts the set of criteria in the name of
which she speaks. The „hermeneutic monism of meaning‟ brings no exemption from the
responsibility of normative justification. 87

Benhabib does recognize, however, the concerns that postmodern feminists have
with normative Critical Theory. Normativity is universalizing, which threatens to level
any number of differences in society, including gender difference. Normativity, at least
in the Habermasian vein, is also limited to a particular historical framework—one that
highlights the current state of affairs, rather than the utopian desire for that which is to
come. However, Benhabib adopts a pragmatic-utopic attitude regarding the capacity for
feminist theory. She writes:
The retreat from utopia within feminist theory in the last decade has taken the form of debunking
as essentialist any attempt to formulate a feminist ethic, a feminist politics, a feminist concept of
autonomy, and even a feminist aesthetic. The fact that the views of Gilligan or Chodorow or Sara
Ruddick (or for that matter Kristeva) articulate only the sensitivities of white, middle-class,
affluent, first-world, heterosexual women may be true (although I even have empirical doubts
about this). Yet what are we ready to offer in their place? As a project of ethics which should
guide us in the future are we able to offer a better vision than the synthesis of autonomous justice
thinking and empathetic care? As a vision of the autonomous personality to aspire to in the future
are we able to articulate a sense of self better than the model of autonomous individuality with
fluid ego-boundaries and not threatened by otherness? As a vision of feminist politics are we able
to articulate a better model for the future than a radically democratic polity which also furthers the
values of ecology, nonmilitarism, and solidarity of peoples? 88

For Benhabib, feminists should be charged with developing a truly critical ethics. This
means that despite the potential normative constraints of such a theory, such a theory has
emancipation as its goal. Normative feminist theories open themselves up for critical
reappraisal by including evaluative measures in the theory. At the same time, these
theories open themselves into utopian goals by articulating a means for working towards
87
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these goals; namely, for Benhabib, democratic participation. Her vision of democratic
participation owes as much to Habermas‟ theories of justification and application as it
does to feminist care ethics and notions of solidarity.
Although Benhabib is herself skeptical of the affinity she shares with Nancy
Fraser, Fraser‟s own commitment to Habermasian theory allies her more with Benhabib‟s
utopic goals than with Butler‟s discursive mode of (re)iteration.89 For Fraser, normativity
is integral to feminist ethical practice, as much as feminist theory. Fraser identifies the
normative framework as a pragmatic tool for solidarity. Interestingly, for Fraser this is
not simply a tool for macrolevel feminist concerns, but also for bringing together the
theoretical positions represented in the Feminist Contentions volume. She contends that
it is theoretically productive to ally Butlerian conceptions of individuation with
Benhabib‟s emphasis on the critical.90 Despite her optimism for theorizing with
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postmodernism, rather than against it, Fraser does not offer an outline for the necessary
theory. In what follows at the end of this chapter, I attempt to articulate the need and
practical grounds for such a hybrid theory. In chapters 5 and 6, I attempt to construct
theoretically my version of a feminist ethics grounded in Butler, Cornell, Benhabib and
Allen, effectively completing Fraser‟s call for a pragmatic hybrid feminist approach.

The United States Healthcare Debate and Feminist Concerns about Normativity
In order to think through why the issue of normativity is so important for feminist
scholarship not merely in the abstract, but also in the theoretical-practical, I propose a
consideration of two possible problem scenarios. In the first, I suggest that the feminist
relevance of healthcare reform in the United States has been occluded because of the
normative construction of the terms of the debate. In the second, I address a problem of
particular relevance for both feminism and a Critical Theory of cosmopolitanism, the
possibility for transnational feminist relations between Western feminist scholars and
Afghani women. Through these considerations, I demonstrate the possibilities for
thinking with and against Habermasian normativity as it relates to feminist concerns,
positing a productive tension between Habermas‟ hard-lined notions of normativity and
postmodern concepts of fluidity and utopia.
Habermas explicitly argues as a part of his theory of communicative action that
social theory has mediatizations—namely, money and power—that influence the
possibilities for transformation in the public sphere.91 Habermas explicates the
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systematic development of these mediatizations in one of his only extended discussions
of the role of power in society. Borrowing from Weberian sociology and Parsons‟ theory
of society, Habermas claims that money and power come to “colonize” the lifeworld
through historical processes of development and mechanisms of legitimation.92 Initially,
power was understood mainly through mythology and religion, but it has now become
secularized as the way in which bureaucracies are controlled by legal means.93 As
mediatizations, power and money must themselves be controlled through legitimation
processes in the public sphere. The private sphere of power plays no central role—it has
to be translated as it were into the public. In this way, the relationship between power as
it has been normalized and the absence of power in those who are disenfranchised cannot
be theorized in a Habermasian model.
Often, from a feminist point of view, money and power are more than simple
mediatizations; these are the grounds by which oppression is normalized. Let us take a
particular example, the problem of access to affordable health insurance in the United
States. Despite the passage of U.S. healthcare legislation in March 2010, the discussion
about healthcare reform is still relevant and pressing: Who are the uninsured? How
should we continue to improve insurance access? Should there be a socialized plan?
What about undocumented immigrants? Even this wide array of relevant questions
regarding the status and application of healthcare in the U.S. uncovers the relatively
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narrow breadth of discussion. In media coverage it is overwhelmingly evident that the
discussion has been normalized to be a debate about choice and political power—
disguising other relevant issues regarding class, gender, and race divisions in access to
both existent healthcare, and the healthcare that will be available in 2019 as per the 2010
Healthcare Reform Bill.
The most contentious battles before the bill was passed, and even after, were
about what healthcare reform meant for the future of power in the dominant political
parties. As New York Times contributors Robert Pear and David M. Herszenhorn framed
it in the first paragraph of their article “Obama Hails Vote on Health Care as Answering
„the Call of History‟,” “House Democrats approved a far-reaching overhaul of the
nation‟s health system on Sunday, voting over unanimous Republican opposition to
provide medical coverage to tens of millions of uninsured Americans after an epic
political battle that could define the differences between the parties for years.”94
Healthcare reform in this discussion seems to be predominately, even almost entirely,
about which parties voted for what, and how successful those parties were at preserving
political face. It is not until near the end of the first page of the article that Pear and
Herszenhorn even mention the numbers of Americans who will be left uninsured even
after the effects of reform are in place: “The budget office estimates that the bill would
provide coverage to 32 million uninsured people, but still leave 23 million uninsured in
2019.”95 This privileging of the debate about political power, even in the arguably
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“liberal” news media outlet of The New York Times, exposes the limitations of the
normatively agreed upon terms of the healthcare debate. If we are able to enter
discussion by the terms of communicative action in discursive ethics only by either, A.)
challenging, or B.) keeping the current normative terms of the debate, then our discursive
range is quite limited. With something as pressing as healthcare access, do feminists
have the time to convince news media that the terms of debate are inadequate, before they
can even mention that nearly 21% of women are uninsured96 or that the U.S. has been
victim to an as yet unexplained jump in maternal mortality rates since 199697?
In Habermasian terms, it would seem that once the discursive bounds are
normatively established, the only recourse for expanding the topic at hand is by recircumscribing the normative bounds for debate. However, the pressing needs of
women‟s access to healthcare should be a part of any discussion, without having to
reframe the debate. Additionally, when power and money—especially as regards a topic
so obviously tied to political prowess—mediate who is authorized to speak and what they
are authorized to speak about, how do women in minority groups, impoverished women,
and even non-profit organizations challenge these normative bounds? This is especially
problematic given the lack of interaction between private access to power and public
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legitimation of that power. Habermas can only appeal to the public access of voting as a
means of legitimation. However, I am arguing here that the private nature of money and
power restrict access to “real” decision making processes that go beyond voting in
elections. In Habermas‟ estimation it is not possible to circumvent mediations entirely in
society; these are material conditions that cannot be willed away. The best society can do
is to develop mediatizations, and society‟s relationship to them, in the most inclusive and
democratic way possible. However, Habermas does not engage with the issues of how
particular groups, or particular individuals, can find their specific roles in these
mediatizations.98
On the other hand, it seems clear that a productive discussion regarding women‟s
healthcare needs must enter the public debate. Without making recourse to some
normative standards for human rights, how could this be accomplished? For as Benhabib
claims, appeals to human rights and universal recognition appear to depend on a
rationally based process of social interaction that produces universalized normative
values. She writes, “By „normative foundations‟ of social criticism I mean exactly the
conceptual possibility of justifying the norms of universal moral respect and egalitarian
reciprocity on rational grounds; no more and no less.”99 Perhaps by appealing to a
pragmatically qualified conception of normative value production, feminist critical
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theorists can carve out space for a middle ground. Fraser suggests the need for such an
alternative when she writes:
Feminists do need to make normative judgments and to offer emancipatory alternatives. We are
not for „anything goes.‟ Moreover, it is arguable that the current proliferation of identitydereifying, fungible, commodified images and significations constitutes as great a threat to
women‟s liberation as do fixed, fundamentalist identities. In fact, dereifying processes and
reifying processes are two sides of the same postfordist coin. They demand a two-sided response.
Feminists need both deconstruction and reconstruction, destabilization of meaning and projection
of utopian hope.100

This synthesis of deconstructive and reconstructive, constructive and critical, abstract
theoretical and pragmatic seems a necessary turn for feminist philosophy, especially as it
considers real issues such as healthcare. Although Fraser articulates this need, and
Benhabib and Butler seem interested in productive critical engagement with their
respective theories, the alternative is yet to be mapped out.

Universalization and the Transnational Feminist Problem
Given the pitfalls of the relatively civil and democratic procedure for discussing
U.S. healthcare reform, it is apparent that complexified feminist issues resultant from
globalization and cosmopolitanism would engender even more difficulties for
contemporary feminist socio-ethical theory. For example, take the relationship between
Western feminist theorists and Afghani women currently living in the Afghanistan warzone. It is suddenly the case that women who have traditionally been forcibly kept from
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educational opportunities, women whose voices were silenced even in their own villages,
now play a major role in discussions of international politics and ethics. Despite the
seemingly beneficial move to the global recognition of these women as world citizens,
the paternalistic move toward universalization pervades even the most well-intentioned
Western feminist thought on the subject.
Normativity is by nature universalizing.101 Universalization depends on
consensus formation. However, consensus formation seems to be undesirable and
impossible in something as complex as the debate about relations between the U.S. and
Afghanistan. Given that each of the following statements are true,
(1) The U.S. war in Afghanistan is almost prohibitively costly for the US;
(2) The U.S. goal of finding Bin Laden in Afghanistan seems increasingly
unlikely; arguably, accomplishing this goal has been unlikely for years;
(3) There is a drug war in Afghanistan, fueled by lack of tribal control;
(4) Women in Afghanistan have had increasing political voice in the past few
years, even gaining positions in parliament;
(5) Women in Afghanistan are torn between allegiance to the unique experience
of Afghani women and Afghani people, and to fostering solidarity with
organizations from the West offering hope for education, protection, and
increasingly audible political voice;
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then, what is the appropriate universalizable consensus? Should it be that Afghani
women seek protection in Western-centered women‟s organizations, like Women for
Women, International?102 What happens when these same women are educated, given
puppet political positions to appease Western pressures, and then condemned for their
Western sympathies, as in the case of Malaila Joya?103 How then can Afghani women
develop their own autonomous subjectivities, which was ostensibly the intent of Western
non-profit organizations? More basically, is it even possible to identify Afghani women
as autonomous subjects, if they are influenced, supported, and structured by Western
organizations? Additionally, what happens to these organizations themselves as the
status and usefulness of Western actors in Afghanistan is increasingly questionable? The
problem here seems to indicate that a rational consensus for a normative solution would
be contentious at best. Even disregarding the practical concerns of the political dilemma,
how would a sensitive feminist theorist conceptualize a transnational solidarity that
preserved and fostered autonomy, while simultaneously extending support and
recognition? This string of socio-ethical questions highlights an important tension
between conventional Critical Theory and Critical Theory informed by feminist concerns.
As I argued in Chapter 1, feminist theorists recognize that the public sphere of discourse
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and debate is not an ideal rational plane of existence, but is instead always already
infused with private interests. That is not to say that these private interests are always
considered during the consensus-formation projects of the public sphere, but instead that
private concerns are more often forgotten and neglected in favor of idealizations.104 It is
only through a feminist ethics that prioritizes the individual and the particular, at least as
much as the general normative and the universal, that transnational recognition can take
place.105

Conclusion
Far from answering Benhabib, Butler, Cornell, or Fraser‟s concerns regarding the
status of Critical Theory and postmodernism, in this chapter I have sought to
problematize the relationship between contemporary feminist scholars and Habermasian
conceptions of normativity. By recasting the discussion in this light, I have been able to
find both the strengths and the weaknesses of Habermas‟ theory vis-à-vis feminist
concerns regarding healthcare and transnational solidarity. Although I have only briefly
sketched the problem here, I return to the issue of particular feminist concerns in
104
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healthcare ethics in my fourth chapter. There, I argue that, as Habermasian normativity
formalizes into an account of future subject formation, his theory further limits feminist
interests in care relationships and utopian goals of expanding subjective possibility. I
articulate an alternative wherein intersubjective and contextualized relationships offer
sufficient normative grounding for an ethics of care. Additionally, as the example of
Afghani women‟s concerns makes clear, the development of a socio-ethical theory which
accounts for difference, even in solidarity, is of utmost concern. I return to a discussion
of the development of such a theory in Chapter 6, where I suggest an outline for a
tenuous solidarity, as an inspired alternative to a discursive ethics dependent on
normative consensus.
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Chapter 3
Seeking Utopia: A Feminist Critical Analysis of Habermas’ Consensus Orientation

In his theory of communicative ethics, Habermas establishes a reinvigorated and
reevaluated grounding for Critical Theory, a grounding that stems not only from his roots
in the Frankfurt School, but also from asserted roots in the lineage of Enlightenment
thought. Explicitly, Habermas often identifies his philosophy with Kantianism and coins
the description “post-metaphysical” to describe the Enlightenment roots of his unique
development of Critical Theory. Habermas‟ ambivalence towards Hegel manifests itself
most explicitly in the Hegelian attitude of his theory of communicative ethics. In Seyla
Benhabib‟s essay “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics” (1991), she offers
a critique using Habermasian ideas against Habermas himself. Her critique rests on the
grounds that Habermas over-determines the normatizing power of communicative action
in fulfilling truth ideals to the detriment of the utopian and emancipatory transfiguring
powers of critique. Explicit in her claims is a neo-Kantian and feminist formulation of
utopianism and emancipation as the primary outcomes of critical philosophy. However,
implicit in her claims lies a potentially illuminating reconstruction of Habermasian
communicative ethics as a philosophy of Spirit rather than critique. In this chapter, I seek
to uncover Habermas‟ Hegelian tendencies, tracing his ethical formulation of labor and
interaction in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) to its Hegelian
roots. Then, by examining Benhabib‟s critiques of fulfillment-oriented philosophy, I
argue that Habermas‟ description of normativity is not only linked more to his Hegelian
heritage of philosophies of Spirit than to his critical allegiance with Kantianism, but it
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also abandons the central critical theoretical goals of emancipation and utopianism.106 It
is precisely these goals of transfiguration that allow for a feminist Critical Theory to
emerge, and by recreating the philosophical historical lineage of Habermas‟ thought, I
hope to reconfigure a contemporary Critical Theory that synthesizes Habermasian
concepts with the ethical, political, and practical theoretical aspects of utopian feminist
critique. I end this chapter with an analysis of practical and theoretical issues illuminated
by a case example of immigration legislation, culminating in a developed feminist
utopian position using Honig‟s, Benhabib‟s, and Pateman‟s theories.

Habermas’ Hegelian Heritage
In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas defines the
parameters for his discourse ethics. He explains his theoretical lineage in terms of an
affinity for the projects of modernity. The pinnacle of modernity for Habermas, however,
is not the expected Kant, but rather Hegel. In fact, Habermas claims that his notion of
lifeworld is best aligned with Hegel‟s explicit critique of Kant: “Rooting the practice of
argumentation in the lifeworld contexts of communicative action calls to mind Hegel‟s
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critique of Kant...”107 From what follows in Moral Consciousness and Communicative
Action, I take the critique to which Habermas is alluding to be Hegel‟s position that
Kant‟s critical philosophy is overly subjective, and in that subjectivity it opens itself to
skepticism.108 Habermas wants to avoid falling into a skeptical trap in his ethics, and
attempts to do so by establishing firmly contextual foundations for ethics—the lifeworld.
Habermas goes further to claim that his lifeworld is related to a Hegelian notion of ethics:
Because morality is always embedded in what Hegel called ethical life
(Sittlichkeit), discourse ethics is always subject to limitations, though not limitations that can
devalue its critical function or strengthen the skeptic in his role as an advocate of the
counterenlightenment.109

Discourse ethics, then, is limited by the context of lived situatedness. In this way,
morality and the ethical life fit into the larger framework of lifeworld that pervades
Habermas‟ overall theory:
In a discursive framework we perceive the lived world of the communicative practice of everyday
life from an artificial, retrospective point of view: as we hypothetically consider claims to validity,
the world of institutionally ordered relations becomes moralized, just as the world of existing
states of affairs becomes theoreticized. Facts and norms that had previously gone unquestioned
can now be true or false, valid or invalid. Moreover, in the realm of subjectivity, modern art
inaugurated a comparable thrust toward problemetization. The world of lived experiences is
aestheticized, that is, freed of the routines of everyday perception and the conventions of everyday
action. For this reason we do well to look at the relationship of morality and ethical life as part of
a more complex whole.110

For Habermas, the power of discourse exists both as a means for navigating
intersubjective and cultural experience, and as a method for framing moral and
theoretical considerations. This power only exists in relation to the lifeworld. On the one
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hand, the lifeworld is that in which we experience the cultural and intersubjective. On
the other hand, the lifeworld allows us the subjective perspective to analyze, moralize and
theorize.
The ethical is not simply an extrapolation from the lifeworld, however. The
sphere of ethical life also contains the answers to lifeworld questions, in a sort of
reciprocal relationship. As part of its relation to justice, these questions are “always
already” answered, according to Habermas:
From the viewpoint of a participant in moral argumentation, the lifeworld that he has put at a
distance, a world in which the unproblematic cultural givens of cognitive, expressive, or moral
origin are interwoven with one another, appears as the sphere of ethical life. In this sphere duties
are so inextricably tied to concrete habitual behavior that they derive their self-evident quality
from background convictions. In the sphere of ethical life, questions of justice are posed only
within the horizon of questions concerning the good life, questions which have always already
been answered.111

Habermas expresses an inextricable relationship between ethics and morality within the
lifeworld; this depiction underscores Habermas‟ commitment to an Enlightenment notion
of universalist morality. Habermas claims that everyday duties are “self-evident,” they
are concerned with “the good life,” and they relate to questions that merely concretize the
knowledge of justice that already exists. As subject to validity claims, ethics and
morality would seem to indicate the Kantian element of Habermas‟ theory. However, as
I have already argued, Habermas‟ ethical system is rooted in the lifeworld, and this
lifeworld is dependent, in part, on a Hegelian commitment to experiential reality, rather
than subjective transcendence.
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Despite his argument that ethical life provides the formal sphere for a self-evident
morality, Habermas does not rely on transcendent sources for his justification.112 Instead,
Habermas claims that the self-evident nature of morality in ethical life is a function of
rational decisions, thereby connecting discourse ethics, morality, and rational consensus
in a concrete way. As I explained in Chapter 2, Habermasian ethics can be systematized
only insofar as ethical principles can be decided upon rationally. These rational decisions
lie, for Habermas, in the ability to be of generalizable interest:
Thus, the development of the moral point of view goes hand in hand with the differentiation
within the practical into moral questions and evaluative questions. Moral questions can be
decided rationally, i.e., in terms of justice or the generalizability of interests. Evaluative questions
present themselves at the most general level as issues of the good life (or of self-realization); they
are accessible to rational discussion only within the unproblematic horizon of a concrete historical
form of life or the conduct of an individual life. 113

It is here, I contend, that Habermas clarifies his conception of justice. In the first place,
Habermas explains that practical discourse works to distinguish universal from uniquely
subjective concerns. He also indicates that practical discourse functions to evaluate
moral considerations in communicative action. Moral considerations are of universal
concern, which Habermas explains must be determined through a conception of justice.
Although he does not provide a substantial argument here, Habermas links justice with
generalizability. I would argue that there is a further equivocation in play here, between
generalizability and what he calls elsewhere, “universal.” This equivocation is not
necessarily a lapse in terminological concreteness, however. I believe that the
replacability of generalizability with universal merely further indicates the intractability
112

Self-evident justification has a performative source for Habermas. Interestingly, this emphasis on

performativity aligns Habermas‟s ethical justificatory procedures with Judith Butler‟s. Throughout her
corpus, Butler contends that the process of subjectivation takes place in intersubjective interaction, through
what she calls performativity.
113

Ibid., 108, emphasis in the original.

55

of the ethical from the moral. Here, Habermas uses generalizability to describe the
interpretation of interests, arguably an ethical consideration. However, Habermas claims
that this evaluation of interests is decided on the basis of moral questions. Elsewhere,
Habermas uses the term universal to indicate the deontological conclusion of his moral
standpoint theory, as I explained in Chapter 2. This means that moral questions emerge
rationally, are decided rationally, and that rational parameters exist for evaluating the
universalizability of a position. Additionally, justice is only an issue in the face of
generalizable concerns; personal concerns are addressed on an entirely different scale,
namely, through an evaluation of “the good life.” The good life, for Habermas, is
entirely dependent on the self-realization of the individual. It is a quasi-ethical moment
insofar as the good life appears to offer the bridge to the contextual lifeworld; Habermas
goes so far as to explain that these questions can only be addressed within the rational
parameters of a “concrete historical form of life,” which means a subject within a
particular discursive episteme.
This relation to historical context again depends on a Habermasian affinity for
Hegelian theory. Habermas sees Hegel‟s project as understanding the necessarily
historical component of lifeworld, lived experiences, and ethics:
Hegel fashioned his dialectical mode of justification in deliberate opposition to the transcendental
one of Kant. Hegel—and I can only hint at this here—agrees with those who charge that in the
end Kant failed to justify or ground the pure concepts of the understanding, for he merely culled
them from the table of forms of judgment, unaware of their historical specificity. Thus he failed,
in Hegel‟s eyes, to prove that the a priori conditions of what makes the experience possible are
truly necessary. In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel proposes to correct this flaw by taking a
genetic approach.114

In order to accommodate both the universalizable and the historically contingent in his
theory of discourse ethics, Habermas provides a strict procedure by which he contends
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we can evaluate the empirical and normative claims to validity. Following Hegel,
Habermas argues that the historically contingent characteristic of the lifeworld must be
understood in order to rationally evaluate the norms which are then justified and applied.
However, in truly Hegelian fashion, this historical contingency is understood
dialectically, through practical discourse:
The principle of discourse ethics (D) makes reference to a procedure, namely the discursive
redemption of normative claims to validity. To that extent discourse ethics can properly be
characterized as formal, for it provides no substantive guidelines, but only a procedure: practical
discourse. Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure for
testing the validity of norms that are being proposed ad hypothetically considered for adoption. 115

In other words, practical discourse is secondarily related to distributed normative
agreement. The agreement exists first, giving the grounds for practical discourse. This
seems to mean that normative claims in ethics and morality are primordial to practical
application in the lifeworld.
Once this background for discourse ethics is in place, Habermas outlines its
function in producing normative consensus as such. This consensus seems to be almost
entirely fulfillment oriented towards universalization. Habermas even goes so far as to
claim that distancing from norms is only possible inasmuch as it is important for
understanding a hypothetical attitude. This hypothetical attitude cannot be taken up as
lived; instead we should be concerned with a deontological move which would expose
the rational discourse for the prospect of normative consensus:
Participants can distance themselves from norms and normative systems that have been set off
from the totality of social life only to the extent necessary to assume a hypothetical attitude toward
them. Individuals who have been socialized cannot take a hypothetical attitude toward the form of
life and the personal life history that have shaped their own identity. We are now in a position to
define the scope of application of a deontological ethics: it covers only practical questions that can
be debated rationally, i.e., those that hold out the prospect of a consensus. It deals not with the
value preferences but with the normative validity of norms of action. 116
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It would seem that Habermas believes that we can never have a purely objective point of
view. To the extent that we cannot remove ourselves from the lifeworld context in which
we find ourselves and continually create around us, Habermas does not believe we can be
transcendentally objective. However, for Habermas, we can be objective insofar as we
are fundamentally rational beings. Working through rational debate with others, in our
search for consensus, provides us with a universal validating process. Habermasian
deontological ethics is simultaneously historically situated and universally valid; ethics
can act in both modes only when grounded in rational consensus-oriented discourse.117
Discourse is further bounded according to “norms of action,” which emerge through
rational discourse, as well. Habermas argues elsewhere that these norms emerge through
specialized discourse. Experts in diverse cultural fields develop and can then offer the
appropriate evaluative abstraction in that particular field.118
It would seem that an obvious critique of Habermasian discourse ethics would be
a critique of the Enlightenment optimism for access to an ideal point of view, wherein
one can become a participant in rational discourse, or even become an expert. Yet,
Habermas finds emancipatory potential in the emphasis on self-determination in relation
to universal moral determination. For Habermas, Enlightenment optimism does not
necessarily lead to exclusion. Instead, because the fundamental characteristic of
Enlightenment thought is theorizing the increasing social tendency to individuate,
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Habermas believes that an emphasis on individuation prevents the outcome of exclusion.
As David Ingram explains:
Although Habermas recognizes that this liberal phase of the bourgeois public sphere was not
entirely free of contradictions, in that the great mass of workers and peasants were excluded from
membership and private interests often supervened in what was ostensibly a rational articulation of
the public interest, he nonetheless appreciates the principle of democratic self-determination and
critical accountability that it embodied.119

Although Ingram acknowledges the potential critique of modernism, which will in fact be
levied against Habermas by the feminists, Ingram does his best to explain how Habermas
can avoid modernist traps. Ingram claims that it is in fact Habermas‟ commitment to
Hegelian Philosophy of Spirit that ensures Habermasian ethics is not doomed to idealism:
Modernity is defined by a consciousness of novelty, and it is this awareness that forms the
cornerstone of Hegel‟s philosophy. For Hegel, the most recent stage of history, beginning with
the Reformation and continuing through the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, enjoys a
special preeminence insofar as the principle that it brings to explicit articulation, freedom, is the
motor force of history (novelty) itself. 120

Because Hegel emphasizes innovation in the progressive drive of dialectics, then
Habermas need only appropriate Hegel‟s emphasis on novelty to highlight the
groundedness of his theory. An emphasis on novelty means that new voices only enrich
the discursive situation, and that the expansion of dialogue creates greater
universalizability in consensus formation.
Ingram goes so far as to contend that Habermas works to complete Hegel‟s
modernist project. While Hegel could only allude to the possibility of historical
fulfillment for all, Habermas actually introduces the potential for intersubjectively
evaluating real social problems:
Habermas remarks that Hegel‟s decision to ground his conception of Spirit in self-objectifying
subjectivity rather than communicative intersubjectivity may well have dictated his choice of
ethical community. His model of rational society—as involving a strategic conflict of interests
held in check by a bureaucratic administration—resolves the problem of modernity by devaluing
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everyday life and minimizing social critique; subjectivism is criticized philosophically, while
people‟s needs for a democratic community go unheeded.121

In Ingram‟s estimation, Habermas criticizes Hegel for not completing the critical project.
Despite Hegel‟s important move from the subject-object dilemma that plagues Kantian
critical philosophy, Hegel‟s development of the ethical community is incomplete.
Without adequately theorizing this ethical community, which I take to be analogous to
Habermas‟ lifeworld, Hegel cannot effectively address practical problems. Tom
Rockmore, in his book Habermas on Historical Materialism (1989), agrees that
Habermas essentially fills out Hegel‟s project. In this elaboration, Habermas takes up a
very Hegelian task; namely, to employ the historical materialist process of theoretical
fulfillment:
In other words, in the transition from theory reconstruction to theory replacement, Habermas does
not alter his original intent, which is constantly to do better what historical materialism, as he
understands it, was meant to accomplish. What does change is the means he chooses to carry out
this task and perhaps even the specific source for the inspiration for the wider framework he
employs. Although throughout his writings he is more critical of Hegel than Kant, in the effort to
show that his own view is better adapted to reach the goal of a prior theory, in effect he employs a
Hegelian strategy.122

I agree with Rockmore that it is precisely the Hegelian attitude of his theoretical
application that aligns Habermas with Hegelianism, despite Habermas‟ explicit critiques
of Hegel and endorsements of Kant. This mode of Hegelianism also forms the ground for
Benhabib‟s critique of Habermas, which I will elaborate in the next section.
Although it is clear in this analysis that Habermas privileges the modernist
attitude towards reason and rational consensus, he also recognizes that ethical change
depends on a certain motivation to change, to make things better, to increase freedom.
However, Habermas sees even in the explorations of utopic ideals the appeal to reason
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and dialectic.123 He admires Marcuse‟s utopist vision, but less because it inspired
revolution, and more because of what it exposed in Marcuse‟s sensibilities: a romantic
element grounded firmly in a commitment to idealist notions of reason, i.e., Kant, and an
appreciation of history grounded firmly in Hegelian dialectics.124 Although it may be
argued that Habermas himself does not have this romantic edge, Habermas‟ account of
Marcuse is full of reverence and admiration for this quality. So much so, that Habermas‟
own tone begins to wax romantic. However, if Habermas identifies the core of
Marcuse‟s romanticism in Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity, it is certainly because
of his own predilection for these concepts. Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity found
his theory of communication; they are what allow for rational consensus and even speech
act analysis. In this way, Habermas introduces a utopic moment to his theory. He has
hope for a future made better through democratic participation, wherein the norms and
values most helpful for all are rationally agreed to at the end of reasonable
communicative action.
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Benhabib’s Interests in Utopian Value
Habermas‟ quasi-utopist vision parallels the goals and ideals of many “rebellious”
thinkers, including many feminists whose critical optimism rests entirely in the hope for
future change.

As I addressed in chapters 1 and 2, the feminist engagement with

Habermas‟ theory involves varying degrees of accordance with and dependence upon
Habermasian concepts. The same holds true for the feminist engagement with
Habermas‟ fulfillment-orientation. In the coming sections, I primarily engage two of
these feminist positions, Benhabib‟s and Honig‟s, in order to illustrate a possible
modification of critical theoretical principles regarding utopianism and universalization.
Although Habermas and these feminist positions share many of the same goals,
the philosophical commitments are quite divergent. As I explained above, Habermas is
committed to a hard-lined notion of rational argumentation culminating in consensus.
This consensus promotes normative values for society, and it is in these norms that
Habermas expresses a qualified utopian promise. Change occurs through consensus
fulfillment, modeling a strong modernist position. Many feminists have a quite different
grounding. Benhabib, for example, is closest to Habermas, in that she argues that a
commitment to universalist reason is necessary for appealing to the empowering potential
of change. Without agreed upon notions of what good and better are, how else can we
achieve a better future? However, Benhabib is still distinct from Habermas in that she
recognizes that this idealist notion of reason is only useful on a macro-level. In order to
even come together for utopian change, Benhabib contends that we must recognize the
individual particularities that can never be subsumed into one programmatic norm for
society, but are always instead concrete and particular. Utopic promise can only arise
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when a balance is met between the generalized and the concrete other. Here utopianism
is grounded less on Hegelian historicity and more on historically contingent and
contextual psychologies.
Benhabib‟s work is uniquely important to my own understanding of the debate
between communicative action theory and feminists, because contrary to many of the
feminist philosophers I have addressed thus far, Benhabib explicitly espouses a modified
version of Habermas‟ theory. Benhabib‟s critique of Habermas‟ Hegelianism is nuanced
and qualified by her allegiance to an overall appropriation of Habermasian normative
theory. As I addressed in chapter 2, Benhabib believes that feminist ethics must be
grounded in normative standards in order to preserve practical emancipatory possibility.
For Benhabib, a system of Habermasian communicative action resolves conflicts,
answers moral and political questions, and balances self-interest (private) with mutual
understanding (public), albeit in a limited way given his emphasis on normativity. As I
outlined in chapter 1, Benhabib, Fleming, and others believe that Habermas recognizes
and addresses the dichotomy between public and private, but that his application and
extension of political discourse is limited by its normalizing nature to universalize. In
this section, I will develop a different vein of Benhabib‟s critique. According to
Benhabib, Habermas—to his detriment—minimizes the utopic vision of a Kantian
inspired ethical system.125
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In her essay “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics,” Benhabib
exposes Habermas‟ latent affinity for a Hegelian system of ethics and fulfillment.126 To
begin her analysis, Benhabib explains the difference between a utopian-oriented system
of ethics and a normatively-oriented system of ethics as two possible understandings of
an ethics of communicative action:
It [the two possible interpretations of an ethics of communicative action] reveals the intimate
relation between „transfiguration‟ and „fulfillment‟, between the poles of utopia and norm within
which the discourse of a critical social theory unfolds. By „transfiguration‟ I mean the future
envisaged by a theory entails a radical rupture with the present, and in such a rupture a new and
imaginative constellation of the values and meanings of the present takes place. The concept of
fulfillment, by contrast, refers to the fact that the society of the future executes and carries out the
unfinished tasks of the present, without necessarily forging new, imaginative constellations out of
this cultural heritage. These are concepts which I use to designate an essential tension in the
project of Critical theory and which can also be referred to as „utopia‟ and „norm‟ respectively. 127

Benhabib‟s evaluation of transfiguration and fulfillment exposes her own philosophical
lineage and affinities. Benhabib is more or less a neo-Kantian Critical Theorist; however,
she writes elsewhere of her particular draw to Hegel and Hegelian inspired ethical
understanding.128

In this case, Benhabib identifies a Kantian ethical system of theory

replacement with transfiguration, while relegating Hegelian ethics to theory
reconstruction through historically predetermined fulfillment. Benhabib equates
fulfillment with norms, and transfiguration with utopia. Throughout the rest of the essay,
Benhabib attempts to show how, despite his inclusion of both normative and utopian
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elements, Habermas‟ favoring of normativity and generalization limits his capacity to
bring the utopian and culturally sensitive aspects of his theory to fruition.
Benhabib explains that fulfillment and over-generalized norms have been
historically faulted for their inability to reconcile with the value of emancipation and
universalization. She explains that although Habermas tries to re-establish the link
between critical political theory and the Enlightenment, he fails to see that the
Enlightenment legacy excludes several groups from the universal rights and potentialities
it claims to protect:
Habermas has attempted to reestablish the link between the Enlightenment and emancipation, and
to bring the project of emancipation into the light of the public by going back to the Enlightenment
legacy of practical reason. His project requires fulfilling the universalistic promise of social
contract and consent theories which, since the 17th century, have always limited such universalism
on the basis of sex, class, race, and status distinctions. 129

Although Benhabib finds merit in the emancipatory project, she recognizes that any hope
for universalized emancipation can emerge only through a utopian understanding of the
value of the other. Rather than generalizing the Other as that-standpoint-which-is-notmy-own, Benhabib suggests a reevaluation of moral autonomy. She chastises Habermas
for simply accepting the view of the generalized other from Mead: “My thesis is that
Habermas, following Mead, restricts moral autonomy to the standpoint of the
„generalized other‟, and does not do justice to the utopian dimension in his own
project.”130
According to Benhabib, the collapse of Habermas‟ project into simple fulfillmentorientation and generalizability comes from a procedural notion of normative consensus:
There are two premises shared by Rawls and Habermas. I will call the first the „consensus
principle of legitimacy‟ and define it as follows: the principle of rational consensus provides the
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only criterion in light of which the legitimacy of norms and institutional arrangements can be
justified. More significantly, Rawls and Habermas share the meta-theoretical premise: the idea of
such rational consensus is to be defined procedurally. Rawls maintains that his theory of justice
provides us with the only procedure of justification through which valid and binding norms of
collective coexistence can be established. Habermas argues that the „ideal speech situation‟
defines the formal properties of discourses, by engaging in which alone we can attain a rational
consensus. The fictive collective choice situation devised by Rawls and the „ideal speech
situation‟ devised by Habermas are normative justification procedures serving to illustrate the
consensus principle of legitimacy.131

Benhabib‟s explanation of the “consensus principle of legitimacy” exposes another major
flaw of Habermas‟ notion of normativity: it is sterile. By creating an ideal speech
situation, goals and justifications arise in a consensus whose establishment rests on the
notion of a generalized other who legitimizes this normative position. In other words,
Habermas creates a procedure for communicative ethics that does not sufficiently account
for the spontaneity, interconnectedness, historicity, and cultural relevance of real political
speech.
Although Benhabib is sympathetic to the Habermasian project of communicative
action, she finds the problem of fixed normativity almost fatal to his project. Benhabib
believes that the alternative—an open, utopian-oriented ethical attitude whose goal is
transfiguration and whose establishment rests on recognizing the concrete other—
exposes major flaws in Habermas‟ dichotomized system:
If the highest stage of a universalistic ethical orientation is this open, reflexive communication
about our needs and the cultural traditions in light of which they are interpreted, then a number of
oppositions on which Communicative ethics seemed to rest begin to lose their force: questions of
justice merge with questions of the good life; practical-moral discourses flow into aestheticexpressive ones; autonomy is not only self-determination in accordance with just norms but the
capacity to assume the standpoint of the concrete other as well.132

For Benhabib, Habermas‟ claim to a historically contingent and individually sensitive
communicative ethics is impossible to maintain alongside his commitments to
universalizable, justifiable norms and the social practice of consensus that founds these
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norms. Instead, Benhabib illustrates that true openness to particularized interests and
individually contextualized needs undermines Habermas‟ emphasis on the distinctions
between justice and the good life, between practical discourse and aesthetic discourse,
and between self-determination and intersubjectivity. Following Benhabib‟s logic,
individual contextualization would not only determine the best path for selfactualization—or the good life, in Habermasian terms—but it would also determine the
specific interpretation of justice which a political actor would bring to the discursive
public sphere. Similarly, questions of taste and self-expression would influence practical
determinations, as the self-identity of a subject would also influence that specific
subject‟s relation to, and identification with, others. Alternatively, bracketing these
considerations out of public communicative action would force Habermas into a position
of ahistorical and theoretical sterility. Benhabib‟s critical analysis of Habermas leaves
the question: If normativity forces communicative action in the public sphere into a role
of self-restriction, then what alternative does the feminist project of Critical Theory
have?133

Honig, Foreignness and Universalization
In order to uncover the impact of this tension between universalism and
utopianism in normative ethics, I would like to take a modified approach to a familiar
example in feminist Critical Theory, the issue of immigration. For contemporary
feminist philosophers, immigration and the status of immigrant citizens is of particular
133
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concern in a globalized and increasingly cosmopolitan world.134 In a cosmopolitan
world, women‟s rights are not simply an issue for an isolated group of persons in a
national community, but they are instead the paradigms for evaluating human rights
concerns on national, international, and transnational levels. Because of this connection
between women‟s rights, globalization, and citizenship, feminist theory often engages
with issues of immigration that exemplify similar intersectional concerns. Bonnie Honig,
for example, argues in “Immigrant America? How Foreignness „Solves‟ Democracy‟s
Problems” that U.S. immigration policy has served to reinforce the idealization of
universalist ethical principles, while simultaneously exposing the practical impossibility
to ensure universal democratic participation.135 Honig contends that the act of
performing a naturalization process dramatizes the signature of a social contract: “In the
case of the United States, this means (re)enacting for established citizens the otherwise
too abstract universalism of America‟s democratic constitutionalism.”136 For Honig,
foreign immigrants provide liberal legitimacy to the state by creating real situations of
contractual agreement. However, as Honig convincingly elaborates, these same
immigrants are “infantilized” and made to seem unintelligent and “desperate” by nativeborn citizens.137 Native-born citizens create media stereotypes of immigrants as needing
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protection and safe-haven in the paternal authority of the United States. Immigrants are
accused of taking jobs from native citizens and of burdening social services like foodstamps and Medicaid. If the idealization of universalization is only possible in a
fantastical re-enactment wherein the same re-enactment is ultimately undermined by
generalization and stereotypes, then it seems that universalized normative democracy is
untenable. However, I would like to explore this scenario even further.
Habermas explicitly acknowledges that universalization is mediated by
participation. As I laid out in the last two chapters, Habermasian ethics depends on
universal normative standards; these normative standards must be formulated on
consensus in order to justify.138 Habermas further contends that normative justification is
strengthened by incorporating as many disparate voices as possible: It should not be the
white male voice alone, but individuals who have been socialized in particular ways. In
fact, Habermas contends that the individual socialization process is central to the
effectiveness of communicative action.139 These concerns seem analogous to the feminist
project, where the concerns of individuals must be considered in advance of democratic
participation in order to ensure the inclusive efficacy of the emancipatory democratic
process.140 However, as I illustrated above, Habermas‟ project rests on an overly ideal
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notion of consensus fulfillment and ultimate universalization of normative morality, an
Enlightenment project Habermas indicates can and should be fulfilled. As I have already
intimated, this orientation toward fulfillment inhibits the critical and utopic moments of
Habermas‟ projects. But what does this inhibition actually mean in practice?
Returning to the idea of immigration and the relationship between the utopic, the
universal, and democratic participation, I would like to reimagine the case example
Honig provides. U.S. immigration policies and state laws are even more stringent and
inscrutable in 2010 than they were in 1998.141 Today laws in Arizona require noncitizens to offer proof of legal status at the whim of law enforcement, there is a partial
wall separating the Mexico-U.S. Border, and to enter to and from Canada you must now
have a passport. What does this increased restriction on undocumented citizens,
immigration, and border control mean for an analysis of Habermas‟ overly modernist
tendencies? I contend that these new systems and legal boundaries are intended to
preserve an idealization of a social contract. By constraining who counts as a membercitizen in normatively circumscribed boundaries, immigration laws attempt to define
transnational concerns. This theory finds various incarnations, such as Derrida‟s “Democracy-to-come,” or
Cornell‟s “Moral Imaginary.”
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particular social contract relationships. Society has a duty to protect you, but only if you
are a true member of that society. The increased stringency of immigration and border
laws further narrow the definition of citizenship and membership, thereby further limiting
the duties of society for protection. However, at the same time that these laws and
practices serve to exclude and limit persons from citizenship status, they also serve to
make the duties of society appear better fulfilled. For example, if a part of the perceived
ideal social contract is the duty of protecting property rights, financial securities, and free
marketplace trade, it is easier to perform these duties for a select number of accounted-for
citizens who have legal-status jobs and participate in banking. However, when members
of a community without legal status are unable to participate in these systems and instead
seek under-the-table employment and cannot invest in banks, it makes the entire system
seem inefficient and incapable. By pushing these marginalized individuals completely
outside the bounds of the social contract, the duties appear more universally fulfilled, and
therefore more universal in general. But this universalizability is illusory, precisely
because those who are expelled from the system are forced to function outside of the
system, de-stabilizing the system itself. This is essentially the inverse of the problem
Honig identified.
Benhabib contends that these issues are not merely the result of the practical
deployment of current democratic institutions, but that they are, in fact, grounded in
precisely the type of theory which Habermas endorses.142 She writes:
142
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Habermas has attempted to reestablish the link between the Enlightenment and emancipation, and
to bring the project of emancipation into the light of the public by going back to the Enlightenment
legacy of practical reason. His project requires fulfilling the universalistic promise of social
contract and consent theories which, since the 17th century, have always limited such universalism
on the basis of sex, class, race, and status distinctions. 143

For Benhabib the greatest threat to emancipation is the idealization of modernist and
Enlightenment conceptions of universalism. By glorifying these positions, and by
claiming that they help to establish the normative framework Habermasian
communicative ethics needs, Habermas falls prey to a system of domination, rather than
emancipation. In the following section, I explain how my specific interpretation of
Benhabib‟s and Honig‟s positions provides an alternative to Habermas‟ limitations.

Utopian Cosmopolitanism
As an alternative theory of democratic participation, both Honig and Benhabib
endorse cosmopolitanism. Although their conceptions of cosmopolitanism are quite
distinct, both theorists share a principle value of utopianism as central to inclusive
democracy.144 According to Honig, cosmopolitanism must be radically democratic,
accommodating participants who are disenfranchised by other views of democratic
participation:

to support contractualism, which he defines as an understanding of social contract theory which explicitly
emphasizes social critique and historical realities (16).
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The goal of a democratic cosmopolitanism is to offset the risks and vouchsafe the benefits of a
state (non)membership by widening the resources and energies of an emerging international civil
society to contest or support state actions in matters of transnational and local interest, such as
environmental, economic, military, cultural, and immigration policies. This is a democratic
cosmopolitanism because democracy—in the sense of a commitment to local and popular
empowerment, effective representation, and the generation of actions in concert across lines of
difference—is its goal.145

By this definition, the democratic cosmopolitanism Honig endorses is utopian in its
orientation towards not a singular, fulfillable goal, but to an ever-widening scope of
inclusionary emancipation and participation. Further, this utopian vision for transnational
democracy depends on an ethics founded in relational difference, which utilizes
contentious and complimentary solidarity as a mechanism for change. Although Honig
does not develop either of these positions, I argue that it is clear such a program is needed
for transnational and local feminist concerns by her recommendation that democratic
cosmopolitanism mediate “transnational and local interest” through the “generation of
actions in concert across lines of difference.” In chapters 4, 5, and 6, I strive to articulate
the possibility for theorizing these ethical foundations, by arguing for the development of
a relational ethics modeled upon parental care ethics, grounded primarily in the
recognition of mutual vulnerability, which requires specific acts of solidarity for its
application. Such a program is, like Honig‟s vision for democratic cosmopolitanism,
fundamentally utopian.146 It is a procedure, always in process, never oriented to absolute
fulfillment that gathers strength in its ability to be fungible and flexible.
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Benhabib, like Honig, advocates an expansionary definition of transnational
democracy. In her formulation of cosmopolitanism, Benhabib attempts to reconcile the
universal with the particular, and the global with the local, by demonstrating their
fundamental interdependence for justification. Unlike Habermasian justifications,
Benhabib argues, cosmopolitan justifications cannot rely on the rationalization processes
of a nation-state. Instead, cosmopolitanism depends as much on the particularity of
intranational cultural differences as it does on the generalizability of international human
rights. As Benhabib explains:
The spread of cosmopolitan norms, from interdictions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide to the increasing regulations of cross-border movements through the Geneva
Conventions and other accords, has yielded a new political condition: the local, the national and
the global are all imbricated in one another. Future democratic iterations will make their
interconnections and interdependence deeper and wider. Rather than seeing this situation as
undermining democratic sovereignty, we can view it as promising the emergence of new political
configurations and new forms of agency, inspired by the interdependence—never frictionless but
ever promising—of the local, the national, and the global. 147

This definition of cosmopolitanism follows Benhabib‟s earlier injunction that
universalism in ethics must be oriented toward open transfiguration, rather than
transformative completion. By highlighting the future orientation of increasingly
cosmopolitan ethical navigation, Benhabib suggests a utopian openness is necessary for
theorizing contemporary ethical problems. In this account, neither the particular, nor the
universal is given primacy, unlike the Habermasian account. However, in distinction to
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Honig‟s formulation, Benhabib still emphasizes a quasi-modernist notion of universal
normative justification.
Despite Habermas‟ fears that such an ethics would lose legitimacy in its
theoretical justification, and efficacy in its practical application, using Benhabib and
Honig to qualify Habermas‟ project, I argue that a feminist ethics of utopian
cosmopolitanism would ultimately reorient Critical Theory to Habermas‟ own goals of
emancipation. In the next chapter, I address how utopian openness would also benefit
Habermas‟ theory of human nature by providing the theoretical grounding for the
expansion of an understanding of embodied subjectivity.
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Chapter 4
The Future of Human Nature:
A Critical Analysis of Habermas and the Ethics of Expanding Human Nature

In his book The Future of Human Nature (2003), Jürgen Habermas challenges the
ethics of medical enhancement by proposing that even something as seemingly benign as
preimplantation genetic testing questions the very authenticity of subjective existence and
personal autonomy. Arguing that parental rights to interfere genetically with fetuses
must be clearly delimited by the possibilities of the future person's decision-making
ability, Habermas claims that the philosophical and political right to freedom is at stake
in determining medical ethics. Habermas' argument hinges on the notion of biological
nature—he proposes that genetic interference is ultimately irreversible and formally final
in the constitution of a person. However, Habermas' strict definition of human nature and
its future possibilities restricts the potential for reevaluating the very notion of human
nature. Habermas‟ concerns with normativity and autonomy are, therefore, too restrictive
for Critical Theory when it comes to such normative and moral concerns as
preimplantation genetic diagnosis. In this case, his strictures actually limit normatively
guaranteed autonomy by limiting parental decision-making and also by confining the free
choice of the individual within biological and genetic constraints, forcing Habermas to
propose a restrictive theory of human nature. I propose that in order to evaluate the
ethics of medical enhancement, the definition of "human nature" must be expanded to
recognize the cultural, psychological, and self-constitutive forces that are, in fact, no
longer fixed and yet contribute to the creation of personhood. This notion of existential
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personhood simultaneously respects the decision-making ability of the individual, while
recognizing the expanded notions of human nature and parental responsibility. In this
chapter, I begin with a careful analysis of Habermas' core argument in The Future of
Human Nature, providing an examination of challenges to his project, notably from
Cristina Lafont on the role of parental responsibility and Nikolas Kompridis on
normativity. Once the core argument is established, I provide an analysis of an
alternative ethical foundation through a modification of relational care ethics. In this
way, I challenge the fundamental assumption that genetic enhancement limits autonomy
by proposing that a responsible medical ethics including genetic enhancement may
instead expand existential freedom. I end this chapter by bracing my argument with an
analysis of Amy Allen‟s feminist critique of Habermasian notions of power, explaining
that a synthesis of Habermas and more feminist-friendly relational notions of power
dynamics allows for a fuller depiction of a self-constitutive subject. It is in this
framework, I contend, that the future human subject of the post-genetic age may in fact
be better equipped to assert her freedom and autonomy through critical reflection on
biological and cultural forces.

Habermas and Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis
Seemingly breaking from his trademark essays and books on social normativity
and its effects on communicative action, Habermas‟ work in The Future of Human
Nature explores the ever-widening scope of medical ethics and the potential effects
medical enhancement may have on ethical autonomy. Medical enhancement‟s scope is
so wide and so amorphous that Habermas limits his analysis to the specific developing
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medical technique of preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Habermas identifies his explicit
understanding of preimplantation diagnosis as that diagnosis which: “permits genetic
screening to be carried out on embryos at the eight-cell stage.”148 Habermas further
clarifies his operational understanding of this diagnosis as a procedure explicitly
“recommended, in the first place, to parents wanting to rule out the risk of transmitting a
hereditary disease.”149 Following this concise definition of preimplantation genetic
diagnosis as the paradigm advancement in contemporary medical society, Habermas
begins to explore the potential problems and crises he sees arising from the expanding
world of medical enhancement and its impact on the question of human nature.
Although it initially seems that Habermas is breaking from his traditional work in
communicative ethics and normativity by exploring a debate in contemporary medical
ethics, it soon becomes clear that Habermas‟ fears about preimplantation genetic testing
are rooted directly within the issues of familiar Habermasian Critical Theory. Namely,
Habermas fears the possibility that medical developments and research investments are
moving at a pace beyond the scope of the limitations and regulations established by
communicative action in the public sphere. For Habermas, developments in medical
enhancement represent a potential threat to communication and normativity on several
levels. Primarily, it is on the level of the autonomous individual, which will be the focus
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of this chapter and something I will discuss in further detail in the coming sections, but
also on the level of the ethicopolitical society.
Habermas identifies several factors related to medical advancement techniques
that problematize political society and the effectiveness of the public sphere. In
Habermas‟ estimation: “As biotechnological research is by now bound up with investors‟
interests as well as with the pressure for success felt by national governments, the
development of genetic engineering has acquired a dynamic which threatens to steamroll
the inherently slow-paced processes of an ethicopolitical opinion and will formation in
the public sphere.”150 The very relation of medical development to funding sources and
governmental recognition, according to Habermas, infuses the biotechnological debate
with a force that is difficult to control via the normal public and political practices.
Habermas believes that in order to combat hasty acceptance of medical advancement
techniques, ethicopolitical society must engage in a more specific application of
communicative action. Evaluating the ethical standards for preimplantation genetic
diagnosis, Habermas writes:
As a first step, the population in general as well as the political public sphere and parliament may
come to feel that preimplanation genetic diagnosis as such may be morally permitted or legally
tolerated if limited to a small number of well-defined cases of severe hereditary disease which the
persons who are potentially affected by them in the future cannot be reasonably expected to cope
with.151

This line of reasoning seems to presuppose two major assumptions: First, that the
political public sphere is best suited to provide the ethical guidelines for the
Kierkegaardian private determinations of the self on which Habermas is grounding his
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argument.152 And secondly, that the “ability to cope” provides sufficient normative
content to overcome the limitations of medical/economic and private/familial
determinations of biotechnological ethics.
Remarking on the relationship between biotechnological advances and legal
restrictions to date, Habermas claims that the freedom of biotechnology has been in
keeping with the freedoms of the rest of social society, and as such has been in large part
protected, rather than restricted, by law: “From this sober empirical perspective,
legislative interventions restricting the freedom of biological research and banning the
advances of genetic engineering seem but a vain attempt to set oneself against the
dominant tendency to freedom of modern society.”153 Far from seeing this type of
freedom as positive in a rationally motivated communicative society, Habermas seems to
indicate that the unrestricted tendency towards “freedom” has potentially negative
consequences. Later in this chapter, I will examine in detail Habermas‟ conflicted
attitude towards freedom in The Future of Human Nature and assess the possible
normative ramifications of this attitude on the autonomous individual.
Parallel to his fears about the ethicopolitical ramifications of preimplantation
genetic diagnosis and runaway medical advancements, Habermas expresses angst for the
status of autonomous individuals in a post-genetic world. Imagining the outcome of the
“future person” affected by preimplantation genetic diagnosis--the former fetus-subject,
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now an embodied adolescent--Habermas predicts an existential crisis beyond the scope of
normal adolescent existential crises. He writes:
In this way, the dedifferentiation of the distinction between the grown and the made intrudes upon
one‟s subjective mode of existence. It might usher in the vertiginous awareness that, as a
consequence of genetic intervention carried out before we were born, the subjective nature we
experience as being something we cannot dispose over is actually the result of an
instrumentalization of a part of our nature. 154

For Habermas, then, the most affecting result of genetic diagnosis and intervention is not
the presumed goal of combating hereditary disease and ensuring fetal health; rather, the
most affecting outcome is the potential inability for the “future person” to self-identify
according to its subjective nature.155
Habermas‟ warnings about the future of human nature in a post-genetic world
then are two-fold: First, he anticipates a world in which the speed of technology
supercedes the effectiveness and abilities of political communication, which he compares
to a “dominant tendency toward freedom in modern society.” Additionally, and more
relevant to this project, Habermas identifies the potential for new existential crises related
to medical instrumentalization and formally final genetic interventions.156 In the
remainder of this chapter, I want to highlight a particular problem with Habermas‟
explanation of PGD. I argue that Habermas conflates the existential with the biological.
Recognizing the detriment to autonomous self-understanding caused by the “disposing
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over” the future human person, Habermas mistakenly attributes this danger to an
inevitable consequence of PGD. However, PGD as a biological-technology tool and
intervention is not necessarily a practice of the anonymous disposing over by an
unanswerable third party. As an alternative, I propose in the following sections that if,
instead, the normatively interested critical theorist looks to where normative decisions
properly belong, namely the communicatively experienced lifeworld, an analysis of the
appropriate normative ethical channels—practices of parenting, adolescent selfconstitution, the responsiveness of human rights—proves that PGD may retain its place
as a practicable technique without disrupting individual autonomy. In other words, if
Habermas had focused on the distinction between the biological and the normative issues,
he would have had to offer a more nuanced account of medical ethics, rather than
resorting to a weak argument for formal biological normativity.

Fixed Normativity and the Devaluation of the Critical in Critical Theory
Nikolas Kompridis, in his book Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between
Past and Future (2006), challenges the Habermasian position on both the notion of future
and the notion of human autonomy and possibility. Taking for his main interest the role
of normative ethics in the disclosure of human facticity, Kompridis hones his appraisal of
Habermas‟ distinction between proceduralist ethics and human nature.
Although Kompridis‟ main objective is to rectify contemporary Critical Theory
with a current reading of Heideggerian disclosure theory, underlying his entire project is
an apt critique of Habermas—particularly the more recent works by Habermas.
Kompridis begins his discussion of Habermas with an analysis of the Critical Theory
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project of understanding future possibility. According to Kompridis‟ estimation,
contemporary Critical Theory is founded on recognition of renewal—a renewal which is
historically constituted. This concept of renewal is not only a notion of cultural
reevaluation, but also a deeply personal responsibility of the individual in a normatively
constructed lifeworld. For Kompridis, Critical Theory demands that we reassess the
normative as a reflective tool:
Thus we can say that the normativity of the new contains both a problem-solving aspect that
answers the ever-present need to make sense of the discontinuity against a shifting background of
continuity, and a culture-orienting aspect that facilitates a reflective understanding of and relation
to the past.157

According to this assessment of the role of novelty in normative problem-solving, the
responsible critical individual must retain a reflective relationship with the historical
understandings of normativity and renewal. This reflective relationship appears at the
heart of both first generation Critical Theory and in Habermas‟ writings on modernity.
In his reading of Habermas‟ The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity158,
Kompridis ascribes an important ethical paradigm to Habermas‟ interpretation of the
„present‟:
Within this ethically reinterpreted historical horizon we bear a special responsibility: we are the
ones who must self-consciously renew and correct our forms of life, who must repair what is
broken, or break with what seems irreparable. We are the ones who must remake our languages
and practices, and make something new out of something old. 159
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Individuals have a special reflective duty to renew both their autonomous lives and the
intersubjective lifeworld around them in Habermas‟ assessment of modernity. It is this
duty—to renew and rehabilitate the individual in the face of a historical present—that
Kompridis finds lacking in the more recent Habermas. Kompridis finds that Habermas
moves further and further away from the project of innovation by his interest in
proceduralist ethics. According to a Habermasian system of proceduralist ethics, the goal
of communicative action is a rational goal—namely, to achieve a norm to which all
communicative actors in the lifeworld can ascribe. However, Kompridis argues against
Habermas‟ claims to neutrality and distance from content-rich ideas of the good life. Not
only is this position self-defeating—in order for Habermas to make claims about rational
standards, he must elevate the notion of rationality to a „good‟—but also, the position is
potentially harmful to the critical capacity of Critical Theory. As Kompridis wryly states,
“A good that has no significant content has no critical potential.”160 The problem of
neutrality and empty goods also points to a much larger problem stifling Habermas‟ full
critical potential. Kompridis identifies a Habermasian shift from an emphasis in
historically centered philosophy of the subject (key to first generation Critical Theory) to
what Kompridis calls a “more foundationalist theoretical structure.”161 Kompridis finds
the totalizing nature of this move problematic for Critical Theory‟s own ability to retain
its critical identity, where Kompridis identifies the critical capacity with an emphasis on
historical situatedness and particularization. The shift finalized in Between Facts and
Norms situates Habermas‟ contemporary brand of Critical Theory within a proceduralist
vision of ethics—a restrictive vision Kompridis distills as “…through which the role of
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philosophy is largely restricted to the problem of designing procedures for determining
the validity of the generalizable, collectively binding norms.”162 In his new work,
therefore, Habermas has moved away from the important critical goal of reflective
innovation, to the severely limited philosophical action of rationally assessing validity.
Despite Habermas‟ insistence that communicatively centered Critical Theory
avoids the postmodern trap of „otherness,‟ or more specifically, the other of reason,
Kompridis points out the impossibility of avoiding otherness based on the very practices
of communicative Critical Theory:
Nonetheless, communicative rationality does produce its own „other‟ of reason because it denies a
transformative role for reason, a role it cannot help but deny so long as it is narrowly framed by a
proceduralist conception of rationality that privileges the justificatory role of reason. This is not a
problem that is easily rectified, since the basic concepts of communicative rationality are not
designed to make sense of—but simply take for granted—the ways in which human beings
transform the meanings, ideals, norms, institutions, practices, and traditions they inherit and pass
on.163

According to this assessment, Kompridis not only identifies the problem communicative
Critical Theory faces—namely, that the justificatory purpose of rationally motivated
communication eliminates the acceptance of other notions of reason—but he also hints at
the solution. If communicative rationality ignores the transformative power of human
beings, then a refocusing of Critical Theory precisely on that which is transformative,
innovative, and creative would revive the critical and historical situatedness of
communication and Critical Theory.
It would seem then, that Habermas‟ interest in genetic innovation in The Future of
Human Nature is exactly what his philosophical system needs in order to revitalize its
critical character. Unfortunately for Habermas, however, Kompridis finds that far from
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revitalizing his project, Habermas simply exposes his system‟s own limitations.
According to Kompridis, although Habermas‟ previous works establish a specific role for
philosophy--as a procedural method for establishing rationally motivated normative
ethics—The Future of Human Nature explicitly changes the purpose and goal of
philosophy to an intervention in the lifeworld. Kompridis clarifies this new goal, when
he writes:
Philosophy is not just being asked to play a mediating role; it is expected to have a say in
determining “the right understanding of cultural forms of life in general.” Now that calls for a
great deal more than what Habermas‟ procedural conception allows: it calls for critical
illumination of what it means to be a human being. 164

Habermas‟ call to define human life changes the Habermasian system; now, far from
offering a proceduralist system for rational communication, Habermas advocates a
normative definition of human person as primary to any philosophical understanding.
This new direction poses a unique problem for Habermas; it forces Habermas to
acknowledge the necessity of conceiving of the being and life of the communicative
subject before the communicative act can actually take place. According to Kompridis,
the arguments in The Future of Human Nature ultimately force Habermas to reverse the
priority of his positions. Justice as the outcome of communicative action must now be
secondary to “…a prior background understanding of what it is to be a human being.”165
However, what Habermas offers in the way of understanding human nature does not
fulfill the necessary requirements for an existential understanding of human nature.
Whereas theories of world disclosure involve the creative and the reflective activities of
the self as self-constitutive, even in The Future of Human Nature, Habermas merely
provides a fixed prescription for what humanness requires. According to the previously
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discussed fear Habermas has about the existential ramifications of genetic diagnosis on
autonomy, the person is unable to reassess and redefine her own nature in the face of
genetic manipulation. In other words, the human person is formally constituted by his or
her genetic code.
Because of the limitations of a Habermasian system of communicative ethics,
specifically the form of ethics restricted by proceduralist and rationalist interests,
Kompridis offers his own version of a Critical Theory perspective on human nature.
Addressing the need for the innovative and world-disclosing characteristics of Critical
Theory—the very qualities he finds lacking in Habermas‟ Between Facts and Norms—in
conjunction with a notion of being in a „genetic‟ world, Kompridis advocates a critical
position in which the meaning of “human being” is continuously redisclosed in the face
of historical presence: “For it is not enough simply to offer reminders of what it means to
be a human being; philosophy must do what it can to speak in the name of the human,
disclosing and redisclosing the meaning of human being in the face of all that threatens
it—including those expert cultures which claim to know the human.”166 In order to avoid
the antiseptic and ultimately overly rationalist conception of the world in Habermasian
Critical Theory, Kompridis revitalizes the concepts of renewal, critique, and historicity167
integral to world-disclosing existential perspectives and first generation Critical
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Theory.168 In the context of the future possibilities of human nature, this alternative also
opens the evaluation of what it means to be human to further interpretation and
possibility, a concept I will return to in the final section of this chapter.

Parental Responsibility: The Subtle Differences Between Negative and Positive Eugenics
Despite his critique, even Kompridis recognizes the timely importance of
Habermas‟ contribution to medical ethics. In the context of an increasingly important
philosophical discussion about medical ethics and advancing medical technologies, The
Future of Human Nature offers new insight into the possible ethical and existential
ramifications of a system of positive eugenics. However, as Cristina Lafont has made
clear in her “Remarks on Habermas‟ The Future of Human Nature,” it is important to
distill the apt critique of the potential harms of genetic intervention from a conflation of
negative and positive eugenics.
Habermas does attempt to enunciate a clear definition of positive eugenics for the
purposes of his project. He writes: “Genetic interventions involving the manipulation of
traits constitute positive eugenics if they cross the line defined by the logic of healing,
that is, the prevention of evils which one may assume to be subject to general consent.”169
In other words, Habermas indicates that positive eugenics is that medical intervention
which has been agreed upon as beyond the scope of medical „treatment‟. However, in
this account of positive eugenics it is arguable that given the blurred distinction between
treatment and enhancement as it already stands in medicine, many forms of genetic
168
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intervention could equally be interpreted as negative or positive eugenics. For example,
depending on the definition of medical treatment, using Ritalin as a medication for
increased focus rather than Attention Deficit Disorder is sometimes considered
inappropriate use of medicine, and sometimes as a legitimate treatment option. If
normative standards are the ultimate weighing mechanism for Habermas‟ treatment of
eugenics, not only does this definition seem unclear, but it also gives way to
inconsistencies in Habermas‟ own argument.
In her “Remarks on Habermas‟ The Future of Human Nature,” Cristina Lafont
explores the inconsistencies in Habermas‟ argument from the very structure of his
argumentation. Beginning with Habermas‟ position that the future will of the fetus must
be considered in genetic intervention, Lafont identifies “The Principle of Counterfactual
Consent,” or the PCC, in Habermas‟ argument. According to Lafont, the PCC, “[S]tates:
„all genetic interventions, including prenatal ones, must remain dependent on a consent
that is at least counterfactually attributed to those possibly affected by them‟.”170 Lafont
goes on to claim that the PCC forms the foundation for Habermas‟ argument for the
necessity of “The Principle of Abstention Under Certainty,” or PAU: Namely that, “„we
should abstain from any genetic intervention whenever there is no certainty that it would
meet with the counterfactually attributed consent of those possibly affected by it‟.”171
Following the principles of PCC and PAU through Habermas‟ argument we find this
basic argument:
In cases of extreme suffering, we can assume conterfactual consent.
170
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In cases where suffering is not apparent, we cannot be certain of
counterfactual consent.
Therefore, we must abstain from all interventions where suffering is not apparent,
because we do not have counterfactual consent.
As Lafont explains:
The problem with this argument is that it relies on a symmetry that is only apparent. PCC tells us
to make our decisions dependent on the counterfactual consent or dissent of those affected by the
intervention at issue. Thus, whenever we are (reasonably) certain of the counterfactual consent of
the affected, intervention should be permitted, and whenever we are (reasonably) certain of their
dissent it should be prohibited. But for that very reason this principle has no application for cases
in which we are uncertain about the counterfactual consent or dissent of those affected. Given that
our uncertainty is as close to their dissent as to their consent, in such cases we cannot make our
decisions dependent on either.172

Following this logic, Habermas links uncertainty with dissent, and thus confuses the
distinction between positive and negative eugenics and the normative value of each. By
claiming that a lack of foreknowledge about the future-person‟s wishes amounts to the
future person‟s dissent, Habermas offers his own interpretation of uncertainty as dissent.
This replacement of uncertainty with a specific interpretive meaning is itself explicitly
making a final determination on behalf of the future-human person, exactly what
Habermas argues would be problematic by assuming assent. Additionally, by confusing
the PCC with the PAU, Habermas forgets that the PCC is necessarily linked to negative
eugenics. The PCC claims that we can assume counterfactual consent in cases of
extreme suffering, precisely those cases that negative eugenics and a practice of treating
illnesses diagnosed by PGD would be oriented towards.
In other places in his argument, Habermas does specifically address the issue of
dissent and the PAU. Habermas claims that even presuming a child would desire genes
that ensure higher intelligence, or eliminate the chance of a minor disability, parents—
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and by extension communicative society—cannot know what qualities and genes would
actually prove to be objectively best for the child. The conclusion is again, that in the
face of uncertainty the parents must choose inaction. Lafont argues that this argument
not only changes the criteria for evaluation—changing from PCC to a new criterion of
objective best and general consent—but that this new argument for the PAU is also selfdefeating:
For even if we could anticipate the consent of the affected person to, say, the elimination of a mild
handicap (which is not hard to imagine especially at those early times of her life history in which
she would suffer the most under its consequences), according to PAU we should still abstain from
intervening in view of the fact that the handicap could turn out to be best for her in the end,
regardless of her dissent at any prior time.173

Lafont goes on to claim that following this argument, Habermas also introduces the
possibility for a different type of resentment and unhappiness with the genetic self: a
teenager who discovers that she could have been smarter and could have been healthier
with genetic intervention may conclude that her parents failed in their roles to act
constructively on her behalf.
Although Habermas argues that eugenics precludes participation in the
communicative sphere—“With genetic enhancement, there is no communicative scope
for the projected child to be addressed as a second person and to be involved in a
communication process”—following Lafont‟s apt critique, this argument may be
interpreted as disingenuous.174 If Habermas feels that parents must be respectful of a
“projected child‟s” potential in all decisions regarding the fetus, then is it not possible for
parents to project the communicative interactions with the future child to determine the
desirability of a genetic intervention? For example, if parents discover that their fetus
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shows the genetic marker for hemophilia and that sufficient medical development has
been achieved to treat the genetic defect prenatally, is it not only possible, but desirable,
for the parents to consider the interests of the future person and determine that, given the
choice between hemophilia and no hemophilia, the child would most likely normatively
choose no hemophilia? Additionally, in this situation, are the parents really restricting
the child‟s potential by treating the hemophiliac gene, or are they opening the child‟s
potentials by freeing the child from the restrictions the disease imposes on those who
carry it? Or, in Lafont‟s words, “…It is hard to see how abstaining from an intervention is
less determinative of such a range of opportunities than intervention.”175

Care Ethics and Parental Autonomy
Lafont‟s analysis of The Future of Human Nature exposes weaknesses in
Habermas‟ argument about the role of parental rights. According to Habermas, parental
rights are secondary to the potential rights of the future person. In Habermas‟ estimation,
the future person loses his or her capacity to engage in communicative dialogue about her
very person once the parents have unilaterally decided to use preimplantation genetic
testing. Habermas claims that this unilateral decision on the part of the parents disallows
the autonomous development of the child, and severely limits her ability to self-identify
as an autonomous individual. He writes:
Irrespective of how far genetic programming could actually go in fixing properties, dispositions,
and skills, as well as in determining the behavior of the future person, post factum knowledge of
this circumstance may intervene in the self-relation of the person, the relation to her bodily or
mental existence. The change would take place in the mind. Awareness would shift, as a
consequence of this change of perspective, from the performative attitude of a first person living
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her own life to the observer perspective which governed the intervention one‟s own body was
subjected to before birth.176

However, as Lafont aptly points out, Habermas‟ evaluation of the genetically diagnosed
child‟s abilities seems to ignore already existing parental interventions in normal
childhood development. She writes: “Here I suppose that an important source of
disagreement with Habermas lies in the extent to which I see cultural intervention as even
more irrevocable in their existential import than most of the genetic determinations one
can realistically think of.”177 Lafont alludes here to the already normatively established
cultural practices in Western societies for a child to be raised according to her parent‟s
cultural practices.
As a matter of practice, parents have a considerable amount of influence as to
what their children are environmentally and culturally exposed. And this level of
parental control seems almost universally acceptable. If the parents are Catholic, for
example, they have the recognized right and authority to bring their child to Catholic
Sunday School and teach their children Catholic morals. Existing parental control is not
merely limited to cultural practices, either. Parents make decisions about their children‟s
food and diet, they choose to give or withhold vaccines and certain medicines, and they
even enroll their children in sports teams and activities—all of these parental decisions
have a direct impact on the “health” of the child. With regard to genetic intervention,
even without the technical capacity of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, parents often
choose reproductive partners based on obvious genetic traits. Genetic manipulation, on a
pre-technological basis, is a part of normative reproduction in contemporary Western
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civilization. And within certain normatively proscribed limits, these parental decisions
and interventions are not only acceptable, but ostensibly the established ethical method
for parenting in Western societies. Although Lafont does not make specific reference to
care ethics as influential in normative parenting practices, her recognition of parental
responsibility and cultural interventions aligns her argument well within the bounds of an
approach to parental guidelines based in care ethics.
Care Ethics is the branch of ethics emergent from Carol Gilligan‟s analysis of
Lawrence Kohlberg.178 In light of my previous discussion of Habermas‟ commitment to
Kohlberg in Chapter 2, it is an especially interesting alternative basis for an ethical
theory. Like discourse ethics, the ethics of care is a normative ethical theory insofar as it
is a theory that takes a stance about what makes actions right or wrong. Far from being
the only feminist alternative to traditional moral and ethical theories, it is one of a cluster
of normative ethical theories that were developed by feminists in the second half of the
twentieth century. While consequentialist and deontological ethical theories emphasize
universal standards and impartiality, ethics of care emphasizes the importance of
relationships. The basis of the theory is the recognition of the interdependence and
mutual vulnerability of all individuals in specific historical, cultural, and relational
contexts. Different relationships in different contexts with correspondingly differing
levels of intersubjective vulnerability and interdependence make each ethical decision in
178
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a care ethical paradigm situation specific. However, at the same time, by highlighting the
intersubjective character of relationality, and emphasizing that there are appropriate
decisions for each context, care ethical paradigms still represent a normative rather than
relativistic ethical theory.
Care ethics is a normative system of ethics founded on the principle that a mutual
recognition of responsibility and attachment is essential for guiding ethical behavior
towards those people closest to you, wherein appropriate parenting typifies appropriate
ethical relations in general. In more contemporary formulations of this ethical position,
familial relationships form models for private, public, and even transnational ethical
decisions. According to Virginia Held in The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and
Global:
Consider mothering or fathering in the sense of caring for a child, or “parenting,” if one prefers
this term. This is probably the most caring of the caring practices since the emotional tie between
carer and cared-for is characteristically so strong. This practice has caring well for the child as its
primary value. But as understanding of what this involves becomes more adequate, it should
include normative guidance on how to avoid such tendencies as parents may have to unduly
interfere and control, and it can include the aspect well delineated by Ruddick: “respect for
„embodied willfulness‟.” 179

The care ethics guidelines for parenting include a consideration for the well-being of the
child, the avoidance of undue interference with the child, and respect for the wishes of
the child. In Held‟s estimation, this paradigm is reciprocally related to social ethics.
Modeling familial interdependence ensures the recognition of social intersubjective
vulnerability, while the emergent social structure can then reflect and intervene on
familial practices.

179

Held, Virginia. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2006. p. 40.

95

To ensure that appropriate parental decisions can be made in the age of
developing scientific interventions, Lafont recommends the addition of a new principle in
place of Habermas‟ argument for the Principle of Abstention in the face of Uncertainty.
Following the logic of parental responsibility and the undeniability of the reality of
medical capabilities, Lafont introduces the Plausible Precautionary Principle to the
Principle of Consent: “The precautionary principle states: „when an activity raises threats
of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken
even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically‟.”180
Lafont‟s recommendation, therefore, hinges on the reality of scientific discovery and the
breadth of scientific knowledge. Parents should be mindful of the actual effects of
scientific interventions, and weigh any decisions against the available scientific evidence.
This common-sense principle, combined with the principle of consent, creates a clear
ethical guideline for responsible parenting in an innovative world:
Thus, if we added to a plausible precautionary principle the equally plausible principle of consent,
we could as citizens of a democratic community draw a line for permissible genetic intervention
that falls very close to the distinction between positive and negative eugenics, at least for the time
being. But, of course, as the latter qualification already indicates, we would be doing so for
entirely different kinds of reasons than those that Habermas‟ argument aims to support.181

Following this ethical guideline, parents may employ appropriate interventions to provide
reasonable care to a future child. This type of intervention would not only be allowable
according to care ethical guidelines concerning parenthood, it would also preserve the
established criteria for parental autonomy—namely, freedom to provide the best possible
future for a child as long as the intervention (biological, cultural, or otherwise) does not
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inhibit the health and happiness of the child, or the future autonomy of the adult
individual.
Although I do not have time to go into sufficient detail, it is worth noting that this
type of common sense, pragmatic approach to critical bioethics and care ethics does not
compensate for another potential problem in genetic intervention. As I addressed in
Chapter 2, fundamental inequalities exist in access to medical care and intervention.
Without sufficient access to the most basic medical care, it is increasingly likely that
these excluded groups and individuals would face further degrees of unequal access to
future medical developments. These inequalities, frequently affecting non-Whites,
citizens of lower socio-economic class, immigrants, and unmarried women, are worthy of
further analysis. Additionally, these excluded groups have a different set of historically
grounded concerns about the future of biomedicine. As disenfranchised members of
society, minority women have often been treated as biomedical guinea pigs, or as the
victims of positive eugenics legislation. Carole Pateman, for example, addresses the
relationships between race, class, gender, eugenics and political participation in The
Contract and Domination (2008).182 However, these critiques, based in issues of class
and race, are fundamentally different in kind from those Habermas levies.183
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Although Cristina Lafont and Nikolas Kompridis provide very different criticisms
of Habermas‟ project, they do share a common interest in the notion of individual
autonomy and a real respect for innovation in the lifeworld. Both see limitations in
Habermas‟ theory in the very things he wants to protect—existential freedom and
communicative consent. In Lafont‟s estimation, Habermas neglects to recognize the real
outcomes of the future person‟s possible dissent and the child‟s and parents‟ right to
existential freedom. In Kompridis‟ account, Habermas fails to address the critical role of
innovation—both in the existential lifeworld and within the bounds of different
rationalities. By combining Lafont‟s critique of Habermas with a care ethics
interpretation of parental responsibility, I have already provided a certain degree of
evidence that genetic diagnosis may offer an expansion of autonomy—albeit in this case
also the autonomy of the ethically responsible parents. Addressing Kompridis‟
alternative to Habermasian Critical Theory, namely a re-evaluation of the notion of
innovation and renewal as integral to a critical perspective of the lifeworld, I have also
introduced the possibility that the new possibilities for the future of human nature, in
their very character as new, may offer fruitful ground for the critically reflective
individual. However simply allowing more freedom to parents, or merely glorifying the
concept of the „new‟, does little to support the actual possibility of the expansion of
human nature.
To offer my own alternative understanding of the expansion of human nature, I
must first begin by agreeing with Habermas‟ claims that instrumentalization of human
beings as human beings leads to negative outcomes, both normatively and existentially, I
contest his simplified claim that genetic diagnosis equates to the most egregious
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instrumentalization. Genetic diagnosis, at the very worst, merely instrumentalizes the
genes and genetic diseases which are, in the end, non-determinative parts of eventual
human subjectivity. And, at the very best, what Habermas fears to be instrumentalizing,
may in fact offer the possibility of life itself.184 In addition, with an expanded
understanding of the ability to provide better circumstances for the full development of
the human person (inclusive of PGD), it may be that our existential self-understanding
will include a deeper recognition of bodily relation and relativity. Despite Habermas‟
claim that birth is philosophically considered the beginning of the human life,185 it is
already well established that medical interventions happen postnatally as well.186 Take
for example the cases in which parents ostensibly “choose” the sex of their
184
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hermaphroditic children upon birth. More commonly seen is the long-standing tradition
of male circumcision, which medical communities not only accept as a standard parental
choice, but also explicitly offer as a medically supported option to new parents. Although
there is considerable ethical debate over the former example (popular culture has even
addressed the subject in literature and television), the latter example is considered so
banal that no one questions the ability of a circumcised male to self-identify as opposed
to an un-circumcised male. 187 In these cases, the modified body is seen relationally to
the constitution of the person, not as formally final. Habermas goes further to contend
that:
Being at odds with the genetically fixed intention of a third person is hopeless. The genetic
program is a mute and, in a sense, unanswerable fact; for unlike persons born naturally, someone
who is at odds with genetically fixed interventions is barred from developing, in the course of a
reflectively appropriated and deliberately continued life history, an attitude towards her talents
(and handicaps) which implies a revised self-understanding and allows for a productive response
to the initial situation.188

However, I find it questionable that Habermas should take for granted the silence of
genetics, and the answerability of the person at odds with their genetic code. Adults in
contemporary society often feel at odds with their genetic code, and actively seek to
remedy that division—through cosmetic surgery, through chemical treatment, through the
active performance of another bodily orientation. Additionally, increasing medical
evidence is showing that the genetic code (even in adults) may not be as fixed or as
187
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clearly defined as previously thought. Whereas, in years past, gender dysphoria was
considered a medical disorder because gender was believed to be clearly genetically
defined, current research indicates that there may be more than one way of defining even
“biological” gender. Even without the completion of studies that may redefine our
notions of genetically-fixed gender, many adults actively perform and identify against
their “genetically defined” gender. Genetic makeup is not completely inscrutable and
unanswerable. It may be possible, therefore, to not only respond to our genetic code—
manipulated, tested, or not—but it may also improve our understanding of bodily
complexity and the relation between our bodies and our self-identity.
In addition to the possibilities for individual autonomy and expansion in the face
of increased complexity in human nature, openness and complexity are also foundational
to a full understanding of human rights. For example, complex understandings of the
human person do not limit the possibilities and opportunities of that person, but by
introducing complexity to the sphere of communication and the establishment of norms,
these complex understandings give way to new and complex rights and responsibilities.
As Marcelo Neves describes in his article, “The Symbolic Force of Human Rights”:
But it is not just a matter of recognizing and confirming this openness to the future. To the
cognitive recognition and confirmation of social contingency and uncertainty about the future in
modern society, human rights respond with the normative demand of structuring the „openness to
the future‟. This means that human rights contribute to the transformation of unstructured
complexity into structured complexity, which entails a claim to justify certain normative
expectations and exclude the legal validity of others. The role of human rights in structuring the
openness to the future and complexity relates to normative requirements that are sensitive to
cognitive recognition of the surplus of possibilities and risks inherent in modern society.189
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These open possibilities may include their own risks, but far from limiting the
autonomous existence of the individual, even these risks have productive value in the
lived sphere of human rights and recognition.
This deeper understanding of the relation between bodies, social recognition and
our self-identity is of important concern to a feminist project of Critical Theory. Amy
Allen‟s recent work The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in
Contemporary Critical Theory explores the limitations of Habermas‟ “normative
idealizations” of human life, offering an alternative wherein, “The key is to give up on
the demand for purity and to develop the Habermasian critical-theoretical project in a
more contextualist and pragmatic direction.”190 In other words, constituting a subject is
not biologically, but socially determined. Genetic intervention may have a determinative
influence on hard biology, but Habermas‟ account also indicates his belief that it is
determinative of subjective identity. This position undermines his own acceptance of
communicative action as self-empowering, and ultimately intersubjective. In the next
two chapters, I would like to consider how expanded notions of human nature may offer
the appropriate context for a feminist ethical understanding of power and autonomy in
Critical Theory.
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Chapter 5
Mourning and Vulnerability: What Butler and Cornell Offer to Habermas’
Theories of Human Nature

Using Habermas‟ The Future of Human Nature and Between Naturalism and
Religion as a grounding, I propose that Habermas‟ recent projects have been preoccupied
with an account of human nature as such. These accounts, though an important addition
to Habermas‟ overarching ethical project, pose new challenges to critical appraisals of
Habermas‟ work. If Critical Theory‟s explicit goal is to uncover the possibilities for
human emancipation, then what is the framework for the notion of “human” that
underlies this emancipatory goal? Habermas, it seems, argues that human nature is
circumscribed by the Kantian, and other modern, models that proclaim human nature to
be “rational” or otherwise determined by the individual‟s ability to employ reason.
Granted, for Habermas, this reason/rationality which defines human nature is not
ahistorical, solipsistic or monolithic as it can be in uncritical philosophical accounts.
Habermas avoids this trap by defining reason and rationality in the context of
communication and the normative ethics of the public sphere. However, Habermas
continues to argue for a formalistic account of human nature—one that is all but
solidified in the prenatal stage of biological life, and determinate of potential political
action in the public sphere. In the previous chapter, I argued that this formalism is
problematic for feminists on the grounds that it overdetermines the effects of biological
formalism and culturally imposed normativity. In this chapter, I wish to argue that
Habermas‟ formulation of human nature is problematic because it forecloses important
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characteristics of potential political actors that make participation in the public sphere not
only possible, but meaningful and oriented towards a more complete emancipation. To
make this argument, I rely on the feminist methodologies of Judith Butler and Drucilla
Cornell.
Ethical considerations of fragility and vulnerability have become increasingly
important in the wake of 21st Century philosophical explorations of violence and
mourning. Perhaps most notably, Judith Butler argues in Precarious Life (2004) that the
most profound way we can hope for ethical recognition of the other, is through an
understanding of mourning. Butler explains that the foundation for human interaction is
not our shared ability to reason and exchange meaningful ideas, but it is instead in
inhabiting a world in which we are all always vulnerable. Similarly, Drucilla Cornell‟s
work in Moral Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory (2008) finds ethical
hope in what she calls the “redemptive imagination,” or the possibility of practically and
theoretically reconfiguring emancipatory ideals.

For Cornell, this potential for

reconfiguration gives space in Critical Theory for necessarily expansive and inclusionary
conceptions of humanism and freedom.

Like Butler, Cornell finds this redemptive

potential in solidarity based on lived experience; also like Butler, Cornell recognizes the
irreducibility of lived experience to an objective totality. For both Butler and Cornell, we
must seek transnational solidarity as an ethical imperative but always with a wary eye
towards the Western and modernist tendencies to reductionism.
I further contend that their uniquely feminist positions offer a necessary corrective
to contemporary Critical Theory. I start with an explanation of Habermas‟ depiction of
human nature, as it unfolds in Between Naturalism and Religion (2008). Once this
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groundwork is in place, I critique Habermas using feminist arguments. First, I explain
why the meaning of human life as such is not a foregone conclusion, using Judith
Butler‟s argument for the validating effects of the recognition of vulnerability from
Precarious Life. Then, I explain how the conceptions of forgiveness and moral
imagination open potentiality for expansive human nature using Cornell‟s ethical analysis
from Moral Images of Freedom.

Habermas: Between Naturalism and Religion There is But the Rationally Motivated
Citizen of the World
Habermas seems to be preoccupied of late with the questions of human nature,
and to a certain extent, human character, that ground any discussion of humanistic ethics
and political action. Habermas rightly argues in Between Naturalism and Religion that
the two countervailing trends of contemporary political discourse center on the expansion
of biomedical scientific understandings of human psychology and embodiment and the
development of what he conceptualizes as a “post-secular” age. For Habermas, both the
overly scientistic account of naturalistic human psychology and physiology and the
increasing tension among world religions and secularists pose grave problems for the
idealized vision of a rationally motivated, normatively ethical and cosmopolitan society
Habermas has been arguing for over the course of the past 40 years.
Habermas‟ relationship to science and scientific development is appropriately
ambivalent. He recognizes the importance of respecting scientific developments as a part
of expert discourses of technology. However, he is also wary of scientistic accounts that
reduce human cognition and human reason to a series of predictable neurotransmitter
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signals. Human freedom depends upon an open scientific system. Habermas finds the
most problematic scientific accounts those that eliminate human freedom and
development in favor of neurobiological determinism.191
In his attempts to respect science, while at the same time providing a suitable
critique, Habermas makes recourse to a sort of positive dialectical middle ground. Yes,
human development models a natural evolutionary trajectory that seems to undergird
naturalist claims for biological determinism. But it is also true for Habermas that this
evolution is not simply something done to the human body by mysterious outside
scientific forces. Instead, it is founded on human interaction and participation with the
lifeworld. Problematic for me here, is Habermas‟ apparent assumption that the evidence
for this is our need to talk about science and scientific ideas through the regular channels
of normative discourse.
It is my contention that Between Naturalism and Religion continues Habermas‟
strong formalistic stance on the definition of human nature he began in The Future of
Human Nature. In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas claims that pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis limits human autonomy and freedom by foreclosing possibilities for
full participation in the communicative action of the public sphere. This foreclosure
occurs ostensibly on two levels. First, the human actors are limited by the fact of external
biological interference, interference which literally, genetically provides specific
boundaries for the physiological development of specific human persons. Although there
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are legitimate concerns from such a biomedically motivated determination of human
development, Habermas‟ own concerns seem to be less ethically relevant. As I argued in
the last chapter, Habermas seems most worried, at least on this level, about the future
human person feeling limited by the knowledge of this intervention. The second
foreclosure exists in terms of recognition of these persons as complete actors in the public
sphere. This argument is vaguer, but Habermas seems to contend that these biologically
manipulated persons have been so over-determined through genetic intervention that their
participation in the public sphere will also be limited.
In Between Naturalism and Religion these formalistic interpretations are further
fleshed out. Here Habermas claims that human persons strive for recognition in their
quest for individuation. For Habermas, this recognition comes expressly through
rationally motivated discourse in a public sphere. He explains the relationship between
reason, mutual understanding, and his take on the Kantian moral agent:
Reason, for Kant, finds its true home in the domain of practice, because it is constitutive only for
moral action alone. This is what inspires the search for traces of detranscendentalized reason in
communicative action. The expression „communicative action‟ refers to those social interactions
in which the use of language oriented to reaching understanding takes on a coordinating role. The
idealizing presuppositions migrate via linguistic communication into action oriented to reaching
understanding.192

Reason, however, is not simply a way of ensuring recognition on an abstract level.
Practical reason as it is expressed in communicative action is also the embodiment of
Habermasian freedom. In other words, reason is, at base, the practical application of
human freedom. Habermas equates freedom with freedom of action, finally all but
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referring to evidence for freedom entirely in terms of action.193 Following a certain vein
of Kantian argumentation, Habermas goes on to differentiate a rationalist explanation of
freedom from a causal determinist position. Wary of slipping into an analytic theory of
causation, Habermas explains that his theory of reason-based freedom avoids the traps of
determinism:
Unlike standard causal explanations, rational explanations of action do not permit the inference
that any given person would reach the same decision given the same antecedent conditions.
Specifying the rational motives for action is not sufficient to transform the explanation into a
prediction. Responsible agency is not merely a matter of being motivated by reasons but by taking
the initiative for specific reasons and attributing the initiative to oneself. That is what makes the
agent the “author” of her actions.194

Determinism is, therefore, the pinnacle of reductionist notions of freedom. A stringent
theory of causation not only reduces action to cause and effect relationships, but it also
effectively eliminates the responsibility actors have to their decisions.
In Between Naturalism and Religion, Habermas attempts to get himself out of the
reductionist trap by explaining that even though freedom is rationally motivated and
ensured, this form of reason is phenomenological-existential:
Rational explanations of action also assume that actors are embedded in contexts and entangled in
biographical involvements when they make decisions. Actors are not situated outside of the world
when they let their will be determined by what is within their power and what they regard as right.
They are dependent on enabling organic conditions, on their biography, character, and capabilities,
on their social and cultural surroundings, and not least on the actual circumstances of the situation
of action.195

This phenomenological-existential argument appears to almost embrace a situational
ethics. Habermas understands that rational decisions are circumscribed by the conditions
within which agents make those decisions. Context and biography play as great a role as
rational thought in this explanation. If Habermas‟ position began and ended here, then
193
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Habermas would have far more in common with the care ethical position I advocated in
chapter 4. However, Habermas goes on to explain that the paradigm for free action is
social communication, reiterating his earlier positions that it is within the “public „space
of reasons‟” that freedom is expressed.196 Arguably, this is itself a reductionist
explanation for human nature and human freedom: We are free because at least we get to
talk about it and debate it? The content of that freedom and our nature seems empty here.
His claim that this is a Kantian notion of freedom seems to ignore the equally important
Kantian conception that freedom must be set squarely in human imagination. In chapter
3, I addressed that Habermas has neglected the utopic vision of Kant in favor of a
Hegelian dialogical freedom in communicative action.

The Death of the Other: How Butler’s Mourning Helps Us to Ethically Relate to the
Other
Judith Butler argues in Precarious Life that perhaps the most profound way we
can hope for ethical recognition of the other is through an understanding of mourning.197
Butler explains that the foundation for human interaction is not our shared ability to
reason and exchange meaningful ideas, but it is instead in inhabiting a world in which we
are all always vulnerable. Interestingly, Habermas‟ first chapter in Between Naturalism
and Religion, “Public Space and Political Public Sphere—The Biographical Roots of
Two Motifs in My Thought,” is one of the closest things Habermas has ever written to an
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account of fluid subjectivity and postmodernist accounts of vulnerability.198 In this
chapter, we can identify Habermas‟ commitments to a quasi-Butlerian notion of
vulnerability and fragility. Waxing autobiographical, Habermas claims that a childhood
surgery “may well have awakened the feelings of dependence and vulnerability and the
sense of the relevance of our interactions with others.”199 It is clear to me that this is a
part of the implicit background for Habermas‟ arguments in The Future of Human
Nature. Habermas finds in his own experience that humans are fundamentally at the
mercy of others. While his argument in The Future of Human Nature sought to obviate
this vulnerability insofar as it was possible to ethically limit prenatal interventions, in
Between Naturalism and Religion Habermas resigns himself to the unavoidability of
embodied intersubjective dependence.
Reversing the emphasis from the personal to the political, Butler makes a similar
claim about the fundamental fact of human vulnerability. She writes about the aftermath
of 9/11: “One insight that injury affords is that there are others out there on whom my life
depends, people I do not know and may never know. This fundamental dependency on
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anonymous others is not a condition that I can will away.”200 Butler emphasizes that as
embodied subjects, we are not simply vulnerable in an immediate sense, but that we are
always vulnerable to the totality of humanity. On the one hand, this vulnerability is
beyond our control, and signifies a limit to individual human power and control. On the
other hand, this vulnerability is the great leveler—every other human being, by virtue of
his or her psychological and bodily existence, is also vulnerable.
Where Habermas and Butler ultimately differ is the way in which the fact of
vulnerability mediates ethical and political decisions and outcomes. For Habermas, as I
have already intimated, intersubjectivity grounds consensus through communicative
action. Vulnerability is effaced through normative decisions that adjudicate and protect
interests. These normative decisions are reached through reasonable communication and
ultimately resolve themselves in consensus. For Butler, however, vulnerability
demonstrates the limits of reasonable and individualistic political actors.
This concept of vulnerability changes the dynamic of political action. Rather than
coming to an ideal speech situation with a clear expression of need, and an idea for
rational action, the Butlerian ethico-political actor makes decisions that do not, “proceed
from my autonomy or my reflexivity. It comes to me from elsewhere, unbidden,
unexpected and unplanned.”201 This anti-rationalist experience of intersubjective
vulnerability does not reduce itself into relativistic and hopeless ethical situations,
however. For Butler, these dynamics open new space for exploring moral and ethical
relationships. The facts of vulnerability, difference, and confrontation allow novel
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critical discourses to emerge, with an eye to openness rather than consensus. Or as she
writes:
We have to interrogate the emergence and the vanishing of the human at the limits of what we can
know, what we can hear, what we can see, what we can sense. This might prompt us, affectively,
to reinvigorate the intellectual projects of critique, of questioning, of coming to understand the
difficulties and the demands of cultural translation and dissent, and to create a sense of the public
in which oppositional voices are not feared, degraded or dismissed, but valued for the instigation
to a sensate democracy they occasionally perform.202

Democratic participation and ethical recognition are then, for Butler, embodied realities.
The vulnerable body is the limit of what we can know, what we can control, what we can
protect; but it is also the call to create the ethical relationship. This vulnerability is
predictably complex: it is not reducible to bodily weakness, nor is it extricable from lived
experience. What Butler‟s concept does provide, is an account of ethical relations based
in a solidarity of lived experience; it is always possible, and necessary, to mourn human
life.
Butler grounds her conception of the other, not in understanding, but in the
concept of the Levinasian face—a concrete other, before me, making demands of me, but
whom I cannot understand as an individual totality because it is infused with the concepts
of Otherness, existence as-such, and the shared existential attitude towards death.203 This
face simultaneously exposes the concrete fact of bodily vulnerability, while offering a
quasi-psychoanalytic grounding for vulnerability—the face appears to me with the
injunction “Thou shalt not kill,” implying its own susceptibility to death and my own
potential for both killing and preserving the Other.
This conception of mourning retains emotional, psychical, and traditional
valences. However, through her ethical analog to the Levinasian face, Butler seems to
202
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indicate that these characteristics are only part of the philosophical nature of mourning.
The other important dimension of mourning is its relation to recognition, specifically on
an ethical and existential level. By seeing the face, and becoming aware of the demands
it makes of me, I am called to offer acknowledgement and recognition. As it relates to
vulnerability, and the concrete reality of death, this recognition is embodied
philosophically and literally through mourning.

Cornell and Imagination: How the Moral Image of Freedom Requires Critical Theory to
Expand its Notions of Human Possibility and Openness
Butler may reconfigure our understanding of vulnerability as the grounds for a
politically oriented feminist ethics, but I believe that Drucilla Cornell completes the
ethical formulation of potentiality which ultimately guides feminist-friendly Critical
Theory. In her book Moral Images of Freedom, Cornell argues that human freedom is
delimited through the philosophical notion of a limit itself. She explains that the concept
of a limit is itself limiting. Philosophical thought and progress is constrained by a notion
of the finite, the absolute, or the end of possibility. In modernism, there are rational
limits, in post-modernism there is a hopelessness of possibility. Both are limits to human
freedom, as such, by confining what potential exists for individuals.
Against the threat of modernist totality or finality—she implicates Hegel, Marxist
determinism, and Habermasian consensus—Cornell claims that Derrida and Benjamin
offer theoretical grounding for her own “philosophy of the limit.”204 In this philosophy,
there is no end to aspire to, nor is there a pessimistic hopelessness about possibility.
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Instead, the “impossible” is seen as a daily reality, in which the call of the other is always
upon us to respect the ethical boundaries of the impossible as just that: the impossible, the
impossible to know, the impossible to configure, the impossible to constrain. This
impossibility is not an impasse, but the exact opposite. It is an opportunity to live with
expectations for open possibilities, since we cannot comprehend the true limits. In the
face of this incomprehension, she makes recourse to Kant. At the same time Kant
constrains reason to representation, he also introduces the aesthetic imaginary. The
aesthetic experience spurs the individual to react to the beautiful—which is still confined
by reason—and the sublime—which is beyond reason. In Kant‟s Third Critique, the
sublime extends beyond the conceptual to that which is impossible to conceive. Before
the sublime, Kant claims, we are introduced to the limits of our conceptualization.
However, the flip side of this, Cornell explains, is that the sublime opens us to that which
is beyond reason and concept, to receptivity for that which we cannot comprehend.205 On
an ethical level, this is the Other.
By recognizing our human limits to comprehend and adequately theorize reason,
Cornell explains that this move to the moral imaginary is important on a theoretical level.
However, the necessity for openness and the illimitable is equally practically important.
Modernist theories of reason depend largely on Western theories of the parameters of
reason. By attempting to universalize these parameters, theory becomes an actively
colonizing force. Cornell contends that the only way of avoiding the trap of colonization
is by opening our understanding of freedom-in-action to an anti-rationalist conception of
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intersubjectivity. Following Fanon, Cornell argues that we must re-symbolize our entire
understanding of the world:
Thus, for Fanon, there are two ways for the imago to defend itself against the horrors of
colonialism and the struggle for self-symbolization: a self-defeating retreat into the individual
fantasy of conflated personhood or the collective action of liberation to remake, literally, the
symbolization of the world giving equal standing to all people.206

For the purposes of my argument, Cornell‟s claims have an important politico-ethical
weight. If the ethical is grounded in receptivity for that which is beyond immediate
understanding, then ethics is grounded concretely within difference, otherness, the nonidentical. Rather than subsuming the distinct desires, needs, and particularities of
individual political actors to a rationalist and normative ideal, Cornell‟s ethics
emphasizes the preservation of these characteristics as the very grounding for the ethicopolitical situation. Freedom and emancipation are grounded within this recognition of
difference and limitation through the “redemptive imagination”—Cornell‟s postmodern
term for the ethical implications of Kantian sublime experience.
As a way of respecting difference and utopian openness to future possibilities, the
redemptive imagination allows for ethical responsiveness that respects, rather than
sublimates, the Other. In ethical and political application, this means that the still
universal claims to humanity and freedom are not grounded in some sort of normative
equalizing structure, but are instead always grounded within the context of the different
cultures and traditions that give rise to different ways of living in the world, with the
respective ethical needs that occur in those ways of life:
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Universal validity, then, demands that we give legitimate place to clarify claims of our humanity
within the context of different cultures and traditions and not simply those that arose in the West.
Revision of a worldview that could give place to the ideal of freedom and the ideal of perpetual
peace is of pressing concern; despite the threat of annihilation in a world eaten up by war such
work opens up a limited space for self-determined life, as these ideals are animated to guide actual
institutional structures of international law. 207

Universalism for Cornell seems akin to Benhabib‟s utopian universalism, which I
explained in chapter 3. Like Benhabib‟s position, Cornell‟s notion of universal validity is
distinct from the Habermasian in that it highlights the primacy of context and
individuation as the basis for universality, rather than the other way around. Universality
is not an attempt to gain consensus, but rather an attempt to gain universal recognition of
particularity.

American Masculinity and Feminism
Butler and Cornell‟s combined ethical formulations encourage a world in which
difference, potential, and emotional and psychical receptivity are primary. These ethical
paradigms stand in direct contrast to many traditional conceptions of what it is to be a
political actor in the Western world. More commonly in practice, the world is still
dominated to a large extent by white, Protestant, male political personages.

This

uniformity of political power emphasizes sameness, consistency, and rational normative
consensus, even in its most “liberal” formulations. So how can a feminist political
philosophy gain entrance into the dominant ethical and political spheres of action?
Furthermore, how can emerging challenges to political and ethical dialogues avoid
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disenfranchising those voices that are now dominant—a necessary move for any real
respect of difference and universal appeals to freedom?208
To explain this point, I make recourse to a different work by Drucilla Cornell,
Clint Eastwood and Issues of American Masculinity (2009). In this book, Cornell uses a
close reading of various films that Clint Eastwood has directed to develop both a theory
of the ideal of American masculinity, and an intergendered challenge to this ideal.
Through this reading of Eastwood‟s films, Cornell finds support for the cultural ideal of
the lone gunslinger, a strong and just figure whose strength and power inhibits his
emotional capacity for personal connection, but whose independence insures his ability to
save women, children, and other impotent and unempowered persons from their
otherwise doomed fates. Although Cornell explicitly finds this archetypal figure in
Eastwood‟s films, she rightly makes the connection between this character-type and the
more pervasive psychoanalytic idealization of Man.

The psychoanalytic figure

transcends the artistic boundaries to find its corollary in ethical and political reality—
where men attempt to live an untenable, imaginary ideal.
For Cornell, the importance of deconstructing Eastwood‟s films lies in
Eastwood‟s directorial ability to call into question the very archetypes he appears to
uphold:
208
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What I am suggesting is that by reading Eastwood‟s involvement in these films against the grain
of even his best critics, we can grapple with some of the most searing issues of masculinity that
confront us in late twentieth and early twenty-first century America. Yes, Eastwood rides off into
the sunset at the end of some of his films, a solitary figure with no need or promise for the
complexity of a lasting connection, but he also struggles visibly with the contradictions of
masculinity in relationships with both men and women.209

For example, Cornell points out that in Eastwood‟s 1993 film A Perfect World, the film
ends in what could be misconstrued as a traditional Oedipal tragedy—a young boy
ultimately causes the death of a father-like figure by wounding him and leaving him
vulnerable to authorities. However, in Cornell‟s nuanced reading, Eastwood‟s portrayal
of the impotence of authority to prevent Oedipal violence exposes the untenable nature of
the Oedipal myth as such: “It is, indeed, one of his saddest films but also one that
questions Oedipal ideals of masculinity because they promote violence in the very effort
to live up to them.”210 By illuminating the ultimate impotence of living up to an Oedipal
ideal, Eastwood‟s filmmaking does more to expose the vulnerability of man, rather than
his unquestioned strength.

By displaying this vulnerability alongside the pathos of

emotional situations, Eastwood challenges the normative and psychoanalytic portrayal of
man as the source of phallic power, and situates man instead in an emotionally grounded
world of complexities. Eastwood‟s man may try to protect women, children and the
unempowered, but in his attempts to do so, his own vulnerable humanity is exposed.
For Cornell, this reading of Eastwood‟s films provides concrete examples of a
reconfiguration of American masculinity as such. For my purposes, this deconstruction
of American masculinity provides a basis for intergendered relationships. If man as man
is not the psychical idealization of phallic power, and if man is also an embodied,
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socially-situated, and vulnerable existential being, then men and women have a common
foundation for ethical relationships.

Recognition of this common foundation may

strengthen Butler and Cornell‟s claims for utopic and embodied ethics, and may help to
improve philosophical notions of solidarity.

Violence, Trauma, and Redemption in The Girl With the Dragon Tattoo211
Because the contemporary liberal formulation of solidarity often involves either
totalizing collapsibility into the generalized needs of a political group, or the overdetermination of solidarity as a political tactic for extreme outsiders, it is difficult to
provide an analytic example for illustrating the powers of a complex utopian and
embodied solidarity. In order to provide a framework for articulating complex solidarity
in contradistinction to the liberal model I propose an evaluation of a fictional relationship
of solidarity, one I feel comes closest to the alternative feminist position for which I am
arguing. In the popular detective novel, The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo by Stieg
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Larsson, the two protagonists form a complex and mutually dependent relationship out of
a shared recognition of their vulnerable need to one another.212
The novel begins with the character Mikael Blomkvist, a journalist for a business
magazine that famously calls into question unethical corporate practices, who, in the
course of his last article expose, has been framed to commit slander and sentenced to jail
time for this crime. Before going to jail, Blomkvist is solicited by the patriarch of a
famous corporate family—Henrik Vanger.

Vanger wants Blomkvist to use his

journalistic skill to uncover a family mystery, the 30 year old disappearance of Harriet
Vanger, Henrik‟s niece. In exchange, Vanger promises to offer redemptive information
on Blomkvist‟s slander trial, and financial compensation that may keep Blomkvist‟s
magazine, Millenium, afloat. Blomkvist moves to the Vanger estate to begin research,
and runs into multiple dead ends, until he discovers that Lisbeth Salander has hacked his
computer, and has the intelligence and wherewithal to help him solve the mystery.
Together, Salander and Blomkvist discover that Harriet was not murdered, or forcibly
kidnapped, but rather that she fled to Australia to avoid further victimization from her
sadistic older brother, Martin, who has assaulted and killed many other women. Martin
tries to kill Blomkvist, but Salander intervenes, causing Martin to run his car off the road.
Given this plotline, Larsson has taken the familiar detective novel tropes of
violence, trauma and redemption, and turned them on their heads.

Like Cornell‟s

analysis of Eastwood‟s films, I argue that Larsson provides a rich and complex timbre to
the novel that questions our comfortability in identifying heroism, victimhood, and
revenge. The hero relies on the heroine, who in turn has difficulty with basic emotional
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functionality. There are various layers of victimization in the novel—Henrik Vanger
seems to be the most incapacitated by his inconsolable mourning of his lost niece, and
Blomkvist comes the closest to death in terms of bodily danger during the novel‟s own
timeline, although Salander, Harriet Vanger, and countless other women suffer deeply
disturbing events of sexual violence. And the concept of revenge is also questioned;
despite Salander‟s relatively just anger at her guardian‟s violent sexual assaults on her,
Blomkvist calls into question her violent tendencies, and points out the potential harm in
revenge. The novel then, like an Eastwood film, seems to offer an aesthetically rich
challenge to traditional conceptions of masculinity and phallologocentric society.
However, even more interesting and original for me, is the novel‟s ability to provide an
example for complex and realistic inter-gendered solidarity.

A Model for Complimentary Solidarity
When political and public action is represented in terms of participatory
democracy in the modern liberal state, a common debate arises between the model of
participation in terms of solidarity, or in terms of normative consensus-oriented action.
In traditional constructions of solidarity as political action, theorists often characterize
groups with interests in solidarity as minority groups, outsiders, who must band together
against the status quo in order for their voices to be heard. While this model of solidarity
has both a theoretical and a practical value, I contend that an alternative solidarity,
characterized not by shared-outsider status, but instead by a tension of complimentary
interests, might open new possibilities for productive relationships of solidarity. In other
words, if solidarity is most often action-oriented political participation within a minority
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group with particular shared interests, then the action of solidarity is always working an
uphill battle in terms of power and representation. If, however, the defining
characteristics of solidarity are not couched in terms of the shared interests of minority
groups, but instead in terms of often tense and complimentary interests that illuminate
difference as much as identity, then power and representation can be shared within some
pretty divergent groups.
This ethical formulation of solidarity borrows from Butler and Habermas‟
emphasis on human vulnerability, while at the same time remaining critical of Habermas‟
overly rationalist conceptions of human freedom. For this model to work, and to not
digress into traditional power dynamics, human freedom must be reconsidered as an antirationalist process of continually re-symbolizing and re-navigating intersubjective
experiences. Following Cornell, this is the utopian moment of the moral imaginary. I
believe, however, that Cornell‟s model of the moral imaginary also depends on an
understanding of intersubjective re-negotiation of communicative meaning. This
understanding is assisted by modifying the Habermasian position on discourse ethics to
highlight Habermas‟ lesson “…that actors are embedded in contexts and entangled in
biographical involvements when they make decisions.”213 The ethical solidarity for
which I am arguing for, then, is dependent on a view of human nature that synthesizes
Habermas, Butler, and Cornell. In order to avoid reductionism or colonialism, our
understanding of human nature must be open-ended. However, in order to ground an
ethical theory, we must have the potential for the recognition and acknowledgement of
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other humans. This recognition and acknowledgement is best defined in terms of shared
vulnerability—on which both Butler and Habermas‟ theories depend.
According to Amy Allen‟s reading of Hannah Arendt in The Power of Feminist
Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (1999), individuals engaged in actions of
solidarity retain other unique identities and often hold very different positions and
viewpoints from other members.214 Solidarity defines individuals in the “group”
according to that specific shared interest which motivates the particular political action.
By highlighting the tension and difference of group members, this notion of solidarity
offers practical and pragmatic coping mechanisms. For example, if Stieg Larsson‟s
Lisbeth Salander would have banded together with other victims of sexual assault in
order to expose the predator Martin Vanger, then Larsson‟s novel would have
exemplified a traditional notion of solidarity, the marginalized group of victims coming
together for shared interests. However, given Lisbeth‟s outsider status, and difficulties
with gaining recognition and respect, Henrik Vanger would never have hired her to
conduct the investigation. At the beginning of the novel we see this very consideration
unfold. The Vanger family lawyer Dirch Frode hires Salander to do a background check
of Blomkvist, and even when he is presented with the evidence that Lisbeth is a capable
detective herself—she compiles a thorough and comprehensive analysis of Blomkvist—
neither Frode nor Henrik Vanger consider hiring her to do the research into Harriet
Vanger‟s disappearance. Instead, as it unfolds in Larsson‟s novel, Mikael Blomkvist is
hired by Henrik Vanger. However, despite Blomkvist‟s obvious status and power, he is
unable to adequately complete this investigative task on his own, and relies on a strained
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relationship of solidarity with Salander. This relationship of solidarity, between
Blomkvist and Salander, exemplifies a nuanced, intergendered and complimentary
relationship. Neither Blomkvist nor Salander are reduced to their interactions; even as a
sexual relationship occurs between them, their differences only become more pronounced
and important to their relationship. However, the resolution of the novel‟s mystery
depends entirely on their ability to work together towards a specific goal, in a way I
would describe as using their differences collectively. This solidarity built on difference
also has ethical implications. By uncovering the sexual predator Martin Vanger, Salander
is able to continue her long-standing opposition to perpetrators of violence against
women, but by accomplishing this task with Blomkvist, Salander is able to legitimize and
publicize this struggle within respected media in the public sphere. Conversely,
Blomkvist is able to reassert himself as an ethical journalist by publishing an exposé of
the unscrupulous business deals of Wennerstrom, but by doing this with Salander, he is
also able to uncover sources and information he was otherwise unskilled to discover.
This extended analysis of the relationship of solidarity between Blomkvist and
Salander illustrates an important philosophical point: solidarity and power do not depend
on a melding together of shared interests, and are not best served by isolating minority
groups. Instead, solidarity as political action should be practically and pragmatically
constructed in complimentary differences, where varying degrees of power and interest
work together to accomplish shared goals. This model of solidarity retains the
recognition for vulnerability and dependence that Butler‟s ethics requires, while also
highlighting openness to difference and emancipation that Cornell‟s theory advocates. It
is a theory of solidarity that could work within and between genders, as well as within
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and between cultures, without the threat of totalizing reductionism that modernist models
of solidarity imply. In chapter 6, I explore the relationship between this modification of
solidarity and relational ethics, providing my unique contribution to feminist critical
theoretical ethics.
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Chapter 6
Arendtian Solidarity: What Hannah Arendt Offers to a Feminist Critique of the
Public Sphere

For feminist philosophers interested in the political and ethical ramifications of
their work, conceptualizations of both normativity and solidarity have been central.
Finding both concepts integral to understanding contemporary notions of subjectivity,
intersubjectivity and socialization, these feminist philosophers attempt to uncover the
meanings of such concepts within a system of feminist ethical discourse. Despite the
continued discussion and reinterpretation of these concepts, both “normativity” and
“solidarity” are admittedly circumscribed by the usage of these terms in the works of
Habermas and Arendt, respectively. As I have been arguing throughout the preceding
five chapters, Habermas‟ definition of normativity has been both a challenge and an
inspiration for contemporary feminist philosophers. The same influence of usage can be
attributed to Hannah Arendt when it comes to the term “solidarity.” Feminist
philosophers such as Benhabib, Honig and Allen, however, do more than simply
acknowledge the historical influence and genealogical relevance of Habermas and Arendt
to the feminist project. Instead, Benhabib, Honig, and Allen adopt and adapt
Habermasian and/or Arendtian philosophy itself as integral to the feminist project. It is
through this lens of adoption and adaptation that Habermasian normativity and Arendtian
solidarity can be seen to have a profound impact on feminist ethics, although neither
Habermas nor Arendt would identify themselves as feminist theorists. For my interests,
the combination and critique of Habermas and Arendt, especially within the circle of

126

feminist critical theorists, provides fertile ground for evaluating feminist notions of
subjectivity in a political and ethical world.
In order to explore the themes of solidarity and normativity as they emerge in
contemporary feminist philosophy, I begin this chapter with a comparative analysis of the
public sphere in Habermas and Arendt‟s thought. I contend that their respective
understandings of the public sphere found their understandings of normativity and
solidarity. Exploring the relationship between Arendtian solidarity and the public sphere,
I will then discuss the feminist reception of Arendt‟s narrativity and universalism in
Benhabib and Honig. Following Amy Allen‟s analysis of solidarity as power in feminist
action, I will conclude with a reinterpretation of solidarity and normativity as
constructive for contemporary Critical Theory and feminist thought.

Die Öffentlichkeit in Habermas and Arendt
Although Habermas and Arendt are both concerned with the political, discursive,
and active possibilities of the public sphere, each takes a unique perspective on the exact
social role and conceptual impact of the public sphere. As I addressed in chapters 1 and
2, in The Theory of Communicative Action and The Structural Transformations of the
Public Sphere, Habermas defines his conception of the public sphere in terms of
normativity, communication, and the media. For Habermas, the public sphere is the
privileged structure for the network of political communication in a modern discursive
world. It is political insofar as it integrates expert and lay culture (along with various
other perspectives) through communicative action, resulting in a consensus oriented
communicative process of normativity. Communication is integral to normative
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consensus; however, for Habermas, communication is more complex than simply
speaking and listening to one another. For Habermas in The Theory of Communicative
Action, an effective speech act must be social and oriented to reaching understanding and
rationally motivated assent. Habermas explains that, “Agreement rests on common
convictions. The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer
contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a „yes‟ or „no‟ position on a validity claim
that is in principle criticizable.”215 An effective speech act can therefore only exist within
the normative bounds of a public sphere structured to invite such Ego/Alter
communication.
The media, the final concept by which Habermas‟ notion of public sphere is
differentiated, is most clearly defined in The Structural Transformations of the Public
Sphere.216 In this book, Habermas explains that the media ostensibly provides private
opinion a venue for the public sphere via publicity. However, Habermas makes clear that
the notion of media as an effective means of transport for true opinion and intention is
merely illusory. Instead, media, especially commercial media, limits communicative
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effectiveness by artificially creating consensus where no-one can actually criticize the
position. As I laid out in chapters 1 and 3, Habermas claims that the public sphere is the
location wherein, through speech acts and assembly, the private interests and opinions
access and guide the affairs of the state.
Hannah Arendt, like Habermas, is interested in the notion of a politically minded
public sphere based in communication and action. Unlike Habermas, however, Arendt
does not emphasize the normative value of communication. Instead, she highlights the
importance of correspondence between action and word. In the Vita Activa, Arendt
claims that the Public sphere is a shared-world [Mitwelt] within which we can assess
phenomena and we can share communal life. This shared-world is best understood in her
conception of activity in the vita activa. For Arendt, activity is both the ability of a
person‟s words to correspond with his or her actions, and also the means by which a
community can act in concert toward a specific shared goal. Like, Habermas, then,
Arendt sees communication and the capacity for politically oriented and purposive action
together. Unlike Habermas, however, these goals do not have to be normatively agreed
upon, or systematically achieved. Instead, in Arendt‟s estimation the public sphere is the
place for the republican ideals originally posited in Greece and Rome. That is not to say,
as many critics have, that Arendt provides a history of decaying society in place of an
explanation of modern public society.217 Instead, following Benhabib, I believe that
Arendt provides a history of concepts wherein historiography of the role of public space
illuminates the importance of differentiating the public sphere and „the rise of the
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social.‟218 Whereas Habermas critiques media for undermining the efficacy of the public
sphere in civil society, Arendt defines the rise of social interests as the source of the
dilution of the political impact of the public sphere. Arendt argues that, “The emergence
of society—the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational
devices—from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere,
has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed
almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life
of the individual and the citizen.”219
Habermas and Arendt both clearly emphasize the roles of communication and
action in their respective notions of the public sphere. They both recognize the role of
the public as a means to political interests and action, and they both see a sort of basic
requirement in communicative rationality as its basis. Additionally, they recognize the
threat that blurring the borders between public interest and social interest constitutes—
Habermas through his analysis of the media, and Arendt in her summation of the „rise of
the social‟. Despite these basic agreements and corresponding attitudes, Arendt and
Habermas do have some striking dissimilarities. Where Habermas emphasizes
normativity and consensus, Arendt emphasizes republicanism and goal-orientation. Also,
218
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while Habermas views communicative action as packaged concept of communication and
action in concert, Arendt‟s conceptualizations of communication and action maintain
separability.

Arendt’s Solidarity
Whereas Habermas‟ notion of political life in the public sphere focused on
normativity and consensus, Arendt‟s valuation of republicanism and orientation towards
change ground her concept of solidarity. Her biography of Rosa Luxemburg provides an
interesting reflection on solidarity as a philosophical and political concept through the
reported actions and ideas of a like-minded revolutionary spirit. For Arendt, Luxemburg
is not simply a historical figure, or an interesting personality worthy of record;
Luxemburg‟s life provides an example, albeit flawed, of living actively and politically
according to proto-Arendtian values.
For Arendt, Luxemburg‟s grounding in realism is as much a key to her
revolutionary spirit and political character as her affinity to Marxian theory or affiliation
with the famous German political movement, the Sparta Group. Arendt claims that,
“What mattered most in her view was reality, in all its wonderful and all its frightful
aspects, even more than revolution itself.”220 Arendt argues that it is Luxemburg‟s firmly
materialist and realist tendencies that inspired her unique analysis of capitalism, not as a
force, but as the historical result of imperialistic actions.221 Arendt is sympathetic to
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Luxemburg‟s realist view of history as causally produced, as opposed to the more
philosophically popular view of history as a Hegelian flow of spirit. I believe that
Arendt‟s affinity for Luxemburg‟s realism further influences Arendtian theory. Most
importantly for my analysis here, Arendt‟s conception of solidarity appears firmly rooted
in a realist conception of the materially and historically experienced world. Arendtian
solidarity is not simply a shared kinship of ideas, but a political stance, in which people
come together for shared goals and actions grounded in the reality of the political, public
sphere.
The biographical reality for Rosa Luxemburg was that she was a part of an
expatriate, communist wave of immigrants. Luxemburg‟s identified with her PolishJewish heritage, believing it allowed her to transcend nationality and nation-state
boundaries. Arendt highlights the importance Luxemburg finds in a constructed culture
of immigrant Jews: “This milieu, and never the German Party, was and remained Rosa
Luxemburg‟s home. The home was movable up to a point, and since it was
predominantly Jewish it did not coincide with any „fatherland‟.”222 Arendt‟s emphasis on
the boundarylessness of Luxemburg‟s affinities proves that solidarity and belonging are
not dependent on citizenship, or on national identity, but rather on the ability to find and
construct partnerships within a kinship of interests. For Arendt‟s quasi-philosophical
analysis, Luxemburg‟s cosmopolitanism proves that it is not the political character of a
party that grants solidarity power, but it is rather the coming together of shared interests
and cooperation for specific goals which characterizes the power of solidarity.

relationship of lived experience, environmental interaction, and historical situatedness which drives the
production of capital and capitalist society.
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Although Arendt‟s depiction of Luxemburg provides a perfect case study for
understanding the powers and conscriptions of solidarity, Arendt is clear that shared
interests and belonging are not always compatible with personal identity and autonomous
political interests. Paradoxically, for Arendt, Luxemburg‟s outsider-identity was equally
integral to her political participation:
Her distaste for the women‟s emancipation movement, to which all other women of her generation
and political convictions were irresistibly drawn, was significant; in the face of suffragette
equality, she might have been tempted to reply, Vive la petite difference. She was an outsider, not
only because she was and remained a Polish Jew in a country she disliked and a party she came
soon to despise, but also because she was a woman. 223

Arendt‟s subtext here seems to say that shared political interests cannot account for the
full spectrum of political action and participation. Individuals are the political actors, and
as individuals, must necessarily participate politically in order to preserve the republican
ideals of Arendt‟s active life. This is not to say that Arendt does not value shared
political interests; she does, and she even goes so far as to argue that shared political
interests are what hold individual political actors together during acts of solidarity.
However, these shared political interests are not sufficient for describing political action,
even if, for her, they are arguably necessary. As I argued in the last chapter, there is a
danger in ascribing too much weight to shared opinions and interests. Not only does it
minimize the important differences of a truly diverse democratic society, but it also
prevents spontaneous solidarity from emerging between actors with otherwise very
disparate and distinct individual needs and values.224
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Arendt also uses Luxemburg to illustrate these republican ideals of politics.
According to Arendt, Luxemburg recognized the necessity for absolute freedom for
individual political actors, not only in their private lives, but also in their ability to engage
publicly:
Which, of course, has never prevented the Russian, Polish, or German comrades from violently
disagreeing with her on this point. It is indeed the republican question rather than the national one
which separated her most decisively from all others. Here she was completely alone, as she was
alone, though less obviously so, in her stress on the absolute necessity of not only individual but
public freedom under all circumstances.225

This reinforces Arendt‟s later claims that republicanism must be preserved beyond the
occasional vote, to a continual individual ability to renew republican membership through
political action. For Arendt, renewing republican membership requires a vocal
engagement in political discourse—protest, presentation, and political writing are all
forms of political action which go beyond simply occasionally voting.

Universalism and Narrativity
In her chapter entitled “Judgment and Politics in Arendt‟s Thought,” Benhabib
rereads Arendt‟s political claims of action through the neo-Kantian lens of moral theory
as foundational for political action. Benhabib claims that Arendt is right to highlight both
the Kantian notion of judgment and the Aristotelian view of narrativity at various points
in her work. However, Benhabib contends that Arendt misses the crucial conclusion of
combining these thinkers in both political and moral matters: the emergence of a
universalist ethics founded in moral judgment. Benhabib writes:
In this sense, Hannah Arendt was right in maintaining that judgement is the most political of all
human faculties, for it leads to the recovery of the perspectival quality of the world in which action
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unfolds. Where I depart from Arendt though is in her attempt to restrict this quality of mind to the
political realm alone, thereby ignoring judgement as a moral faculty.226

By addressing both the moral quality of judgment with the importance of judgment to
political action, Benhabib believes that a reinterpretation of Arendt‟s work would allow
for a workable model of a phenomenology of moral judgment. Reading Arendt against
Arendt, Benhabib articulates three theses for a phenomenology of moral judgment:
1.) “The exercise of moral judgment that is concerned with the epistemic
identification of human situations and circumstances as morally relevant does not
proceed according to the model of the subsumption of a particular under a
universal.”227
2.) “The identity of a moral action is not one that can be construed in light of a
general rule governing particular instances but entails the exercise of moral
imagination which activates our capacity for thinking of possible narratives and
act descriptions in light of which our actions can be understood as others.”228
3.) “The assessment of the maxim of one‟s intentions, as these embody moral
principles, requires understanding the narrative history of the self who is the
actor; this understanding discloses both self-knowledge and knowledge of oneself
as viewed by others.”229
Benhabib believes that by understanding judgment‟s relation to personal moral action and
perspective ensures that political action retains plurality. In Benhabib‟s view, plurality is
not a simply external construct of different actors in a political situation, but instead a
226
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recognition of internal multitudes of perspectives, which can then be translated onto the
political sphere.230 In other words, the political actor must first recognize his or her own
self-propensity for embodying an array of different perspectives and opinions in order to
envision „living in someone else‟s shoes‟. This interplay between the moral self and the
political actor—as well as an inferred reciprocal action of empathy affecting the moral
self—forms the basis for Benhabib‟s Arendtian interpretation of the benefits of
communicative ethics. Communicative ethics, following Benhabib, requires that moral
opinion, as well as political action, of all acting members in a community be respected:
The discourse model of ethics which enjoins enlarged thought, by making the perspective of all
involved in a dialogue situation the sine qua non of the moral standpoint, allows us to think of this
continuity and mediation. For the articulation of the perspectives of all involved requires, in fact,
a civic and public life in which the right to opinion and action is guaranteed.231

For Benhabib, not only does speech ensure the identity of the political actor, but
argument is also the means through which political action itself is validated, a construct
true to the Habermasian system of communicative ethics. Benhabib‟s claims seem to
recall Arendt's account of Herodotus at the end of the “Truth and Politics” essay. There,
Arendt highlights a plurality by acknowledging the good deeds of Greek and Barbarian
alike, suggesting an empathetic understanding of the cultural, moral, and political
other.232

Is Cosmopolitanism a Beneficial Goal?
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As I introduced in Chapter 3, in Another Cosmopolitanism Benhabib is concerned
with the philosophical foundations of cosmopolitanism and the philosophical grounding
for international juridical practices. In what follows in this chapter, I return to a
discussion of cosmopolitanism in Benhabib, in order to uncover and evaluate the
Arendtian foundations for her position. Explicitly, Benhabib identifies Arendt‟s and
Jasper‟s appraisal of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem as forming the basis for any
dialogue about the legitimacy of cosmopolitan juridical norms and the new groundwork
for contemporary republican ideals in a globalized world. Although Benhabib thinks
Arendt posed the right kind of questions and dealt with the right topics (crimes against
humanity, genocide, court legitimacy), Benhabib wonders if Arendt‟s final appraisals and
conclusions are fully correct:
Why does Arendt deny than an International Criminal Court is conceivable? Does she mean that it
is unlikely to come into existence, or rather that, even if it were to come into existence, it would be
without authority? Her position is all the more baffling because her very insistence on the
juridical as opposed to the merely moral dimension of these crimes against humanity suggests the
need for a standing international body that would possess the jurisdiction to try such crimes
committed by individuals.233

Although it seems here that Benhabib is critical simply of Arendt‟s skepticism, it
becomes clear that Benhabib shares a level of skepticism of the legitimacy of
international courts. Benhabib believes that Arendt‟s wish for an international court
capable of preserving human rights has been realized to a certain extent in the presentday European Union and through cosmopolitan organizations of nation-states like
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NATO.234 This development, however, is not free from philosophical, juridical, and
normative problems:
Although the evolution of cosmopolitan norms of justice is a tremendous development, the
relationship between the spread of cosmopolitan norms and democratic self-determination is
fraught, both theoretically and politically. How can the will of democratic majorities be
reconciled with norms of cosmopolitan justice? How can legal norms and standards, which
originate outside the will of democratic legislatures, become binding on them? 235

Because cosmopolitan groups capable of upholding human rights are built from the
nation-states which represent their citizens, cosmopolitan groups must reconcile the
supra-national concern of universal human rights (Arendt‟s right to have rights, and call
to recognize crimes against humanity) with the intra-national concern of remaining
autonomous nation-states able to democratically express the will of the citizenry which
grants these governments their legitimacy. Benhabib identifies this problem as a
philosophical concern for several groups of thinkers, most notably within Critical Theory,
the discipline which she claims to belong: “For a third group of thinkers, whose lineages
are those of Critical theory, cosmopolitanism is a normative philosophy for carrying the
universalistic norms of Discourse ethics beyond the confines of the nation-state (Jürgen
Habermas, David Held, and James Bohman).”236 However, Benhabib thinks that
traditional Critical theory has not thought through the paradox of democratic legitimacy
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and the universal protection of human rights; though she acknowledges that Arendt‟s
skepticism provides a model for concern:
In extending the norms of Discourse ethics toward a cosmopolitan political philosophy, Held and
Bohman in particular have not addressed the paradox of bounded communities. Here I part
company from my Critical theory colleagues and join in the anxiety expressed by Arendt‟s
puzzling observations about an International Criminal Court.237

Benhabib then goes on to articulate the problem through an analysis partially indebted to
Arendt and partially indebted to Kantian understandings of cosmopolitanism in general.
She sees Discourse ethics as a paradigm for desiring cosmopolitan rights: “Because the
discourse theory of ethics articulates a universalist moral standpoint, it cannot limit the
scope of the moral conversation only to those who reside within nationally recognized
boundaries; it views the moral conversation as potentially including all of humanity.”238
These universal rights include concepts taken from both Kant and Arendt—concepts such
as „the right to universal hospitality‟, „crimes against humanity‟, and „the right to have
rights‟ (Arendt) are the legacy of Kantian cosmopolitanism. In each instance, they
articulate a shared philosophical perplexity:
Kant, Arendt, and Jaspers want to give these concepts a binding power over and beyond the moral
obligation which they impose on individual agents. These concepts should not be treated as mere
„oughts‟; they must generate enforceable norms not only for the individuals but for the collective
actors as well, and in the first place, for states and governments.239

Universalist cosmopolitanism, therefore, first and foremost identifies human rights which
must be preserved over-and-above individual governmental interests: “These categories
are intended to provide not only the precepts of individual conduct but also principles of
public morality and institutional justice. They transcend the specific positive laws of any
existing legal order by formulating binding norms which no promulgated legislation
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ought to violate.”240 This universalist tendency must be meted, however, with a respect
for autonomy; the autonomy of nation-states, as well as the autonomy of democratically
participating citizens within those nation-states must be respected. Benhabib identifies
Arendt‟s interest in republican self-governance as an example of this concern:
At times, this is a concession to political realism on their part; more often thought, and particularly
for Kant and Arendt, the division of humankind into self-governing polities is not a factum brutum
but has value in itself…neither Kant nor Arendt can reconcile world government with the values
of private and public autonomy. Therefore, the tension between the demands of cosmopolitan
justice and the values of republican self-governance is greatest in their work.241

Since the Nuremberg trials, the international community has recognized crimes against
humanity, genocide, and war crimes as being more than conventional criminal notions of
murder and rape. Similarly, these new categories of crime sponsor corresponding novel
views of jurisdiction and punishment. This new class of crimes has instigated a
movement toward humanitarian interventions, “…based on the belief that when a
sovereign nation-state egregiously violates the basic human rights of a segment of its
population on account of its religion, race, ethnicity, language or culture there is a
generalized moral obligation to end actions such as genocide and crimes against
humanity. In such cases, human rights trump state sovereignty claims.”242 It is evident in
Benhabib‟s estimation that the universalizable in human rights must trump in situations
of potential conflict with local, national, and sovereign appeals to particular laws and
juridical practices.
Benhabib recognizes the development of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as the instantiation of the internal tension of cosmopolitan norms in contemporary
society: “…although territorially bounded states are increasingly subject to international
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norms, states themselves are the principal signatories as well as enforcers of the multiple
human rights treaties and conventions through which international norms spread.”243 So,
on the one hand, human rights extend beyond the individual nation-states, but on the
other hand, they are dependent on the enforcement and ratification of individual states to
protect them: “Modern democracies act in the same of universal principles, which are
then circumscribed within a particular civic community. This is the „Janus face of the
modern nation,‟ in the words of Jürgen Habermas.”244

Honig and Arendt: Materialist Cosmopolitanism
Bonnie Honig provides a critical and productive answer to Benhabib‟s argument,
which engages a completely different reading of Arendt. Honig believes that Arendt
would be unfulfilled by Benhabib‟s universalism; rather than sympathetic of it, or
placated by it, Honig‟s Arendt would offer a critical interpretation of cosmopolitanism as
politically lacking. Honig begins with a straightforward indictment of what she identifies
as Benhabib‟s moralistic tendencies. She writes: “Benhabib‟s Another Cosmopolitanism
seeks to reclaim universalism or a postmetaphysical politics, but her reclamation is
marked by traces of earlier universalisms that promise moral guidance from above to a
wayward human world below.”245 Contrasting her understanding of Arendt with
Benhabib‟s, Honig claims that Arendt would be disappointed with this moral
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universalism. Honig believes that Benhabib‟s weaker version of Arendt comes from an
incomplete reading of Arendt‟s critique of the Eichmann trial:
She [Arendt] asked not only „How are they trying Eichmann?‟ but also always: „What are they
doing by trying Eichmann? What political ends is this trial serving?‟ This, indeed, is what
offended many of her readers; that she would dare to suggest that the State of Israel might be
operating politically, that it would use this trial, that the trial was not an end in itself, that it was a
quest for something other than absolute, unconditional justice.246

Honig goes on to claim that this critical ambivalence toward the Eichmann trial underlies
Arendt‟s own skepticism about global politics and the development of the nation-state
Israel:
Indeed, her [Arendt‟s] half-hearted wish for an international criminal court, expressed in the form
of a lamentation of its impossibility, was not simply a wish to escape from politics as such into a
really neutral or just realm of law. Or that‟s not all it was. It was (whatever else it was) a way to
highlight and criticize the part played by the Eichmann trial in a larger politics of state-building to
which she was opposed.247

According to Honig, being faithful to Arendt is not simply recognizing her wish for an
international court to found juridical legitimacy, but it is also in recognizing the very real
political problems that any juridical system would have. Further, being faithful to
Arendtian theory requires recognizing that political critique is the duty of each and every
political participant. According to Honig, Arendt does not wish for fulfillment for her
philosophy, she wants, instead, a philosophical openness to challenge all new forms of
political engagement. Honig writes, “Thus, rather than treat the Arendt who wished for
appropriate international institutions to judge Eichmann as if she were fulfilled or
satisfied by the inauguration of today‟s new norms and institutions, we might do better to
see in Arendt‟s example an invitation to assess emerging new orders in the most
relentlessly political and critical terms.”248 I read Honig as articulating an alternative
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notion of cosmopolitanism wherein the new order must be seen in relation to the old, of
course, but they must also always indicate the possibility for further future development.
New methods of governance and political participation must be constantly challenged
and rearticulated. This openness and affinity for challenging accepted authority
corresponds with a Derridean notion of Arendtian politics.
Honig‟s reading of Arendt reinforces her reading of Derrida and the necessity of
double-gestures in real politics:
The right to have rights is itself a double gesture: it is a reproach to any particular order of rights
(albeit certainly to some more than others) and a demand that everyone should belong to one such
order. A double gesture is necessary because, paradoxically, we need rights because we cannot
trust the political communities to which we belong to treat us with dignity and respect; however
we depend for our rights on those very same political communities.249

Although Honig agrees with Benhabib that the question of cosmopolitan rights and
norms is indeed a paradoxical question, she takes that paradox one step further. For
Honig, the paradox is not simply an accident of political legitimacy, but a theoretically
necessary double-relation based on a Derridean reading of Arendt‟s call for rights. It is
the impossible which comes: “Indeed, Arendt‟s right to have rights—a polemical,
political call—directs our attention repeatedly to the need for a politics whereby to
express and address the paradox as it is experienced by minorities, the stateless, the
powerless, and the hapless.”250
Honig criticizes Benhabib on the very Arendtian lines of the necessity for
contextualization and openness to understanding novelty in the political sphere. She
recognizes that the future-aspect of human rights, which Arendt calls for, is not a claim
that we must have unlimited, universalistic protection of the human rights we recognize
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now, but that the very definition of human rights is open to change and incorporate newly
emergent rights:
This view of rights as always pointing (or made to point) beyond themselves is deeply attractive.
However, what those rights point to in Benhabib‟s account is not an open futurity dotted by new
or emergent rights but a normative validity that launches us into a subsumptive logic in which new
claims are assessed not in terms of the new worlds they may bring into being but rather in terms of
their appositeness to molds and models already in place: incomplete, but definitive in their
contours.”251

In contrast to Benhabib, Honig proposes a new cosmopolitan form, not based on the
universalist cosmopolitanism of Benhabib and Kant, but instead on the unconditional
protection of rights based in Arendt and the notion of the double-gesture in Derrida:
An agonistic cosmopolitics locates itself squarely in the paradox of founding, that irresolvable and
productive paradox in which a future is claimed on behalf of a peoples and rights that are not yet
and may never be. Arendt‟s unconditional right to have rights is as good a motto as any for that
project, as long as we understand rights to imply a world-building that is not incompatible with the
project of building juridical institutions and safeguards, but also reaches beyond that project
because it is wary of the sedimentations of power and discretion that accrete in such institutional
contexts.252

For Honig, the universal is simultaneously too much and not enough. Universal rights
and authority must be based in normative values, and seek completion. However,
unconditional rights indicate that our juridical and philosophical foundations are never
adequate for legitimizing human rights protections. Additionally, unconditional rights
leave open the possibility for the expansion of our understanding of human rights and
human rights violations, an expansion that will undoubtedly occur with future change to
culture, society, and transnational relations.

Solidarity and Feminist Power
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In Amy Allen‟s chapter on Hannah Arendt, “The Power of Solidarity: Hannah
Arendt,” Allen is careful to establish that she is not providing a feminist evaluation of
Arendt‟s work through the lens of rereading Arendt as a burgeoning feminist. Instead,
she is reading Arendt as a sort of harvesting ground, out of which she can pick and
choose certain concepts and ideas that would prove fertile to Allen‟s own overall
conception of feminist power.253 Primarily, Allen is interested in Arendt‟s account and
description of „solidarity‟ as a helpful tool for understanding potential resistances to
power regimes, and for regaining a sort of intrinsic feminist power.
Allen begins with a sort of necessary critique of Arendt, highlighting the
difficulties of “feminizing” a philosopher who so staunchly opposed bringing bodily
reality and needs into the political sphere, thereby delimiting the possibilities for sexuated
politics.254 Allen takes up many of the themes pertinent to my own interests in Arendt‟s
thought: Is she or is she not sharply dividing the political and private spheres? Does she
allow for culture in politics, or a politics of culture, in her analysis of the pariah Jew?
Can this analysis be applied to the role of “woman”?
Allen then goes on to read Arendt alongside her interpretations of Butler and
Foucault; the rest of the book is devoted to creating a sort of hybrid account of power
using the Foucault‟s nuanced account of domination surfacing in multiple locations, the
account of performative resistance in Butler, and the political influence and power of
solidarity from Arendt. According to Allen, reading all three theories as complimentary
to one-another provides a theory of power that exceeds the limitations of all three
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philosophers. It gives the feminist the opportunity to be both subject to power and an
agent of power—a theory with political as well as theoretical consequences. However, in
order to develop this theory, Allen needs an Arendtian account of solidarity.
To further her point that it is not only critically possible to read all three
philosophers together, but that it is also true that all three philosophers have explicitly
similar philosophical commitments, Allen describes the “alliance” between the three
philosophers. Interestingly, this alliance begins on the grounds that both Arendt and
Butler make claims about the necessity of linguistic action for creating political subjects.
Allen believes this affinity reveals a shared philosophical lineage among all three
philosophers. Allen points to Benhabib who argued in The Reluctant Modernism of
Hannah Arendt, that Arendt has both a “modernist commitment to universal morality and
her „postmodernist‟ critique of foundationalism.”255 Allen believes that this
postmodernist attitude towards foundationalism, which both Foucault and Butler share,
comes from her Heidegger/Nietzsche lineage, which Foucault and Butler also share. She
carries this genealogical affinity argument even further by pointing out that: 1.) All three
philosophers criticize the Marx/Hegel dialectic as neglecting the notion of novelty; 2.)
Foucault and Arendt both criticize normalizaiton in society—Foucault through
disciplinary power, and Arendt through her critique of the social sphere; 3.) Foucault and
Arendt use aesthetics to explain judgment—Foucault in his notion of living a beautiful
life, Arendt through her adoption of Kant‟s judgment in the Third Critique; 4.) All three
criticize conventional notions of subjectivity—for all three theorists, subjects are never
autonomous or self-creative as such, they are always a part of the contextualized world;
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And 5.) “…They all reject the juridical or command-obedience model of power”256—all
actors for all three theorists are simultaneously political active and political subjugated.257
For my interests, Arendt‟s critique of normativity is most engaging. Allen
explains that:
Arendt‟s critique emerges out of her critique of the rise in the modern era of the domain of the
social, a hybrid sphere that results from bringing the private concerns of the household into the
public sphere of politics. According to Arendt, the rise of the social coincides with the advent of
mass culture, and mass culture functions through normalzaiton. Thus, she notes, with the rise of
mass culture, society comes to expect certain kinds of behavior from individuals, and to impose
„numerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave,
to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement‟.258

Allen reads Arendt as critical of normativity on the grounds that it prevents them from
being truly political actors—without the ability to voice their individual concerns, human
actors are unable to be political actors. This is especially intriguing for me, because this
notion of innovative political action is dependent both on Arendt‟s necessary separation
of the social from the political, and on Arendt‟s claims that we must voice our positions
in order to be political. My philosophical priorities are sympathetic to Arendt‟s
compelling argument for the necessity of innovation in place of normalization (especially
as a potential critique of Habermas). However, it is difficult for me to accept that this
requires the absolute separation of the social and the political, which would exclude
sexuated politics, as I argued in chapter 1. I find it additionally problematic that it
requires linguistic participation, which would exclude non-linguistic or a-linguistic
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participation in the public sphere. For example, art and aesthetic participation seem
equally effective and important means for public participation and critique.259
Allen also provides a summary of Arendt‟s gestalt notion of power. Because
Arendtian power is not of a simple “command-obedience” model, power cannot be
simply “violence,” “authority,” or “strength.” Power as a political concept cannot be
defined as violence, because violence eliminates all other goals—violence becomes a
state of society that is pursued only for its own sake, as in the French Revolution‟s Reign
of Terror. Authority is also more or less an accident of power rather than an actual
political ability—authority is an office, not an action. Strength is a quality possessed by
an individual, also not a political action itself. Allen identifies the conception of power in
Arendt‟s The Human Condition as fundamentally and primarily action. Power is “a
collective, relational phenomenon that relies on numbers, not implements; it is an end in
itself that is, thus, by its very nature legitimate; and, most important, its essence is not
command or rule but collaboration and collective action.”260 This conception of power
reinforces that weapons and brute force do not constitute the absolute bounds of power,
an idea Allen and Arendt share. Instead, by highlighting the power of solidarity, both
Arendt and Allen reinforce the potential for all political actors to publically employ and
harness power. Albeit, in this case, primarily through the sheer numbers of concerted
political action.
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In order to ensure the qualities of collectivity, action, and relationality, power
must itself be an activity of concert—of working with others. This concept is what Allen
identifies as the core of solidarity in Arendt‟s depiction of power. For Allen, Arendt‟s
solidarity is a promise-keeping among a group of similarly interested political actors who
use their concerted efforts to pursue legitimately political goals. Allen analyzes this
relationship in terms of feminist interests. She concludes that solidarity must occur
between a group of individuals with some sort of base commonality—if all members
were totally or radically different, they could not communicate their interests to one
another. However, this does not mean that the group is reduced to a sort of absolute
sameness by rejecting that commonality is an essential quality, it is instead a political
quality. This eliminates the need for a stagnant or formally final conception of what
Allen calls “sisterhood”—the idea that all women are essentially and formally the
same.261 Allen points out the common-sense position of Arendt that absolute equality
would eliminate the need for the political—everyone would prefigure the needs and
desires of the other, as being the needs and desires that he or she also shares. We need
communication and political action because we are all different, and we must be able to
voice our positions, needs, and desires in the political sphere in order to attain the ends of
our interests. Hearkening to Honig and Derrida, Allen seems to articulate the need for a
double-gesture. Allen also highlights Arendt‟s position that we must fight back
politically by identifying with the part of us under attack. Admittedly, Arendt maintains
this position in the context of fighting Nazi oppression through Jewish identity, but, as
Allen agrees, this position could be potentially helpful for feminist interests as well.
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Normativity and Solidarity: A Place in the Renewed Public Sphere
Taking Allen‟s claims to power in solidarity seriously, a new feminist concept of
the role of solidarity in political society emerges. Solidarity is not an equivocation of
differing interests resulting in an essential concept of “woman” or “Other.” Solidarity is
also not reducible to social plurality, which would relegate its effectiveness only to the
private sphere. Instead, following Benhabib, Honig, and Allen‟s extensions of Arendtian
thought, solidarity is an explicitly political form of pluralistic and universalistic action. It
is a sort of civic empathy—to adapt the concept from Mead—wherein concerted political
action emerges through actively formed groups of individuals with similar goals and
interests. In this way, solidarity is not reducible either to individual interests or to
ideologies. As I argued in the preceding section, solidarity is, following Allen‟s reading
of The Human Condition, an activity of power as such.
Keeping in mind the notion of concerted activity as a specific application of
political power, solidarity fits well into the sort of transfiguration Benhabib calls for in a
system of utopian Communicative ethics. If transfiguration is the “new and imaginative
constellation of the values and meanings of the present,”262 is solidarity not also a
transfigurative power? Solidarity, as a political activity, is directly opposed to the notion
of unchallenged fulfillment of norms. Additionally, as a pluralistic endeavor for bringing
together different political actors with shared interests, solidarity seems to be a paradigm
“constellation of values.” The notion of an Arendtian politics in general as being
opposed to aspirations of fulfillment and uncritical complacency, finds even more support
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in Bonnie Honig‟s reading of Arendt‟s Eichmann in Jerusalem. Honig‟s analysis that
Arendt requires an absolute right to have rights, uncovers a deeper power in Arendtian
political solidarity. To remain true to Arendtian politcs, constellations of political agents
working in the interests of solidarity must remain fluid constellations. Solidarity retains
its full power by opening itself to as-yet-unseen interests and as-yet-unheard voices in the
political arena. Following Honig, if Arendtian politics maintains a Derridean duality,
than a refreshed concept of Arendtian solidarity would also provide the “doublegesture”—solidarity works towards the protection of generalizable interests; however, as
a form of ongoing political action, rather than fulfillment, solidarity is also open to the
influence of individual political actors.
It is in this way that Arendtian solidarity may be able to provide a missing crucial
element for Habermasian normative ethics in order to meet feminist concerns in Critical
Theory. According to Benhabib‟s analysis, and Habermas‟ own descriptions of
communicative ethics, Habermasian political action overemphasizes the universalist
qualities of normativity. By asserting that communicative action is not merely the
concert of common interests, but explicitly “common convictions,”263 Habermas asserts
that political action is geared toward normative consensus in all legitimate circumstances.
However, as Benhabib makes clear in her assessment of Habermas, the interest of
normativity is to maintain a fulfillment version of historical development—norms
reinforce the historically held, and therefore propagated, convictions of a consensus
oriented society. These norms preclude transfiguration and the utopian critical interests
of change and development.
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Following the preceding feminist interpretations of Arendt, perhaps Habermasian
normativity could be supplanted with the critical perspective of solidarity. Maintaining
the notion of legitimacy through shared interests, solidarity achieves a certain level of
political value in a system of discourse ethics; however, solidarity circumvents the
problems of normativity by remaining open to transfiguration and the emergence of asyet-unheard individual interests. Because of solidarity‟s unique ability to be
simultaneously an effective political tool for legitimate power, while maintaining an
openness to individual interest, perhaps Arendt can provide new hope for the feminist
project in Critical Theory. While Benhabib has always remained hopeful for the political
application of Habermasian communicative ethics, she admits that there are limitations to
his project of normativity. However, by reintroducing self-interest to mutual
understanding, Arendtian solidarity—through the lens of contemporary feminist
critique—as a notion of political power, may restore the hope for a feminist theory of
communication and political action.
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Conclusion

Is this kind of ethics individualistic or not? Yes, if one means by that that it accords to the individual an
absolute value and that it recognizes in him alone the power of laying the foundations of his own
existence…But it is not solipsistic, since the individual is defined only by his relationship to the world and
to other individuals; he exists by transcending himself, and his freedom can be achieved only through the
freedom of others. He justifies his existence by a movement which, like freedom, springs from his heart but
which leads outside of him.—Simone de Beauvoir264

When considering the relationships between power, autonomy, and participation
in democratically relevant political philosophy, two false alternatives often emerge. On
one side, theoreticians identify society as a group of diverse individuals, with divergent
interests that may be privately met, but whose recourse to an overly insensitive public
sphere insures only the most basic universal rights. Fred Evans refers to this conception
of society as absolute heterogeneity, where a plurality of diversity protects individual
cultures and differences, but only connects social groups tenuously.265 Facile critiques of
postmodern democratic theory often claim that this is the paradigm for contemporary
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political philosophy; but even nuanced analyses find tendencies towards the reification of
absolute difference in the works of Deleuze, Derrida, Irigaray, and Lyotard. On the other
side of the dilemmatic horns, is the obviously problematic conception of homogeneity
within national interests. This position is now almost exclusively addressed in terms of
critique, and from a multitude of perspectives. For example, in Habermas‟ “On the
Relation Between the Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy” in The Inclusion of the
Other: Studies in Political Theory, Habermas indicts ethnonationalist and constructivist
approaches to democratic theory, particularly those espoused by Carl Schmitt.266
Habmermas correctly identifies Schmitt‟s position as relying on the notion that peoples
are existentially and substantively connected—and it is through this connection that
rights and political determinations naturally emerge.267 This notion of absolute
homogeneity has been explicitly out of favor since the Nazi adoption and implantation of
homogenous nationalist principles, but Habermas further identifies contemporary
European tendencies to found even European Union treaties on a conception of
democratic participation that emerges from “national identity” and “in a relatively
homogenous manner.”268 As I have argued throughout chapters 1 through 5, although
Habermas provides such criticism, he continues to have difficulty in proposing an
alternative capable of fully addressing theories of difference, particularly feminist
positions. Throughout the previous five chapters, I have worked to synthesize several
feminist positions as a corrective to Habermas‟ theory. Individually, and in relation to
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one another, these feminist theories function explicitly to provide a critical analysis of
Habermas‟ limitations. By staging the various feminist critiques in relation to one
another, I have worked to synthesize these positions further to create a unique and
original alternative theory.
Through a particular reading of the combination of Pateman, Benhabib, Butler,
Honig, Allen, and Cornell‟s theories, I have suggested the emergence of an alternative
notion of participation based in relational ethics, embodied action through solidarity, and
understanding potentiality in terms of utopianism. What connects us is our shared
experience of the world, with all of the interdependences and contestations that are
represented in this shared experience. What allows us to act in political concert is
solidarity, which I have proposed as a theory of non-effacing political grouping based in
social-psychological recognition of mutual oppression and/or dearth of representative
political power. What gives us hope for emancipatory change is a utopian orientation
towards transfiguration, which I have expressed as an openness to imagining future
possibilities, grounded by our shared past of mourning and forgiveness.

Power and Solidarity: Individual Participation and Intersubjective Alliance
As I explored in chapter 6, theorizing the space for democratic political and social
expression is of utmost concern for both the critical theoretical and the feminist project. I
believe that this issue, more than most, serves to unify the past and future of
philosophical explorations of political participation and autonomy. In chapter 1, I argued
that the very possibility for political participation and expression is wrought with the
problematic exclusion of women (and other disenfranchised minorities) to the private
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sphere. Synthesizing Pateman‟s careful unpacking of liberal democratic exclusionary
practices in social contract formation with Habermas‟ emphasis on intersubjective
society, I attempted to highlight the importance of understanding how intersubjective
society emerges and creates itself. For meaningful democratic participation actually to
endorse emancipation, however, I must critically analyze the basis for this
intersubjectivity.
How then can a feminist ethics ground a notion of intersubjectivity, especially in
light of the difficult power dynamics that pervade social relationships and political
contexts? This problem must be dealt with in any exploration of emancipatory theory,
especially as it relates to the potential confining or freeing of the autonomous individual.
Here, I would like to articulate the background theory of power I have been working
under. I will then relate this theory of power to the theory of solidarity I illuminated in
chapters 5 and 6, further clarifying the important characteristics of a working theory of
participation through solidarity.
To my mind, Amy Allen‟s work in The Politics of Ourselves comes closest to
articulating a working theory of power that neither disguises the real impact of
subordination in society, nor elevates such power relationships to an unquestionable
meta-theory. In contrast to her own position, Allen admonishes both Butler and
Habermas, for adopting either extreme theory of power:
Although Butler goes too far when she suggests that subordination is central to the becoming of
the subject, Habermas is overly sanguine about the psychic costs of the subjection to the (from the
child‟s perspective, completely arbitrary) will of the parent that is necessary for socialization. One
of the costs of this is vulnerability to subordinating forms of subjection, a tendency to become
psychically attached to and invested in subordinating modes of identity. 269
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Butler is potentially guilty, therefore, of making subjectivation and iteration into a theory
of subordination; we can see these tendencies in her hard postmodern theories I addressed
in Chapter 2. Habermas, on the other hand, is indicted for his willingness to overlook the
psychological effects of power relations, even when addressing power relations most
explicitly, as he does when discussing parent-child relationships in The Future of Human
Nature, which I addressed in Chapter 4. Allen would most likely additionally admonish
Butler for her theory of vulnerability as the basis for reciprocal recognition, the theory I
explored in Chapter 5. However, in contradistinction to Butler‟s earlier theories of
subjectivation, this theory of vulnerability seems to require as much out of recognizing
the Other‟s vulnerability to oneself, as it does to internalizing a sort of vulnerability as a
part of subject-formation. In what follows, I propose that by including Butler‟s theory of
mutual recognition into Allen‟s theory of power would strengthen a complex feminist
understanding of power.
Allen, like both Butler and Habermas, understands the key role recognition plays
in forming autonomous subjects capable of intersubjective interaction. In response to
wanting to have both normative reciprocity and recognition, while also acknowledging
the ubiquitous nature of power, Allen proposes that power must be understood as a
background valence of social and cultural life. She writes:
A better way to deal with this problem is to interpret the claim that there is no outside to power not
to mean that power is present in any and all social relationships but instead as the more innocuous
contention that power is an ineradicable feature of human social life. In other words, one could
drop the omnipresence claim but retain the idea that there is no outside to power in the sense of no
possible form of recognizably human social life from which power has been wholly eliminated. 270

Allen argues that the integration of normative foundations with a realistic appreciation of
power dynamics can be accomplished in two ways. First, she suggests transforming
270
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power relationships by using Jane Mansbridge‟s concept of “conceptual and normative
resources”—in effect suggesting that solidarity for activist groups is founded on
preexistent normative recognition.271 Secondly, Allen argues that it may also be possible
to subvert subordination through feminist displays of literature, film, and art. Allen
agrees with María Pía Lara that narrativity has a real impact on culture, which in turn
mediates power relationships and dynamics.272 In regards to her conception of
preexistant normative recognition, Allen does not provide a complete argument. She
only suggests that the effectiveness of solidarity depends on the existence of such
underlying recognition. I, however, believe that the only viable possibility for
preexisting normative recognition is through a recognition that happens at a psychic
level, such as the recognition of mutual vulnerability proposed by Butler. Other forms of
preexisting normative recognition would require a commitment to a transcendent ideal
subject, who forms the basis for all individual subjects. Examples of this form of
recognition are the Kantian model, or other modernist universalist conceptions of
recognition. This is an obviously problematic formulation for feminist ethical theory, as I
explained in Chapter 3.
Keeping in mind this qualified definition of power, let me be concrete about how
solidarity must be characterized, in order to recognize the importance of power relations
on the capacity for political participation. First and foremost, a theory of political
solidarity allows for mutability; as a coming together of shared interests for a timespecific goal or purpose solidarity is, by definition, open to change corresponding to the
changes of interest and desire, as well change in historical-political context. In contrast,
271
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communicative action tends to maintain the status quo; there is more permanence
intended with a theory of normative consensus, resulting in a greater difficulty of radical
or immediate change. In relation to power, this means that a feminist theory of solidarity
upholds a pragmatic approach of recognizing that power relations infuse society.
However, power-as-such is not seen as absolute or omnipotent, but instead has the
possibility for change. If social power dynamics change, then certain political and social
needs will also change in response. This fluidity requires the mutability of solidarity.
Further, solidarity avoids the leveling or hierarchizing of other forms of strategic
unification, i.e. consensus-oriented communicative action. Solidarity defines individuals
as a part of the “group” according to the specific shared interest that brings the group
together, but does not attempt to restrict individuals, as individuals, to these qualities.
According to Arendt and Allen, individuals retain other unique identities and often hold
very different positions and viewpoints from other members on other political, social, and
personal matters. In contrast, by virtue of the consensus-orientation of communicative
action, individual group members are required to defer to one another, to make
compromises, and to level other individual differences. Not only is this problematic on a
theoretical level when it comes to the central Critical Theory issue of emancipation, as I
addressed in chapter 3, but this is also problematic in light of the issue of power. The
“group” in a normative ethics operates by means of consensus. This means that
according to Habermas, it is desirable for individuals to have autonomous desires that are
brought to the group, but that eventually the culmination of normative figuration will be a
totalized agreement. If normative consensus seeking communicative action requires
deference and a leveling of difference, then it encourages precisely the unhealthy
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subordinating power relations Allen warns us to avoid. Not only is Habermas therefore
sanguine about hierarchical power and the psychical damage of internalizing such
subordination, but he is also culpable of directly encouraging such power relations.
Solidarity is often a characteristic of resistance movements. A fringe group can
display the same level of solidarity and the same ethics of solidarity as a “legitimate”
political group. Despite Habermas‟ romantic evaluation of certain revolutionary ideals,
Habermas and Habermasian theory are decidedly conservative.273 Normativity, by its
very nature, promotes standardized political decisions within the scope of a legitimate
political body. Fringe groups‟ limited reach precludes their ability to be as effective
normatively.
Solidarity also upholds the ideals of the care ethics I outline in Chapter 4. Parents
can align themselves as a group with a concerted interest in care of their families and
children. Similarly modeled care relationships can also form, where the requisite social
or political basis is the orientation towards care-fulfillment. These relationships would be
otherwise excluded from political consideration except as a sort of democratic
constituent; this provides a relational/interpersonal characteristic to an ethics of
solidarity.
For these reasons, feminist ethics seem naturally to align more closely with
solidarity. In relation to the issue of distinguishing between public and private concerns,
solidarity obviates problems related to neglecting the feminine concerns of the private
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sphere by respecting psychological and political needs. Additionally, in order to form a
relationship of solidarity, participants are not confined to legitimate political bodies in
order to possess or express power. For example, transnational feminist movements can
employ relationships of solidarity, despite their differences in national governing bodies.
This is not to say that Habermas believes that communicative action is confined to
nationally organized, official governmental political bodies. In fact, in 2003 Habermas
wrote (and co-signed with Derrida) a lengthy appeal to European citizens to unite in their
dissent of the Iraq War, and further to agree in concert to change national public policies,
to correspond with the international opposition to the American invasion of Iraq.274
Habermas hearkens to a theory of globalization, writing that such action could,
“…[S]upport the rejection of Eurocentrism, and inspire the Kantian hope for a global
domestic policy.”275 However, despite Habermas‟ growing sympathies to transnational
political action, this form of globalization still retains valences of the Eurocentric and
imperialistic world order he admonishes. If Habermas‟ goal is the inclusion of nonhegemonic world orders into the protections of international human rights, then why
make the appeal only to the countries of central Europe? As Iris Marion Young
convincingly argues:
I wonder, however, just how cosmopolitan is the stance taken in this statement [the original OpEd
as a whole]. From the point of view of the rest of the world, and especially from the point of view
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of the states and people in the global South, the philosophers‟ appeal may look more like a
recentering of Europe than the invocation of an inclusive global democracy. 276

For Young, Habermas seems to ground his theory of a new global order only through
European political action. In the article, Habermas argues that the possibility for an
emergent global domestic policy is supported by the simultaneous eruption of anti-war
protests across Europe:
But we should also remember February 15, 2003, as mass demonstrations in London and Rome,
Madrid and Barcelona, Berlin and Paris reacted to this sneak attack [the U.S. invasion of Iraq].
The simultaneity of these overwhelming demonstrations—the largest since the end of the Second
World War—may well, in hindsight, go down in history as a sign of the birth of a European public
sphere.277

Habermas‟ use of demonstrations as evidence for the emergence of this international,
albeit exclusively central European, public sphere is the important point for Young. As
Young points out, the important historical moment was not only taking place in Europe,
but across the world, with demonstrations from Mexico City to Johannesburg. More
importantly, for Young, however, is the fact that the evidence for the coordination of
these demonstrations appears to have taken place, not in Europe, but,
…[T]he worldwide coordination of these demonstrations was planned at the third meeting of the
World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2003. The worldwide coordination of these
demonstrations thus may signal the emergence of a global public sphere, of which European
publics are wings, but whose heart may lie in the southern hemisphere. 278

Habermas‟ lack of recognition for the importance of this council, and also for the general
importance of the southern hemisphere in establishing cosmopolitan democracy, is
troubling for Young. According to Young, is additionally symptomatic of another
Eurocentric and phallogocentric problem latent in Habermas‟ theory: he attempts to
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speak on behalf of others, rather than speaking with them.279 By arguing that the
unification of central European policy could be the sign of a new global world, Habermas
also makes the claim that such an agreement would act in proxy of the inclusion of other
interested national parties.
Communicative action seems to require explicit legislative intervention in order to
be effective. I suspect that one reason Habermas is forced into such a conservative
position, is the need for communicative action to rest on a sort of Enlightenment-era
notion of rationality and rational speech. By making his appeal through communicative
action, Habermas is relegated to normative understanding only within countries and
places with the same standards of rational communication and organization. This form of
rational speech lends itself to justification through legislation. Alternatively, the
communication of the form of solidarity which I am proposing is based on an
understanding of the psychological fact of mutual vulnerability.280 This commonality is
enough for the basic recognition required to identify shared interests and needs, which
then ground the action of solidarity. Solidarity can therefore be extraneous to all
governmental bodies and boundaries and grants legitimizing power based on interests,
not law or nationality.
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This understanding of solidarity, however, requires a synthetic understanding of arguments made by

Allen, Butler and Arendt. If, as a contemporary feminist philosopher, I merely took up Arendt‟s
formulation of solidarity, then it would have the same difficulties as Habermasian communicative action.
For Arendt, any political action is based in rational speech. But, as I addressed in chapter 5, this seems
problematic from an inclusionary feminist viewpoint. Therefore, keeping in mind the potential for
aesthetic political participation, as well as intercultural political action, I have adapted Arendt‟s theory with
a new grounding in a Butlerian theory of recognition.
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On an abstract-theoretical level, solidarity is rooted firmly in the present. Its goal
is not consensus formation and transformation in a Hegelian sense. Instead its goal is to
provide an outlet for immediate change, with an eye toward future possibilities for further
change. It is, centrally, a utopian political practice, oriented towards transfiguration.

The Psychological Foundations for Utopian Change
Habermas sees in the explorations of utopic ideals, the appeal to reason and
dialectic. He admires Marcuse‟s utopist vision, but less because it inspired revolution,
and more because of what it exposed in Marcuse‟s sensibilities, a romantic element
grounded firmly in a commitment to idealist notions of reason, i.e., Kant, and an
appreciation of history grounded firmly in Hegelian dialectics.281 Although it may be
argued that Habermas himself does not have this romantic edge, Habermas‟ account of
Marcuse is full of reverence and admiration for this quality. So much so, that Habermas‟
own tone begins to wax romantic. However, if Habermas identifies the core of
Marcuse‟s romanticism in Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity, it is certainly because
of his own predilection for these concepts. Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity
ground his theory of communication; they are what allow for rational consensus and even
the speech act situation. In this way, Habermas introduces a utopic moment to his theory.
He has hope for a future made better through democratic participation, wherein the norms
and values most helpful for all are rationally agreed to at the end of reasonable
communicative action. This utopist vision parallels the goals and ideals of many
“rebellious” thinkers, including many feminists whose critical optimism rests entirely in
281
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the hope for future change. Although Habermas and these feminist positions share many
of the same goals, the philosophical commitments are quite divergent. Whereas
Habermas is committed to a hard line notion of reason based argumentation culminating
in rational consensus in order to promote norms, which are themselves the utopian
promise, many feminists have a quite different grounding. Benhabib, for example, is
closest to Habermas, in that she argues that a commitment to universalist reason is
necessary for making appeals to betterment—without agreed upon notions of what good
and better are, how else can we achieve a better future? However, Benhabib is still
distinct from Habermas in that she recognizes that this idealist notion of reason is only
useful on a macro-level. In order to even come together for utopian change, Benhabib
contends that we must recognize the individual particularities that can never be subsumed
into one programmatic norm for society, but are always instead concrete and particular,
as I argued in Chapter 3. Utopic change can only arise when a balance is met between
the generalized and the concrete other. Here utopianism is grounded less on Hegelian
historicity and more on historically contingent and contextual psychologies. Drucilla
Cornell expands on these notions of historically contingent and contextual notions of
utopia. Like Benhabib, Cornell, believes that it is in the reflection of the other that utopia
is best understood. However, Cornell hearkens to Kant, Adorno, and Derrida to explore
how that otherness can be uncovered in the subject‟s own psyche. For Cornell, Kant
explains the internal notion of the other best by placing the ego, the act, and the time of
the act in relation to one another:
The form of interiority for a subject necessarily “in time” means not only that time is internal to us
but also that our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves; in this sense, it splits us in two,
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which is a splitting in two that never runs its course since time has no end for us as finite human
beings. We cannot know ourselves as free subjects in the sense of a theoretical knowledge..282

For Cornell, then, there is a sort of Kantian optimism for the possibility of a moral image.
Obviating the problems of cultural relativism and absolute heterogeneity, Cornell adapts
a Kantian theory of the internal subject/other relation. By grounding this relationship
within the human psyche, difference is a concept internal to us as human subjects.
Similarly, Cornell argues that the image of freedom itself emerges in our mind, as that
which we understand is already, and “how much it can itself become „other‟ from that
moment.”283 She synthesizes this political reading of the Kantian subject, with a reading
of Adorno, highlighting Adorno‟s charge that negativity and pessimism illuminates its
opposite: “So, even in Adorno the insistence that we must come to terms with the full
force of the internalization of how we have become subjected and the objects of a society
of total commodification, we do so not merely by holding on to consummate negativity
because in a sense that negativity can never be grasped or configured without another
standpoint.”284 For Cornell, then, first generation Critical Theory and postmodernism
have something in common with Kant, they require an internal psychological reflection.
On the other hand, as I explained in chapter 5, Cornell is less convinced than Habermas
or Benhabib that utopianism must be grounded on conceptual reason at all, where
conceptual implies a specific concept which is the object of reason. She contends that the
limits of reason are in fact the possibilities for change and the future; these possibilities
are what she identifies as the objects of “redemptive imagination.”285 We must be

282

Cornell. Moral Images of Freedom. p. 8.

283

Ibid.

284

Ibid.

285

Ibid., 35.

166

Kantian to be sure, but the Kant of the Third Critique, rather than the First or Second. In
this way, Cornell‟s optimism for the future is grounded on what has not yet come, a
hearkening to Derrida at his most political.
For my interests, it is this simultaneously aesthetic and political idea that gives
credibility toward a feminist relational ethics oriented towards emancipatory
transfiguration. By extending Cornell‟s conception of the “redemptive imaginary” to an
ethical imperative, we are able to reconfigure the terms of the tension between absolute
heterogeneity and homogeneity. By recasting the very framework for the discussion into
Kantian aesthetic and Derridean political terminology, the alternative emerges as a
“universality that respects the plurality of cultural forms and symbols as integral to the
moral demand put on us by the ideal of humanity itself.”286 I believe that Cornell‟s
theory emerges as a viable alternative, combining Benhabib‟s interest in the universal
utopian with Butler‟s demands for an ethics of respect for individual subjective
iteration.287 Additionally, Cornell‟s emphasis on the aesthetic and the imaginary appeals
to Allen‟s notion of solidarity, where she claims that feminist hopes for undoing
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believe she is arguing explicitly for such a synthesis. Instead, it is my position that Cornell‟s redemptive
imaginary can be read as a theory which combines these interests, one which I have been arguing
throughout is necessary as a feminist Critical Theoretical corrective to Habermasian theory. See also De
Beauvoir, Simone. The Ethics of Ambiguity. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. Seacaucus, NJ: The
Citadel Press, 1948. There she writes: “To put it positively, the precept will be to treat the other (to the
extent that he is the only one concerned, which is the moment that we are considering at present) as a
freedom so that his end may be freedom; in using this conducting-wire one will have to incur the risk, in
each case, of inventing an original solution.” p. 42. I believe that this position is quite similar to the one
Cornell explains, and for which I have been arguing for. It is not relativism that guides such ethical
behavior, but instead an openness to future possibility.
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patriarchal and hierarchal power relations are often best addressed through aesthetic,
narrative, and cultural change.

The Future of Critical Feminist Theory
Feminist philosophy, explicitly or implicitly, has always had critical predilections.
By combining the best parts of Habermasian Critical Theory with these impulses, an
innovative and adaptive Critical Theory of intersubjectivity and participation emerges.
Although I have outlined a position I feel a viable alternative and corrective to Habermas‟
normative and consensus-oriented limitations, I freely admit that this theory is neither
absolute nor permanent. In fact, in order to maintain the essential core of my argument
this theory must be adaptable and oriented to future change. As de Beauvoir elegantly
and succinctly explained at the birth of feminist philosophy, “The Other is multiple, and
on the basis of this new questions arise.”288 It is in her spirit that I open this work to
further critique and new critical engagements.
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